带有规制的员工薪酬合同设计

发布时间：2018-01-31 20:49

本文关键词： 规制试用期匹配最低工资委托代理　出处：《天津大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：薪酬问题是现代企业人力资源管理的核心问题,关系到企业自身的生产效率及其在市场上的竞争优势.薪酬问题也是社会问题,关系到一个国家或地区生产消费的均衡、关系到社会公平甚至社会稳定.政府会在薪酬制定方面对企业加以规制.研究政府规制下薪酬制定问题对现代社会来说有着非常重要的意义.基于搜寻匹配理论和委托代理理论,本文研究了在政府规制下,试用期工资和最低工资对薪酬的影响问题.本文的主要内容如下:研究试用期工资对失业和议价工资的影响.建立了带有试用期的搜寻匹配模型.在试用期阶段企业按照政府规定的试用期标准支付给员工工资.在正式录用阶段,员工的工资由企业和员工通过议价形成.得到了混合均衡和分离均衡两类稳态均衡.通过与没有试用期的匹配模型比较,发现试用期的引入在降低失业率的同时也降低了员工的议价工资.对试用期工资的比较静态分析表明随着试用期工资的增加失业率会上升,员工的议价工资也会增加.研究非对称信息下具有最低工资标准的企业薪酬合同设计问题.分别建立了完全信息、努力不可观测和非对称能力信息情形下带有最低工资约束的工资激励机制模型.利用委托代理理论,得到了三种情形下最优的薪酬合同.分析了最低工资对最优合同的影响.探讨了最低工资的引入对企业利润和社会福利的影响.结论表明最低工资标准比较高时,最低工资的引入降低了企业利润和社会福利.研究双重非对称信息下具有最低工资标准的企业薪酬合同设计问题.建立了双重非对称信息下带有最低工资约束的薪酬激励模型.基于委托代理理论得到了最优的薪酬合同.分析了最低工资的引入对最优合同、企业利润、员工效用和社会福利的影响.结论表明最低工资标准比较高时,最低工资的引入降低了企业利润,对企业是不利的;最低工资的引入既增加了高类型员工的效用也增加了其工资;只能增加低类型员工的工资而不能增加其效用,这对员工有利.但在某些情况下最低工资的引入能增加社会福利.
[Abstract]:Compensation is the core of modern enterprise human resource management, which is related to the production efficiency of the enterprise and its competitive advantage in the market. The compensation problem is also a social problem. It is related to the balance of production and consumption in a country or region. The government will regulate the enterprise in the aspect of salary making. It is very important for modern society to study the problem of salary establishment under government regulation. Based on search and match theory, it is very important to study the problem of salary establishment in modern society. And principal-agent theory. This article has studied under the government regulation. The effect of probationary period wage and minimum wage on salary. The main contents of this paper are as follows:. This paper studies the effect of probation wage on unemployment and bargaining wage. A search matching model with probationary period is established. During the probation period, the enterprise pays the employee wages according to the standard of probation period set by the government. . Employees' wages are formed by bargaining between enterprises and employees. Two kinds of steady-state equilibrium, mixed equilibrium and separated equilibrium, are obtained and compared with the matching model without probationary period. It is found that the introduction of probationary period not only reduces the unemployment rate but also reduces the bargaining wage of employees. The comparative static analysis of probationary wage shows that the unemployment rate will rise with the increase of probation wage. The bargaining wage of employees will also increase. This paper studies the design of the minimum wage contract with minimum wage standard under asymmetric information and establishes the complete information respectively. In the case of unobservable and asymmetric ability information, the model of wage incentive mechanism with minimum wage constraint is established. The principal-agent theory is used. The influence of minimum wage on the optimal contract is analyzed. The influence of the introduction of minimum wage on enterprise profit and social welfare is discussed. The conclusion is drawn that the minimum wage is higher when the minimum wage is higher. . The introduction of minimum wage reduces the profit and social welfare of the enterprise. This paper studies the design of the minimum wage contract with minimum wage under the double asymmetric information. The minimum wage constraint under the double asymmetric information is established. Based on the principal-agent theory, the optimal salary contract is obtained, and the introduction of minimum wage to the optimal contract is analyzed. The conclusion shows that when the minimum wage is relatively high, the introduction of the minimum wage reduces the profit of the enterprise, which is disadvantageous to the enterprise; The introduction of minimum wage not only increases the utility of high type of employees, but also increases their wages; It is good for the employee to increase the wage of the low type of employee, but in some cases the introduction of the minimum wage can increase the social welfare.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F272.92

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