政府审计的揭示效应和威慑效应对地方经济发展的影响
发布时间：2018-09-05 09:35
【摘要】：分权改革这一制度设计对于我国经济发展起到重要的作用。然而,我国分权改革机制重视激励忽视监督,存在一定的缺陷,随着经济体量的累积,制度上的激励将面临失效。特别是在2008年经济危机以后,分权改革制度缺陷浮出水面。国家经济发展速度下滑,但经济转型却尾大不掉。为此,近年来政府审计作为监督机制维护国家经济安全,拟补了分权改革的缺陷,促进经济发展。但是,由于理论发展的滞后,政府审计功能依然局限于监督。本文通过对中央分权和政府审计文献的梳理发现政府审计不仅可以在监督方面具有揭露效应,同时对于政府官员具有威慑力。与此同时,通过对比委托代理理论和威慑效应理论发现两者具有相似的性,以此发现政府审计的威慑效应。这是以往研究未有触及。因此,文章以分权改革为背景,结合委托代理理论和威慑效应理论,利用博弈模型分析了在经济分权的背景下,政府审计的揭示效应和威慑效应对地方经济的影响路径。并且利用2007-2014年的数据进行实证检验。实证结果发现,政府审计的威慑效应和揭示效应均对地方经济发展产生显著的影响。揭示效应在短期内对经济发展产生了负面影响,但这种负面影响是提高经济发展的合理性为前提,最终促进了经济的长期发展;而威慑效应对地方经济产生了显著的促进作用,而威慑效应时效性有一定的滞后,但威慑效应在中长期具有持续的影响力。这表明政府审计对于地方经济发展一方面通过揭示问题降低了经济风险,另一方面通过威慑力遏制地方政府的机会主义行为,提高长期的经济发展效益。
[Abstract]:The system design of decentralization reform plays an important role in the economic development of our country. However, China's decentralization mechanism attaches importance to incentives and neglects supervision, and there are some defects. With the accumulation of economic volume, institutional incentives will be faced with failure. Especially after the economic crisis in 2008, the system of decentralization reform defects surfaced. The national economy develops the speed to decline, but the economic transformation actually ends big. Therefore, in recent years, government audit, as a supervisory mechanism to safeguard national economic security, has made up for the defects of decentralization reform and promoted economic development. However, due to the lag of theoretical development, the function of government audit is still limited to supervision. By combing the documents of central decentralization and government audit, this paper finds that government audit can not only expose the effect of supervision, but also be a deterrent to government officials. At the same time, by comparing the principal-agent theory with the deterrent effect theory, the author finds that the two theories are similar, so as to find out the deterrent effect of government audit. This has not been touched upon in previous studies. Therefore, under the background of decentralization reform, combined with principal-agent theory and deterrent effect theory, this paper analyzes the influence of government audit on local economy under the background of economic decentralization by using game model. And using the 2007-2014 data for empirical testing. The empirical results show that both the deterrent effect and the revealing effect of government audit have a significant impact on the development of local economy. In the short term, however, the negative effect is the premise of improving the rationality of economic development, and ultimately promotes the long-term development of the economy, while the deterrent effect has a significant role in promoting the local economy. But the deterrent effect has lasting influence in the medium and long term. This indicates that the government audit can reduce the economic risk by revealing the problems on the one hand, and restrain the opportunistic behavior of the local government through deterrence on the other, so as to improve the long-term economic development benefit.
【学位授予单位】：广东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F239.44;F127
[Abstract]:The system design of decentralization reform plays an important role in the economic development of our country. However, China's decentralization mechanism attaches importance to incentives and neglects supervision, and there are some defects. With the accumulation of economic volume, institutional incentives will be faced with failure. Especially after the economic crisis in 2008, the system of decentralization reform defects surfaced. The national economy develops the speed to decline, but the economic transformation actually ends big. Therefore, in recent years, government audit, as a supervisory mechanism to safeguard national economic security, has made up for the defects of decentralization reform and promoted economic development. However, due to the lag of theoretical development, the function of government audit is still limited to supervision. By combing the documents of central decentralization and government audit, this paper finds that government audit can not only expose the effect of supervision, but also be a deterrent to government officials. At the same time, by comparing the principal-agent theory with the deterrent effect theory, the author finds that the two theories are similar, so as to find out the deterrent effect of government audit. This has not been touched upon in previous studies. Therefore, under the background of decentralization reform, combined with principal-agent theory and deterrent effect theory, this paper analyzes the influence of government audit on local economy under the background of economic decentralization by using game model. And using the 2007-2014 data for empirical testing. The empirical results show that both the deterrent effect and the revealing effect of government audit have a significant impact on the development of local economy. In the short term, however, the negative effect is the premise of improving the rationality of economic development, and ultimately promotes the long-term development of the economy, while the deterrent effect has a significant role in promoting the local economy. But the deterrent effect has lasting influence in the medium and long term. This indicates that the government audit can reduce the economic risk by revealing the problems on the one hand, and restrain the opportunistic behavior of the local government through deterrence on the other, so as to improve the long-term economic development benefit.
【学位授予单位】：广东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F239.44;F127
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相关期刊论文 前10条
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