审计合谋成因与对策分析

发布时间：2018-06-23 18:23

本文选题：审计 + 审计合谋　；参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2007年硕士论文

【摘要】： 注册会计师的审计鉴证功能,是现代资本市场正常运转的重要基石之一,注册会计师独立性的保持更是其发挥鉴证功能的基本前提。但是近年来发生的财务报告舞弊案件,很多都牵涉到注册会计师的审计合谋问题。审计合谋是一种不正常的经济现象,它的存在对我国市场经济的发展造成很严重的危害,同时也严重损害了我国会计师事务所形象。笔者希望通过对我国审计合谋现象的研究,能够提供一点对审计合谋防范和治理有价值的建议。本文试图结合我国的制度、环境等非经济因素,从经济学的角度,运用博弈分析的方法,考察审计市场中合谋双方的预期合谋利益、合谋成本,分析双方趋利避害的行为选择,揭示审计合谋的形成机制,进而提出通过整治外部社会法律环境、完善创新现有制度等途径来改变审计合谋双方的预期和行为选择,从而达到防范、治理审计合谋行为的目的。文章首先介绍了文章的研究背景以及选题的意义,对中外学者以往的研究情况进行了回顾,通过学习、借鉴国内外专家、学者以往的研究成果,阐述了审计合谋的内涵和审计合谋行为形成的理论机理,并结合中国审计市场的当前现状,归纳了审计合谋的特性。通过收集、整理、比较近几年审计署、证监会等监管机构公布的处罚公告,简要介绍了审计合谋行为在我国的现状,揭示了我国审计市场中目前存在的问题。通过对一个典型审计合谋案例的说明与分析,指出了审计合谋行为产生的原因是多方面的,既有外部制度环境等因素的影响,也有内部利益驱动原因。由此区分制度环境以及利益驱动等不同方面深入考察了审计合谋行为的形成机制。在分析利益驱动原因部分,为了能够深入分析利益的取舍以及审计市场双方趋利避害的行为选择,采取了处理此类问题比较通用的作法,即运用博弈分析的方法,通过建立符合中国审计市场特点的博弈矩阵并对其进行分析,考察双方的预期合谋利益、合谋成本,希望在此基础上找到治理审计合谋的有效措施。通过对审计合谋行为产生机制的分析,有针对性的提出了对审计合谋行为的治理意见,其中既包括为鼓励和保证良好审计业务质量而应当采取的积极对策与措施,也包括为抑制审计合谋行为发生所应当采取的惩治对策与措施。
[Abstract]:The audit verification function of CPA is one of the important cornerstones of the normal operation of the modern capital market, and the maintenance of the independence of CPA is the basic premise of its function of authentication. However, in recent years, many of the financial reporting fraud cases involve the audit collusion of CPA. Audit collusion is a kind of abnormal economic phenomenon, its existence causes very serious harm to the development of market economy of our country, at the same time, it also seriously damages the image of the accounting firm of our country. The author hopes to provide some valuable suggestions for the prevention and management of audit collusion by studying the phenomenon of audit collusion in China. This paper attempts to combine the system, environment and other non-economic factors of our country, from the angle of economics, using the method of game analysis, to investigate the expected collusion benefit and collusion cost of both sides in the audit market, and to analyze the behavior choice of both sides to seek profit and avoid harm. This paper reveals the forming mechanism of audit collusion, and then puts forward to change the expectation and behavior choice of both sides of audit collusion by renovating the external social legal environment and perfecting and innovating the existing system, so as to achieve the purpose of preventing and managing audit collusion. The article first introduces the research background and the significance of the topic, reviews the past research situation of Chinese and foreign scholars, and draws lessons from the previous research results of domestic and foreign experts and scholars. This paper expounds the connotation of audit collusion and the theoretical mechanism of the formation of audit collusion, and sums up the characteristics of audit collusion combined with the current situation of audit market in China. By collecting, sorting out and comparing the punishment announcements issued by the Audit Office and the Securities Regulatory Commission in recent years, this paper briefly introduces the present situation of audit collusion in China, and reveals the problems existing in the audit market in our country. Through the explanation and analysis of a typical audit collusion case, it is pointed out that the causes of audit collusion are various, both the influence of external institutional environment and the internal interest driven reason. The formation mechanism of audit collusion is investigated from different aspects, such as institutional environment and interest drive. In the part of analyzing the reasons of interest driving, in order to analyze the choice of interests and the behavior choice of both sides of audit market, we adopt the general method to deal with this kind of problem, that is, using the method of game analysis. By establishing and analyzing the game matrix in accordance with the characteristics of China's audit market, the paper investigates the expected collusion interests and collusion costs of both sides, and hopes to find effective measures to govern audit collusion on this basis. Based on the analysis of the mechanism of audit collusion, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the governance of audit collusion, including the positive countermeasures and measures to encourage and guarantee the good audit quality. It also includes the countermeasures and measures that should be taken to curb the occurrence of audit collusion.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F239.4

【引证文献】