家族控制、审计监督与公司治理——基于年报补充更正视角的经验证据

发布时间：2019-04-16 16:22

【摘要】：本文基于上市公司年报补充更正的独特视角,深入考察家族控制、审计监督的公司治理效应。研究发现:(1)与非家族上市公司相比,家族上市公司发生年报补充更正的可能性较高;(2)聘任高质量审计师以及获得标准审计意见的上市公司发生年报补充更正的可能性较低;(3)高质量审计师和审计意见在非家族上市公司中更能够揭示财务报告的风险;(4)与非家族上市公司相比,家族上市公司更不愿意聘任高质量审计师,而且更有可能获得"非标"审计意见。上述发现表明,在我国,家族控制并未发挥明显的治理效应,而审计监督则扮演了积极的公司治理角色。进一步地,审计作为一种外部公司治理机制,其治理效应的发挥在很大程度上受公司控制权这种内部公司治理机制的影响。
[Abstract]:Based on the unique angle of supplement correction of listed companies' annual reports, this paper investigates the corporate governance effects of family control and audit supervision. It is found that: (1) compared with non-family listed companies, family listed companies have a higher probability of annual report supplement correction; (2) High-quality auditors and listed companies with standard audit opinions are less likely to have supplementary corrections to their annual reports; (3) High-quality auditors and audit opinions are more likely to reveal the risks of financial reporting in non-family listed companies; (4) compared with non-family listed companies, family listed companies are less willing to employ high-quality auditors, and are more likely to obtain "non-standard" audit opinions. These findings indicate that family control does not play a significant role in governance in China, while audit supervision plays an active role in corporate governance. Further, audit as an external corporate governance mechanism, its governance effect is largely influenced by the internal corporate governance mechanism of corporate control.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地基金项目“上市公司财务信息披露质量研究”(07JJD630009) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-06-0565) 教育部人文社科青年项目“公司透明度评价体系与治理机制研究”(08JC630073)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F276.6;F239.4

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