股权激励契约影响企业业绩路径的研究

发布时间：2018-05-05 15:31

本文选题：股权激励契约 + 企业业绩　；参考：《河北经贸大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：企业所有者与企业管理者之间的风险偏好与目标函数的不一致,导致双方存在较为严重的利益冲突。企业管理者为了自身利益最大化往往会规避风险,甚至放弃一些高风险高收益的项目,这无疑会损害到企业所有者的利益。如何能够使企业所有者与企业管理者的风险偏好与目标函数趋于一致是企业亟待解决的问题。作为一种长期激励机制,股权激励通过授予管理者一定股权,能够使管理者和所有者共担风险共享收益。然而实践表明,并非所有的股权激励方案都产生了良好的激励效果。股权激励契约结构的关键要素是什么?什么样的股权激励契约结构才会促使管理层承担风险,进而产生正向的激励效果?这些问题值得我们进行深入研究。基于上述思考,通过查阅有关股权激励方面的文献发现,学者们主要考察了股权激励契约对企业业绩的直接作用,却并未揭示其中的作用机理。因此,本文运用契约理论、委托代理理论、人力资本理论、管理层风险厌恶假说和风险报酬权衡理论等,基于风险承担视角研究股权激励契约影响企业业绩的路径。为了实现上述研究目的,本文采用Preacher和Hayes(2008)[1]研究开发的Bootstrap方法,对2006年至2013年沪深A股上市公司实施股权激励方案的数据进行实证分析。本文主要的研究结论如下:总体而言,股权激励契约能够有效引导企业管理者采取风险承担行为,提升企业长期业绩,从而是代理问题得以缓解。其中:(1)激励种类、激励力度、激励有效期与管理层风险承担(研发投入水平变动、集中化经营程度变动、资产负债率变动)均呈正相关关系,即采用股票期权激励,增加激励力度和激励有效期更有助于管理层采取风险承担行为。(2)风险承担(研发投入、集中化经营、债务融资)有助于企业长期业绩的提高。(3)股权激励契约影响企业业绩路径显著,但股权激励种类主要是通过影响管理层作出集中化经营决策进而提升企业业绩,股权激励力度主要是通过影响管理层加大研发力度和增加债务融资来促进企业业绩提升,股权激励有效期主要是通过影响管理层加大研发力度和集中化经营来促进企业业绩提升。因此,在今后上市公司设计股权激励过程中应明确设定全面反映管理层风险承担的指标,使企业的激励制度能够促进管理层采取承担风险的行为以促进业绩提升。
[Abstract]:The difference between the risk preference and the objective function between the owner and the manager of the enterprise leads to a more serious conflict of interests between the two parties. In order to maximize their own interests, the enterprise managers often avoid risks and even give up some high risk and high income projects, which will undoubtedly damage the interests of the owners. The consistency of risk preference and objective function of enterprise owners and managers is an urgent problem for enterprises. As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive can make managers and owners share risk sharing benefits by granting managers a certain equity. However, practice shows that not all equity incentive schemes are produced. What are the key elements of the structure of equity incentive contract? What kind of equity incentive contract structure can motivate the management to take risks and produce positive incentive effects? These problems deserve our in-depth study. We mainly examine the direct effect of equity incentive contract on enterprise performance, but do not reveal its mechanism. Therefore, this paper uses the contract theory, the principal-agent theory, the human capital theory, the management risk aversion hypothesis and the risk reward tradeoff theory, and then studies the impact of equity incentive contract on the enterprise performance based on the perspective of risk bearing. In order to achieve the purpose of the research, this paper uses the Bootstrap method of Preacher and Hayes (2008) [1] research and development, and makes an empirical analysis on the data of equity incentive scheme for Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies from 2006 to 2013. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: in general, the equity incentive contract can effectively guide the enterprise management. Taking the risk bearing behavior to improve the long-term performance of the enterprise, the agent problem can be alleviated. Among them: (1) the type of incentive, the motivation, the incentive validity period and the management level risk bearing (the change of R & D input level, the change of centralized management degree, the change of asset liability ratio), that is, the incentive of stock option is used to increase the excitation. Motivation and incentive effectiveness are more conducive to the management to take risk bearing behavior. (2) risk commitment (R & D input, centralized management, debt financing) helps to improve the long-term performance of the enterprise. (3) the equity incentive contract has a significant impact on the enterprise performance path, but the type of equity incentive is mainly through the impact of management to make centralized management decisions. In order to improve the performance of the enterprise, the motivation of equity incentive is to promote the improvement of enterprise performance by increasing the management level and increasing the debt financing. The validity period of equity incentive is mainly to promote the improvement of enterprise performance by influencing the management to increase the R & D strength and centralized management. In the process of encouragement, we should clearly set the indicators that reflect the risk of management in an all-round way, so that the incentive system of the enterprise can promote the management to take the behavior of taking risks so as to promote the improvement of performance.

【学位授予单位】：河北经贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F275

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