不同质量能力企业的质量信号选择偏好分析——基于中国企业-员工匹配调查的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-11 13:23

  本文选题：质量能力 + 质量信号　； 参考：《科技进步与对策》2017年18期

【摘要】：质量能力提升与质量信号传递是新常态下制造业企业提高产品质量,实现市场需求的重要途径。基于2015年中国企业-员工匹配调查数据,运用Oprobit模型对不同质量能力企业的产品质量信号选择偏好进行研究。结果表明,质量战略能力强的企业更倾向于选择强制性标准或市场性价格作为质量信号传递的载体,质量运营能力强的企业更倾向于选择自愿性商标或强制性标准作为质量信号传递的载体,而质量管控能力对质量信号选择倾向的作用不显著,质量竞争能力强的企业并不认可除品牌外的质量信号作为产品质量能力的效用。基于此,建议加大对标准信息缺失或造假的监管力度,鼓励企业进行第三方认证,降低第三方认证成本,同时鼓励企业进行质量战略能力及品牌能力的建设与提升。
[Abstract]:The improvement of quality ability and the transmission of quality signal are important ways for manufacturing enterprises to improve product quality and realize market demand under the new normal condition. Based on the survey data of Chinese business-employee matching in 2015, Oprobit model is used to study the preference of product quality signal selection for enterprises with different quality capabilities. The results show that enterprises with strong quality strategic ability tend to choose mandatory standard or market price as the carrier of quality signal transmission. Enterprises with strong quality operation ability tend to choose voluntary trademark or mandatory standard as carrier of quality signal transmission, but the effect of quality control ability on quality signal selection tendency is not significant. Enterprises with strong quality competitiveness do not recognize the utility of quality signals other than brands as product quality capabilities. Based on this, it is suggested to strengthen the supervision on the lack of standard information or fraud, encourage enterprises to carry out third-party certification, reduce the cost of third-party certification, and encourage enterprises to build and enhance their quality strategic ability and brand ability.
【作者单位】： 武汉大学质量发展战略研究院宏观质量管理湖北省协同创新中心;
【基金】：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(15JZD023) 国家科技支撑计划项目(2015BAH27F01) 科技部公益性科研专项(201310202)
【分类号】：F273.2
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本文编号：1874148