制度双元响应下中国海外投资企业高管权力与创新绩效的关系研究

发布时间：2018-06-27 03:39

本文选题：制度双元性 + 海外投资企业　；参考：《南京信息工程大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在经济全球化加速发展的背景下,企业为了在更大的市场范围内获取持续的竞争力,越来越多的发展中国家企业选择进行海外投资。引人瞩目的是,新兴经济国家企业对外投资发展速度正赶超发达国家,尤其是中国企业海外投资正进入加速阶段,中国已成为全球跨国企业投资的焦点。企业高管作为海外投资企业的投资战略决策的发行者与主要执行者,其理念和行为对企业生存与创新发展具有关键作用,他们是企业最为重要的资源,其人口统计学特征尤其是公司治理中的权力激励特征会对企业创新和外部风险认知偏好产生重要影响,进而影响其行为与企业创新绩效。鉴于当前中国企业海外投资所面临的机遇与挑战,即既有迫切的海外创新动力又面临跨国环境中的高度创新风险,因此,在国内制造企业走出去转型升级的新时期,探讨中国企业高管权力特征与企业海外创新绩效的关系具有重要的实践意义与学术价值。基于上述理论思路,本文以沪深A股市场中我国2001—2013年制造业海外投资企业为样本,借鉴组织控制理论的相关原理,将企业创新决策中的母国政治关联作为高管的重要创新动力、东道国制度环境作为高管的关键风险意识,对两者在高管权力配置与企业海外创新绩效之间的交互影响进行实证检验,并重点揭示了国有企业与民营企业在上述问题中的显著差异。基于分类治理背景,对制度双元性下的高管权力与企业海外创新绩效之间关系进行了研究。主要的研究发现:第一,无论是国有还是民营企业,董事会监控、高管任期总体上与企业海外创新绩效显著负相关;相对于国有企业,高管两职兼任对民营企业海外创新绩效有着更为显著的负面影响,而高管年薪的人力资本定价功能和股权比例的管理防御效应对民营企业海外创新绩效分别起着更为显著的积极与消极影响。第二,相对于国有企业,民营企业中的母国政治关联在两职兼任、董事会监管和海外创新绩效关系方面都发挥更显著的调节作用。其中,董事会监控力度会因母国政治关联中高管权力强化效应而得到增加,不利于企业海外创新绩效;两职兼任引发的管理防御效应对企业海外创新绩效的不利影响受到母国政治关联反向积极的调节作用;相对于民营企业,国有企业高管连任所产生的对企业海外创新绩效更为不利的特色影响受到了母国政治关联更为显著的反向调节作用。第三,无论是国有企业还是民营企业,东道国制度完善性在董事会监管、海外创新绩效和年薪报酬方面都有着显著的调节作用。其中,董事会监控的权力约束效应对企业海外创新绩效的不利影响因东道国制度完善而得到强化;高管年薪的人力资本定价功能对企业海外创新绩效的有利影响,受到东道国制度完善性的正向强化的积极作用。相对于民营企业,国有企业中高管连任所产生的对企业海外创新绩效更为不利的特色影响,被东道国制度环境完善性的创新支持作用反向调节后更为显著。
[Abstract]:In the context of accelerated economic globalization, more and more enterprises in developing countries choose to invest abroad in order to gain sustainable competitiveness in a larger market. The focus is that the development of foreign investment in emerging economic countries is catching up with the country, especially in China. China has become the focus of global investment in transnational enterprises. As the issuer and chief executive of investment strategic decision of overseas investment enterprises, the concept and behavior of enterprise executives play a key role in the survival and innovation of enterprises. They are the most important resources of the enterprise, and their demographic characteristics, especially corporate governance, are the most important. In view of the opportunities and challenges facing the overseas investment of Chinese enterprises, that is, both the urgent overseas innovation power and the high innovation risk in the transnational environment are faced with the opportunities and challenges facing the overseas investment of Chinese enterprises, therefore, it is made in China. It is of great practical significance and academic value to discuss the relationship between the characteristics of Chinese enterprises' executive power and the innovation performance of enterprises overseas. Based on the above theory, this paper takes the sample of the overseas investment enterprises in China's manufacturing industry from 2001 to 2013 in the A stock market in Shanghai and Shenzhen as a sample, drawing on the correlation of the theory of organizational control. The principle is that the political association of the parent country in the enterprise innovation decision is the important innovation motive of the executive, and the host country system environment is the key risk consciousness of the executive, and the interaction between the executive power allocation and the enterprise's overseas innovation performance is tested empirically, and the key points are revealed that the state-owned enterprises and the private enterprises are in the above problems. On the basis of Classified Governance background, the relationship between executive power and overseas innovation performance under institutional dual nature is studied. The main research results are as follows: first, the supervisory control of the state-owned or private enterprises and the board of directors is negatively related to the enterprise's overseas innovation performance; relative to the state-owned enterprises. The two position of senior executives has a more significant negative impact on the overseas innovation performance of private enterprises, while the human capital pricing function of the executive salary and the management defense effect of the share proportion have more significant positive and negative effects on the overseas innovation performance of private enterprises respectively. Second, relative to the state-owned enterprises, the home country of the private enterprises. Political relevance plays a more significant role in regulating the relationship between the two posts, the board supervision and the overseas innovation performance. Among them, the monitoring of the board of directors will be increased by the strengthening effect of the executive power in the country's political connection, which is not conducive to the enterprise's overseas innovation performance; the management defense effect caused by the two job is the innovation of the enterprise overseas. The negative impact of the performance is positively adjusted by the political relevance of the mother country; the more negative influence on the enterprise's overseas innovation performance relative to the continuous appointment of the state-owned enterprises relative to the private enterprises. Third, the state-owned enterprise or the private enterprise, the host country, and the host country. The perfection of the state system has a significant adjustment effect on the board of directors, the innovation performance overseas and the annual salary. Among them, the effect of the power constraint effect on the overseas innovation performance of the enterprise is strengthened by the improvement of the host country system; the human capital pricing function of the senior executive's annual salary has the innovation performance of the enterprise overseas. The favorable influence of the host country system is positively strengthened by the improvement of the host country system. Relative to the private enterprises, the senior executives in the state-owned enterprises have a more unfavorable influence on the enterprise's overseas innovation performance, and the innovation support role of the host country's institutional environment is more significant after the reverse regulation.
【学位授予单位】：南京信息工程大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F273.1;F125;F279.2

【参考文献】