股权激励与外部审计需求的关系研究
发布时间：2019-04-26 14:56
【摘要】：本文根据代理理论框架,基于2010~2015年沪深两市A股上市公司的经验数据,首先从产权性质角度实证分析发现:股权激励与外部审计需求之间存在替代关系,而这种关系在非国有控股企业中更为显著。然后再分别从股权激励实施强度和激励方式两方面入手,进一步细化股权激励与外部审计需求的内部关系,研究发现:股权激励实施强度与外部审计需求呈显著的负相关关系;选择股票期权激励方式的上市公司会增加对高质量外部审计的需求,而选择限制性股票激励方式的上市公司会降低对高质量外部审计的需求。
[Abstract]:Based on the empirical data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2010 and 2015, based on the framework of agency theory, this paper first empirically analyzes the nature of property rights and finds that there is an alternative relationship between equity incentive and external audit demand. And this relationship is more significant in non-state-owned holding enterprises. Then the internal relationship between equity incentive and external audit demand is further refined from the two aspects of the implementation intensity and incentive mode of equity incentive. It is found that there is a significant negative correlation between the implementation intensity of equity incentive and external audit demand; The listed companies that choose the incentive mode of stock option will increase the demand for high-quality external audit, while the listed companies that choose the restricted stock incentive mode will reduce the demand for high-quality external audit.
【作者单位】： 四川师范大学商学院;
【分类号】：F272.92;F239.4
[Abstract]:Based on the empirical data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2010 and 2015, based on the framework of agency theory, this paper first empirically analyzes the nature of property rights and finds that there is an alternative relationship between equity incentive and external audit demand. And this relationship is more significant in non-state-owned holding enterprises. Then the internal relationship between equity incentive and external audit demand is further refined from the two aspects of the implementation intensity and incentive mode of equity incentive. It is found that there is a significant negative correlation between the implementation intensity of equity incentive and external audit demand; The listed companies that choose the incentive mode of stock option will increase the demand for high-quality external audit, while the listed companies that choose the restricted stock incentive mode will reduce the demand for high-quality external audit.
【作者单位】： 四川师范大学商学院;
【分类号】：F272.92;F239.4
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