高管权力对我国上市公司会计信息披露质量的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-05 18:39

本文选题：上市公司　切入点：高管权力　出处：《山西财经大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在公司内外部会计信息不对称的情况下,为了使投资者、债权人等公司外部信息使用者可以更好地了解公司的财务状况和经营成果,上市公司进行了会计信息披露。上市公司向外界披露会计信息是广大利益相关者了解公司经营状况最主要的途径,也是以此为依据进行投资决策。因此,上市公司披露的会计信息质量直接影响着投资者的决策,进而影响证券市场的健康发展和资源的有效配置。作为公司的管理者,上市公司的高管团队直接参与会计信息的收集、生成及披露,对公司的会计信息质量有着重大和不可推卸的责任。而高管对公司信息质量的影响与其权力性质密不可分。本文在研究中利用了深交所主板上市公司的信息考评结果来替代公司的会计信息披露质量,并分别采用总经理是否兼任董事长替代高管的结构性权力变量,高管是否持股替代高管的所有权权力变量,公司财务负责人的任职期限替代高管的个人能力权力变量。本文首先介绍了前人关于上市公司会计信息披露质量、高管权力以及二者之间关系的研究;然后,基于两权分离与委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、行为学理论和高层梯队理论的分析,论述了上市公司高管权力对会计信息披露质量的影响,为全文的实证研究奠定了理论基础;其次,本文在此基础上提出了研究假设,选取深交所2010年—2014年共580个样本,并通过多元有序面板Logit模型进行了回归分析,实证检验了不同性质的高管权力对会计信息披露质量的影响;最后,基于实证分析的结果,提出了改善上市公司会计信息披露质量的建议。通过描述性分析发现,在信息披露方面,我国上市公司的整体状况在逐年好转。在高管权力方面,有77%-86%的公司仍保持两权分离的状态,使董事会保持了一定的独立性,能够更好地监管高管的行为,从而有助于信息披露质量的提升。高管持股的上市公司占比在60%—70%之间,这有助于增强高管的主人公意识,提升公司业绩,进而提高会计信息披露质量。同时,我国上市公司财务负责人更换频繁,不利于会计信息披露质量的提升。通过多元有序面板Logit回归分析发现,上市公司高管的结构性权力与会计信息披露质量呈现显著负相关,而高管的所有权权力和个人能力权力对提升会计信息披露质量有一定的促进作用。因此,本文在最后章节中明确提出,上市公司应避免出现两职兼任的情况,同时应通过股权激励政策增加高管的持股比例,并注重培养高管的个人专业素质和业务能力等建议。
[Abstract]:In the case of asymmetric internal and external accounting information, in order to enable investors, creditors and other external information users of the company to better understand the financial situation and operating results of the company, The listed companies disclose the accounting information to the outside world. It is the most important way for the stakeholders to know the operating status of the company, and it is based on this to make investment decisions. The quality of accounting information disclosed by listed companies has a direct impact on investors' decisions, and then affects the healthy development of the securities market and the effective allocation of resources. As the managers of the companies, the executives of listed companies directly participate in the collection of accounting information. Generation and disclosure, The influence of executives on the quality of corporate information is closely related to the nature of their power. This paper makes use of the information appraisal of listed companies on the main board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The result is to replace the quality of accounting information disclosure in the company, The structural power variables of whether the general manager is also the chairman of the board of directors and the ownership power variables of the senior executives are adopted, and whether the executive shares replace the ownership power variables of the executives. This paper first introduces the previous studies on the quality of accounting information disclosure, executive power and the relationship between them. Based on the analysis of separation of two rights and principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, behavior theory and high-level echelon theory, this paper discusses the influence of the executive power of listed companies on the quality of accounting information disclosure. It lays a theoretical foundation for the empirical research. Secondly, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis, selects 580 samples from 2010 to 2014 of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and carries out regression analysis through the multivariate ordered panel Logit model. Finally, based on the results of empirical analysis, the author puts forward some suggestions to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure of listed companies. In terms of information disclosure, the overall situation of listed companies in China is improving year by year. In terms of executive power, 77% to 86% of companies still maintain a state of separation of the two powers, which enables the board of directors to maintain a certain degree of independence and be able to better monitor the behavior of senior executives. This helps to improve the quality of information disclosure. The proportion of listed companies held by senior executives is between 60% and 70%, which helps to enhance executives' awareness of the protagonists, improve corporate performance, and thus improve the quality of accounting information disclosure. The frequent turnover of financial directors of listed companies in China is not conducive to the improvement of the quality of accounting information disclosure. Through multiple ordered panel Logit regression analysis, it is found that there is a significant negative correlation between the structural power of listed company executives and the quality of accounting information disclosure. However, the ownership power and personal ability power of senior executives can promote the quality of accounting information disclosure to some extent. Therefore, in the last chapter of this paper, it is clearly proposed that listed companies should avoid the situation of two positions and concurrently. At the same time, we should increase the proportion of senior executives' shareholding through the equity incentive policy, and pay attention to the suggestions of cultivating the personal professional quality and business ability of senior executives.
【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275;F272.91

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