利益铁三角:地方发展型政府的行为逻辑及其影响

发布时间：2019-01-07 12:44

【摘要】：本文在公共选择理论框架下,阐释了地方发展型政府的行为逻辑,力图对地方政府在追求经济增长过程中与中央政府、企业、城市居民、商业银行所结成的"利益铁三角"和"超级利益铁三角"进行深入剖析,并对其负面影响进行归纳总结。地方政府主导下的"利益铁三角"是以政治利益、经济利益和寻租利益为代表的地方自我理性最大化的行为逻辑和表现,贯穿于地方初级政治市场、地方政策供给市场和地方政策执行市场,其结果是地方政府的非合意性和对国家治理现代化的现实梗阻。而现有的中央政府治官权下的"以官治官"机制凸显了对治理地方政府的有效体制机制欠缺的问题,因此,应加快完善治理地方政府及官员的各种制度约束机制,突破单纯"以官治官"的弊端,从而打造更加合意和守规的地方政府。
[Abstract]:Under the framework of public choice theory, this paper explains the behavioral logic of local development-oriented government, and tries hard to analyze the behavior of local government with central government, enterprises and urban residents in the process of pursuing economic growth. The "benefit iron triangle" and "super interest iron triangle" formed by commercial banks are analyzed in depth, and their negative effects are summarized. The "benefit iron triangle" led by local government is the behavior logic and performance of maximization of local self-rationality represented by political interests, economic interests and rent-seeking interests, which runs through the local primary political market. The local policy supplies the market and the local policy executive market, the result is the local government's non-agreement and the realistic obstruction to the modernization of the country's governance. However, the existing mechanism of "governing officials by officials" under the authority of the central government highlights the lack of effective institutional mechanisms for governing local governments. Therefore, it is necessary to speed up the improvement of various institutional restraint mechanisms for governing local governments and officials. To break through the malpractice of "governing officials by officials", and thus to create more suitable and obedient local governments.
【作者单位】：山东大学商学院;南京邮电大学经济学院;
【基金】：2015年度国家自然科学基金面上项目《资本化效应、土地财政与地方公共品提供:因“地”而异的中国式分权》(71573160) 2016年度江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目《江苏省公共服务均等化测度与实现路径研究:基于新型城镇化与财政分权的视角》(2016SJB790001) 2013年度南京邮电大学人文社会科学基金项目《中国省级公共投资区域效应:差异化与均等化》(NYS213006)
【分类号】：F127;D630

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