以地生财:地方政府土地行为与地方增长模式——一个序贯博弈均衡视角

发布时间：2018-04-27 04:29

本文选题：财政分权激励 + 官员晋升激励　；参考：《公共行政评论》2017年02期

【摘要】：论文通过构建一个序贯博弈均衡模型,重新审视了"以地生财"的地方增长模式的形成机理及其弊端,采用严谨的数理演绎方式发现:地方政府的土地财政策略、土地引资策略分别导致了商服用地高价格的城市化增长模式和工业用地低价格的工业化增长模式,并具体依据禀赋差异而呈现出区域发展分化的情形,即发达地区的城市中心城市化增长模式和城市郊区工业化增长模式,以及整个落后地区的城市化增长模式。在资本可以跨辖区跨行业自由流动时,这两种模式的激励效果和区域发展分化的差距均得以加剧和强化。这一结论旨在以前车之鉴为新常态下的土地供给侧改革提供逻辑机理的分析证据。
[Abstract]:By constructing a sequential game equilibrium model, this paper re-examines the formation mechanism and malpractice of the local growth model of "making money by land", and finds out that the land finance strategy of local government is rigorous and mathematical deduction. The strategy of land investment induces the urbanization growth model with high commercial land price and the industrialization growth model with low industrial land price respectively, and presents the situation of regional development differentiation according to the difference of endowment. That is, the urban center urbanization growth model, the urban suburb industrialization growth pattern, and the whole backward area urbanization growth pattern in the developed region. When capital can flow freely across jurisdictions and industries, the incentive effect of these two models and the gap between regional development and differentiation can be aggravated and strengthened. This conclusion aims to provide logical evidence for the land supply-side reform under the new normal condition.
【作者单位】：广东技术师范学院财经学院;华南理工大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点项目(15AGL003) 广东省哲学社会科学共建项目(GD16XGL07) 广东省软科学面上项目(2016A070705023) 广东技术师范学院博士科研启动项目(1722817)
【分类号】：F301;F127

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