减税激励、研发操纵与研发绩效

发布时间：2018-01-29 01:20

  本文关键词： 高新技术企业认定 产业政策 法规门槛 研发操纵 研发绩效　出处：《经济研究》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：张维迎和林毅夫就"政府是否应该制定产业政策"展开了激烈争论。与他们从较为宏观的视角分析不同,本文利用《高新技术企业认定管理办法》确立的公司研发投入占销售收入之比这一"一刀切"的微观认定门槛,研究公司是否会操纵研发投入以满足相关标准。研究发现,研发收入之比的分布在法规门槛附近不连续,这确认了公司研发操纵行为的存在。基于分布不连续特征定义的研发操纵公司获得了更多的税收优惠和政府补助。进一步地,研发操纵现象在民营企业、盈利企业以及位于税收征管力度较弱地区的企业中更为显著,且研发操纵公司的研发投入与公司未来发明专利申请、发明专利授权数量间的正相关关系更弱。研究表明,与政策制定者的初衷不同,研发激励政策会激励公司进行研发操纵,最终导致公司研发绩效下降。本文不仅为产业政策引发的激励扭曲效应提供了微观证据,还为更好地制定和执行高新技术企业认定政策提供了理论参考。
[Abstract]:Zhang Weiying and Lin Yifu have launched a heated debate on whether the government should formulate industrial policies, which is different from their analysis from a more macroscopic perspective. This article uses the "high-tech enterprise identification management" established by the company R & D investment in sales revenue this "one-size-fits-all" micro-recognition threshold. The study found that the ratio of R & D revenues was distributed discontinuous near the regulatory threshold. This confirms the existence of R & D manipulation. Based on the definition of distributed discontinuity, R & D manipulation companies get more tax incentives and government subsidies. Further, R & D manipulation phenomenon in private enterprises. Profit enterprises and enterprises located in weak tax collection and management areas are more significant, and R & D manipulation company R & D investment and the company's future invention patent application. Research shows that, unlike the original intention of policy makers, R & D incentive policy can encourage companies to manipulate R & D. This paper not only provides microcosmic evidence for the incentive and distortion effect caused by industrial policy, but also provides a theoretical reference for better formulation and implementation of high-tech enterprise identification policy.
【作者单位】： 中南财经政法大学会计学院;首都经济贸易大学会计学院;华东政法大学国际金融法律学院;中欧国际工商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402054)、国家自然科学基金项目(71372203) 教育部人文社科基金青年项目(17YJC790186) 博士后科学基金第八批特别资助(2015T80421)支持
【分类号】：F273.1;F812.42
【正文快照】： *杨国超,中南财经政法大学会计学院,邮政编码:430073,电子信箱:yang.guochao@outlook.com;刘静,首都经济贸易大学会计学院,邮政编码:100070,电子信箱:wenmu9@163.com;廉鹏,华东政法大学国际金融法律学院,邮政编码:201620,电子信箱:lianpeng82@gmail.com;芮萌,中欧国际工商学院，

本文编号：1472101