核心企业参与的中小企业应收账款融资模型研究

发布时间：2018-02-11 00:34

本文关键词： 斯坦克尔伯格博弈应收账款融资核心企业三方博弈　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：银行等融资机构借助供应链核心企业,开展供应链金融业务,对于缓解中小企业融资困境起到了积极的作用。以应收账款为抵押的融资业务如果只有贷款企业与银行,那么银行方将承担巨大的风险;核心企业的参与,将银行的投资风险部分转移到了核心企业身上,降低了银行的风险,成员企业也将更加容易的获得贷款这有利于供应链的整体优化,最终会惠及广大的中小企业,也有利于核心企业自己的利益,从而取得了三方共赢。本文首先介绍了供应链应收账款的研究现状,说明了现有应收账款模式存在的问题,进一步梳理了供应链金融的相关理论基础与方法,明确了选题意义。在此基础上,选取斯坦克尔伯格博弈分析方法,通过建模分析了传统应收账款模式有关企业和银行的两者之间的利益博弈。接着再运用斯坦克尔伯格博弈建立银行、成员企业、核心企业之间的两两博弈模型,通过逆向求解分别得到了各方的均衡条件,揭示了影响银行贷款率和企业守约率的相关的影响因素;再通过银行、成员企业、核心企业三方的联合博弈模型,进一步提出了新的银行期望收益模型,并设计了三方的融资流程。最后利用数值算例验证了三方博弈模型相比原有应收账款融资模型更有利于融资,科学地分析了核心企业的作用。本文研究表明,通过企业供应链,尤其是核心企业的加入和参与融资所起到的重要作用,供应链应收账款融资模式,可以提高中小企业的应收账款融资的贷款率,并且能够约束中小企业,使中小企业的失信行为也得到了改善。
[Abstract]:Banks and other financing institutions take advantage of the core enterprises of the supply chain to carry out the supply chain financial business, which plays a positive role in alleviating the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. Well, the banks will bear huge risks; the participation of the core enterprises will transfer the investment risk part of the banks to the core enterprises, thus reducing the risks of the banks. The member enterprises will also get loans more easily, which will be conducive to the overall optimization of the supply chain, and will ultimately benefit the vast number of small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as the interests of the core enterprises themselves. This paper first introduces the current research situation of supply chain accounts receivable, explains the existing problems in the model of accounts receivable, and further combs the relevant theoretical basis and methods of supply chain finance. On the basis of this, we choose the game analysis method of Steinkerberg. By modeling and analyzing the benefit game between the enterprise and the bank in the traditional accounts receivable model, the paper sets up the two-game model between the bank, the member enterprise and the core enterprise by using the Steinkerberg game. Through reverse solution, the equilibrium conditions of each party are obtained, and the influencing factors of bank loan ratio and enterprise compliance rate are revealed, and then through the joint game model of bank, member enterprise and core enterprise, Furthermore, a new expected return model of banks is proposed, and a three-way financing process is designed. Finally, a numerical example is used to verify that the three-party game model is more favorable than the original account receivable financing model. This paper analyzes the role of the core enterprise scientifically. The research shows that the supply chain accounts receivable financing model is based on the important role of the enterprise supply chain, especially the participation and participation of the core enterprises in financing. It can improve the loan rate of accounts receivable financing and restrain the small and medium-sized enterprises, and improve the behavior of the small and medium-sized enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F276.3;F275

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