地方政府竞争与产能过剩的理论与实证分析
发布时间：2018-09-11 17:09
【摘要】：自上世纪90年代我国首次出现产能过剩开始,我国已经经历了三次严重的产能过剩阶段,分别是上世纪90年代中后期、2003-2006年和2009年至今。过剩产能的范围也从最初的生活用品到生产资料,到最后甚至连光伏产业、多晶硅等新兴高科技产业也出现了严重的产能过剩,虽然中央政府多次下决心治理,但始终收效甚微,产能过剩问题已经成为了严重影响我国经济健康稳定发展的因素之一。 在我国产能过剩的不同阶段,由于产业政策、市场环境和国际局势有较大差异,因此影响产能利用情况的因素也有所不同,但是在所有这些因素当中,地方政府之间的竞争始终贯穿于我国产能过剩的各个阶段,并且在其中发挥着巨大的作用,而国内外文献对于此类问题的研究往往采用定性研究的方法,为此本文则在前人的基础上采用定性分析和定量分析相结合的方法,对地方政府之间的竞争导致我国产能过剩的机制进行全方位的分析。 本文通过建立一个关于地方政府和企业的简单经济学模型,地方政府向企业提供产能补贴,企业根据利润最大化原则制定生产计划,通过均衡分析可得参与竞争的地区和企业越多,政府提供的补贴成本越低,越容易出现产能过剩的情况。而这个结果也十分符合目前我国的实际情况。我国目前的财税体制和官员考核体制导致地方政府官员出于对地区经济利益和自身政治利益的考量,有着强烈的竞争意识,而竞争的焦点则主要集中在了对资本资源的争夺,因为资本资源可以在最大程度上转化为地方政府的财政收入和GDP,最终成为地方政府官员的政绩。而我国不清晰的土地产权、环境产权、银行预算软约束以及不完善的财政监管体制又为这种竞争提供了“廉价”的手段,地方政府通过这些手段向企业提供大量直接或者间接的补贴已达到获得投资,赢得地区竞争的目的。这种不符合市场规律的补贴严重扭曲了市场要素的价格,影响企业的投资决策,企业为了获取政府补贴而扩大投资规模,最终导致产能的过剩。 在实证分析中,本文采用数据包络分析的方法,定量的计算了2000年-2012年我国31个省(直辖市、自治区)国有及规模以上企业的产能利用情况,计算结果与我国产能过剩的阶段性特征相一致。并且利用面板数据对影响产能利用情 况的各个指标进行回归分析,结果显示,地方政府补贴与产能利用情况呈显著的负相关。 最后本文在理论和实证的基础上,提出对产能过剩问题的治理建议：首先从地方政府的动机入手,从源头上遏制产能过剩；其次从地方政府的手段入手,从技术上遏制产能过剩；最后从强化监管入手,防止产能过剩死灰复燃。
[Abstract]:Since the first overcapacity appeared in China in the 1990s, China has experienced three serious stages of overcapacity, from 2003 to 2006 and from 2009 to present, respectively, in the middle and late 1990s. The scope of excess capacity also ranges from the initial household necessities to the means of production, and finally even the photovoltaic industry, polysilicon and other emerging high-tech industries have also experienced serious overcapacity, although the central government has made up its mind to deal with it many times. However, the problem of overcapacity has become one of the factors seriously affecting the healthy and stable development of China's economy. At different stages of overcapacity in China, the market environment and the international situation are quite different because of industrial policies, so the factors affecting the utilization of production capacity are different, but among all these factors, The competition among local governments is always running through every stage of overcapacity in our country, and plays a great role in it. However, the domestic and foreign literature often adopt the qualitative research method to study this kind of problem. On the basis of the previous studies, this paper uses the method of qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis to analyze the mechanism of local government competition which leads to overcapacity in our country. Through the establishment of a simple economic model about local government and enterprise, the local government provides the production capacity subsidy to the enterprise, and the enterprise formulates the production plan according to the principle of profit maximization. Through balanced analysis, the more competitive regions and enterprises, the lower the cost of subsidies provided by the government, and the more prone to overcapacity. And this result also accords with the actual situation of our country very much at present. The current fiscal and taxation system and the official assessment system in our country have led local government officials to have a strong sense of competition for their regional economic interests and their own political interests, and the focus of the competition is mainly on the competition for capital resources. Because capital resources can be translated to the maximum extent into local government revenue and GDP, finally become the achievements of local government officials. However, the lack of clear land property rights, environmental property rights, soft bank budget constraints and imperfect financial supervision system provide a "cheap" means for this kind of competition. Through these means, local governments provide a large number of direct or indirect subsidies to enterprises to achieve the goal of obtaining investment and winning regional competition. This kind of subsidy which does not conform to the market law seriously distorts the price of market elements and affects the investment decision of enterprises. In order to obtain government subsidies the enterprises expand their investment scale and eventually lead to excess capacity. In the empirical analysis, this paper uses the method of data envelopment analysis to quantitatively calculate the capacity utilization of state-owned enterprises in 31 provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) in China from 2000 to 2012. The calculated results are consistent with the stage characteristics of overcapacity in China. The results show that local government subsidies have a significant negative correlation with productivity use. Finally, on the basis of theory and practice, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to deal with the problem of overcapacity: firstly, starting with the motivation of local government, then curbing overcapacity from the source; secondly, starting with the means of local government. Technology to curb overcapacity, and finally to strengthen regulation to prevent the recurrence of overcapacity.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;F124;D630
