金融分权影响经济增长和通胀吗——对中国式分权的一个补充讨论

发布时间：2018-05-28 04:13

本文选题：金融分权 + 财政分权　；参考：《财贸经济》2017年03期

【摘要】：财政分权和晋升激励向地方政府植入了为增长而竞争的基因,但这不足以解释中国地方政府对经济金融运行的影响为何远大于其他国家。我们认为,现有中国式分权的分析框架需考虑地方政府对金融杠杆的运用。本文研究发现,金融分权会加大通货膨胀和经济过热风险,从而促使中央政府紧缩调控。中央-地方财税关系在分税制改革相对固化后,中央政府更倾向于调整金融分权边界,以达到调控目的,从而使地方政府性债务增速逆经济周期变化。本文主要政策含义是:金融监管体制改革应统筹考虑建立双层金融监管体系,明确地方政府的金融管理职能,向地方政府金融放权作为逆周期调控手段的做法需要扭转。
[Abstract]:Fiscal decentralization and promotion incentives have implanted genes into local governments to compete for growth, but that is not enough to explain why local governments in China have so much more influence on economic and financial operations than other countries. We believe that the existing Chinese-style decentralized analytical framework needs to consider the use of financial leverage by local governments. This paper finds that decentralization of finance increases the risk of inflation and economic overheating, thus prompting the central government to tighten its control. After the relative solidification of the central-local fiscal and taxation relationship, the central government tends to adjust the boundary of financial decentralization to achieve the purpose of regulation and control, thus making the growth rate of local government debt reverse the economic cycle. The main policy implication of this paper is that the reform of financial supervision system should consider the establishment of a two-tier financial supervision system as a whole, clarify the financial management functions of local governments, and change the practice of devolving financial power to local governments as a counter-cyclical means of regulation and control.
【作者单位】：中国人民银行办公厅;中国人民银行上海总部国际部;
【基金】：中国金融四十人青年论坛专项课题上海领军人才队伍建设专项资金国家自然科学基金青年项目“混业经营背景下我国商业银行非利息业务发展及其影响研究”(71603085)
【分类号】：F124;F832.1

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