母子公司间业务分布与子公司多元化对高管薪酬激励的影响

发布时间：2018-02-10 20:40

本文关键词： 母子公司间业务分布子公司多元化高管薪酬激励　出处：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股东与董事会依据高管行动产出来激励高管,并以业绩作为基础设计薪酬契约。依据最优薪酬契约理论中激励强度原则,薪酬水平与薪酬-业绩挂钩程度取决于高管努力对业绩的边际贡献与业绩偏离高管真实努力程度的大小(Milgrom and Roberts,1992;张维迎,2014)。根据信息量原则,应将能够反映高管努力与才能信息的业绩与非业绩指标纳入薪酬契约(Holmstrom,1979;Taylor,2013)。面对上市公司中普遍存在的业务下沉子公司与子公司多元化的情况,现有关于高管薪酬激励的研究多是基于整体合并业绩进行的,并未考虑不同母子公司间业务分布与子公司多元化因素导致的合并业绩内在来源的差异,以及由此导致的激励机理差异。当业务主要分布在子公司的情况下,虽然上市公司高管仍需要对整体经营负责,但业绩一部分取决于子公司自身努力(陆正飞、张会丽,2010)。在这种情况下,高管努力对合并业绩所能施加的影响有限。不同的母子公司间业务分布下,高管薪酬契约中高管努力对业绩的边际贡献与业绩偏离高管努力程度存在差异。同时,子公司多元化经营使得上市公司高管面对的业务跨多个行业与地区,对高管才能的要求与高管所需付出的努力更多。高管薪酬契约若未将母子公司间业务分布与子公司多元化纳入,将导致激励基础与高管的才能与努力不匹配,进而降低高管薪酬激励的有效性。本文按照母子公司间业务的规模分布与子公司多元化的不同情况将高管薪酬激励基础展开,分析由此带来的业绩来源、高管努力与才能信息等差异,主要采用大样本实证研究方法,并选取高管薪酬水平模型与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性模型,研究了母子公司间业务的分布与子公司多元化对高管薪酬激励的影响。研究发现:(1)子公司业务比重越高,高管薪酬水平越高。当业务主要分布在子公司时,具有更低的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性;(2)子公司行业与地区多元化程度越高,高管薪酬水平越高。相比于子公司行业与地区多元化程度较低时,子公司行业与地区多元化程度较高时,具有更高的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性;(3)综合考虑母子公司间业务分布与子公司多元化对高管薪酬激励的影响,业务下沉子公司加强了子公司多元化程度对高管薪酬激励的影响。扩展研究发现:(1)相比于民营上市公司,国有上市公司中子公司业务比重、子公司行业多元化与子公司地区多元化对高管薪酬水平的正向影响更大;(2)区分高管股权激励存在与否,研究业务分布与子公司多元化对高管薪酬激励的影响时发现:高管股权激励在一定程度上对高管薪酬激励具有削弱与替代作用。本文为基于母子公司间业务的纵向规模分布与横向行业与地区布局视角的上市公司高管薪酬激励研究提供了参考。
[Abstract]:The shareholders and the board of directors in accordance with executive action produced incentive executives, and performance as the basis for the design of compensation contract. On the basis of the principle of incentive intensity theory of optimal compensation contract, salary level and salary - performance depends on the marginal contribution and performance to executives on the performance of the deviation from the true effort degree of executives (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Zhang Weiying, 2014). According to the principle of information quantity, the index can reflect the information to executives efforts and performance and non performance in compensation contracts (Holmstrom, 1979; Taylor, 2013). In the face of widespread listed companies in the business of sinking sub company and the subsidiary company diversified situation, the existing research on executive compensation incentive how is the overall merger based on performance, did not consider the difference in the different sources of lead between the parent company and subsidiary business distribution and diversified factors combined results in ISO, and the incentive mechanism of the resulting difference. When the business is mainly distributed in the sub company, although the executives of listed companies still need to be responsible for the overall operation, but the performance depends in part on a subsidiary's own efforts (Lu Zhengfei, Zhang Huili, 2010). In this case, executives can be applied to the combined results the parent company limited. Between different business distribution, executive compensation contract executives trying to marginal contribution and performance on the performance of the different from executives trying to degree difference. At the same time, a subsidiary of the diversification of the listed companies in the face of high tube business across multiple industries and areas, to the requirements on executive and executive pay required more effort. Executive compensation contract if not the business between the parent company and subsidiary company diversified into distribution, will lead to efforts and incentive based and executives do not match, and reduce the high Effective salary incentive. According to different size distribution and between parent company and subsidiaries of the diversification of the business will be the executive compensation incentive basis, analysis of the resulting source of performance differences, and to executives trying to information, mainly by the large sample empirical research methods, and selected the level of executive compensation and executive compensation model performance sensitivity model, to study the influence between the parent company and the subsidiary company of diversified business distribution of executive compensation incentive. The study found that: (1) the proportion of subsidiary business is higher, higher levels of executive compensation. When the business is mainly distributed in the subsidiary, has a lower pay performance sensitivity; (2) more the high degree of industry and regional diversification subsidiary, executive compensation level is higher. Compared to the degree of industry and regional diversification subsidiary is low, subsidiary industry and regional diversification degree That has a higher pay performance sensitivity; (3) considering the parent company and the subsidiary company of diversified business distribution effects of executive pay incentives, business sink subsidiary to strengthen the effect of the sub degree of diversification of executive compensation incentive. Extensive research has found that: (1) compared to the private listed companies, the proportion of state-owned the listed company neutron business, subsidiary and subsidiary diversified industry area diversification positive influence on the level of executive pay more; (2) to distinguish between executive equity incentive exists or not, the research found the business distribution and subsidiary diversified effect on executive compensation incentive: to a certain extent to the executive compensation incentive is weakening and substitution the role of equity incentive for executives. In this paper, from the perspective of vertical scale distribution between the parent company and the business and industry and the layout of the lateral area of listed company executives pay incentives based on the research The reference is provided.

【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92

【参考文献】