本文编号：2237322
[Abstract]:Since the first overcapacity appeared in China in the 1990s, China has experienced three serious stages of overcapacity, from 2003 to 2006 and from 2009 to present, respectively, in the middle and late 1990s. The scope of excess capacity also ranges from the initial household necessities to the means of production, and finally even the photovoltaic industry, polysilicon and other emerging high-tech industries have also experienced serious overcapacity, although the central government has made up its mind to deal with it many times. However, the problem of overcapacity has become one of the factors seriously affecting the healthy and stable development of China's economy. At different stages of overcapacity in China, the market environment and the international situation are quite different because of industrial policies, so the factors affecting the utilization of production capacity are different, but among all these factors, The competition among local governments is always running through every stage of overcapacity in our country, and plays a great role in it. However, the domestic and foreign literature often adopt the qualitative research method to study this kind of problem. On the basis of the previous studies, this paper uses the method of qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis to analyze the mechanism of local government competition which leads to overcapacity in our country. Through the establishment of a simple economic model about local government and enterprise, the local government provides the production capacity subsidy to the enterprise, and the enterprise formulates the production plan according to the principle of profit maximization. Through balanced analysis, the more competitive regions and enterprises, the lower the cost of subsidies provided by the government, and the more prone to overcapacity. And this result also accords with the actual situation of our country very much at present. The current fiscal and taxation system and the official assessment system in our country have led local government officials to have a strong sense of competition for their regional economic interests and their own political interests, and the focus of the competition is mainly on the competition for capital resources. Because capital resources can be translated to the maximum extent into local government revenue and GDP, finally become the achievements of local government officials. However, the lack of clear land property rights, environmental property rights, soft bank budget constraints and imperfect financial supervision system provide a "cheap" means for this kind of competition. Through these means, local governments provide a large number of direct or indirect subsidies to enterprises to achieve the goal of obtaining investment and winning regional competition. This kind of subsidy which does not conform to the market law seriously distorts the price of market elements and affects the investment decision of enterprises. In order to obtain government subsidies the enterprises expand their investment scale and eventually lead to excess capacity. In the empirical analysis, this paper uses the method of data envelopment analysis to quantitatively calculate the capacity utilization of state-owned enterprises in 31 provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) in China from 2000 to 2012. The calculated results are consistent with the stage characteristics of overcapacity in China. The results show that local government subsidies have a significant negative correlation with productivity use. Finally, on the basis of theory and practice, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to deal with the problem of overcapacity: firstly, starting with the motivation of local government, then curbing overcapacity from the source; secondly, starting with the means of local government. Technology to curb overcapacity, and finally to strengthen regulation to prevent the recurrence of overcapacity.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;F124;D630
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