剩余控制权的侵占与保护——以国美公司内部控制权争夺为例

发布时间：2018-02-06 02:13

本文关键词： 人力资本专用性剩余控制权产权保护内部人控制敲竹杠　出处：《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在现代公司产权结构下,委托代理关系的主要矛盾之一是对公司控制权的争夺或者说是对公司控制权的监督。在控制权失控和监督不力的情况下,具有物质资本专用性投资的大股东或创始人及其具有专用性人力资本投资的管理层将出现相互敲竹杠以及侵占对方利益的可能性。国美公司内部创始人股东和CEO之间对剩余控制权的争夺及其管理层引入的外部不可更改的投资条款方案较好地诠释了这一点。文章通过修正Holmstrom-Milgrom模型,讨论国美集团企业内部的产权结构安排的效率问题,得出了合理的公司制度可以有效保护委托人财产权利的结论。该结论说明,提高代理人分享的剩余利益有利于降低专用性人力资本敲竹杠的可能性;股权制度安排应该遵循剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对应的原则。
[Abstract]:Under the structure of modern company property right, one of the principal contradictions of principal-agent relationship is the struggle for corporate control or the supervision of corporate control. Large shareholders or founders with material capital-specific investments and the management of special-purpose human capital investments will have the possibility of ripping off each other and encroaching on each other's interests. The contention for residual control between EOs and the external irrevocable investment clause scheme introduced by the management well explain this point. This paper modifies the Holmstrom-Milgrom model. This paper discusses the efficiency of property right structure arrangement in Gome Group, and draws a conclusion that reasonable company system can effectively protect the property rights of clients. Increasing the residual benefits shared by agents is conducive to reducing the possibility of special human capital extortion; The arrangement of equity system should follow the principle that residual claim and residual right of control correspond to each other.
【作者单位】：东北财经大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“特许经营合约中的准租金挤占和治理研究”(71272053)
【分类号】：F275

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