基于演化博弈的赣江流域生态补偿研究

发布时间：2018-06-02 01:11

本文选题：博弈 + 赣江　；参考：《企业经济》2017年09期

【摘要】：随着赣江流域生态环境的日益严峻,各利益方冲突加剧,因此不同区域了解他们的利益诉求和博弈策略,是进行高效生态补偿的关键。本文基于流域生态补偿的相关原则,确定了赣江流域生态补偿利益方,并根据"囚徒困境"博弈模型,分析了不同区域政府管理者之间、政府管理者与社区居民间生态补偿的选择过程。结果显示,在政府管理者之间的生态补偿博弈过程中,通过建立赔偿金制度,当赔偿金高于生态收益与保护成本的差值时,即政府管理者与社区居民间的生态补偿博弈是在赔偿金高于生态保护成本与内生收益的差值,就可以跳出"囚徒困境",实现流域生态补偿方选择生态补偿策略,受偿方选择环境保护策略,从而获得最佳的生态补偿效益。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly severe ecological environment of Ganjiang River basin, the conflicts between different stakeholders are becoming more and more serious. Therefore, understanding their interest demands and game strategies in different regions is the key to carry out efficient ecological compensation. Based on the relevant principles of watershed ecological compensation, this paper determines the benefit parties of Ganjiang river basin ecological compensation, and according to the "prisoner's dilemma" game model, analyzes the different regional government managers. The selection process of ecological compensation between government managers and community residents. The results show that in the process of ecological compensation game between government managers, when the compensation is higher than the difference between ecological income and protection cost, the compensation system is established. That is, the game of ecological compensation between government managers and community residents is the difference between the compensation cost and the endogenous income, which can jump out of the "prisoner's dilemma" and realize the ecological compensation strategy chosen by the ecological compensator in the watershed. The indemnified party chooses the environmental protection strategy, thus obtains the best ecological compensation benefit.
【作者单位】：东华理工大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“生态文明视角下赣南等原中央苏区江河流域生态补偿机制研究”(项目编号:14BJY026)
【分类号】：F127;X321

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