供应商成本信息不对称下装配系统协同问题研究

发布时间：2018-02-11 05:52

本文关键词： 成本信息不对称装配系统批发价补贴协同　出处：《运筹与管理》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文研究的装配系统由两个供应商和一个制造商组成,其中一个供应商的成本信息为公共信息,另一个供应商的成本信息为其私有信息,制造商通过设计契约来揭示该私有信息。作为装配系统的主导者,制造商一方面以自身利润最大化为目标,另一方面希望通过系统协同来获得更多的利润。研究结果表明,制造商对两个供应商都采用批发价契约时,无法揭示供应商的私有信息;制造商对信息公开的供应商采用批发价契约,对拥有私有信息的供应商采用价格补贴契约时,可以揭示供应商的私有信息,但不能实现装配系统的整体协同;制造商对两个供应商都采用价格补贴契约时,在成功揭示供应商的私有信息的同时,也实现了装配系统的整体协同。数值分析结果表明,同制造商对两个供应商分别提供批发价契约和价格补贴契约时相比,制造商对两个供应商都提供价格补贴契约时,私有信息的揭示区间会变大,系统总利润和拥有私有信息的供应商的利润会增加,信息公开的供应商的利润会降低,制造商的利润可能增加也可能降低。
[Abstract]:The assembly system studied in this paper is composed of two suppliers and one manufacturer. One supplier's cost information is public information, the other supplier's cost information is its private information. As the leader of assembly system, the manufacturer aims to maximize his own profit on the one hand, and on the other hand, he hopes to obtain more profit through system cooperation. The research results show that, as the leader of assembly system, the manufacturer can reveal the private information by designing contract. When the manufacturer adopts the wholesale price contract for both suppliers, he cannot reveal the private information of the supplier; when the manufacturer adopts the wholesale price contract for the supplier with open information, and the supplier with private information adopts the price subsidy contract, It can reveal the private information of the supplier, but it can not realize the overall coordination of the assembly system. When the manufacturer adopts the price subsidy contract for both suppliers, it can successfully reveal the private information of the supplier. The numerical analysis results show that the manufacturer provides price subsidy contract to both suppliers when the manufacturer offers wholesale price contract and price subsidy contract to two suppliers, and the numerical analysis results show that, when the manufacturer provides the wholesale price contract and the price subsidy contract to the two suppliers respectively, the manufacturer provides the price subsidy contract to both suppliers. The disclosure interval of private information will become larger, the total profit of the system and the profit of the supplier with private information will increase, the profit of the supplier with public information will decrease, and the profit of manufacturer may increase or decrease.
【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学工商管理学院;华中科技大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71602189,71072035) 教育部人文社科研究青年基金(16YJC630083)
【分类号】：F274

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