博弈地位对延长担保供应链协调的影响研究

发布时间：2018-05-15 23:21

本文选题：供应链 + 延长担保　；参考：《中国科学技术大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,延长担保在电脑、汽车、家用电器等耐用产品行业中非常流行。以往这类行业的一个重要特征就是制造商在整个供应链中处于领导者的角色。面对日益激烈的市场竞争以及瞬息万变的经济地位,供应链中的零售商正在不断增强自身的实力,有时候甚至可以支配整个供应链的运作方向。基于目前市场上的零售现状并针对以往学者们的研究不足,本文进行了零售商为领导者和制造商为领导者的延长担保供应商模型对比分析。本文主要研究延长担保供应链中制造商和零售商的博弈地位对产品政策和延长担保政策的影响,我们假设这个延长担保供应链中只有一个制造商和一个零售商,并用斯坦科尔伯格博弈理论来描述制造商和零售商之间的博弈。这篇文章同时研究了制造商为领导者和零售商为领导者的情况,并且将产品的质量作为决策变量,对比分析了两种延长担保提供者模型:零售商或制造商提供延长担保。研究表明,不管是制造商还是零售商为领导者,产品的最优质量在制造商提供延长担保模型中低于零售商提供延长担保模型,且零售商提供延长担保时,产品及延长担保销量最大。制造商提供延长担保时,零售商作为领导者时产品的质量低于制造商作为领导者时产品的质量。零售商提供延长担保时产品质量最高,制造商提供延长担保且其处于弱势地位时产品质量最差。延长担保提供者相同时,制造商作为领导者,产品及延长担保销量最大。对各方而言,提供延长担保时比不提供时利润要大,提供延长担保是最优决策,且处于领导地位时的优势更大。
[Abstract]:In recent years, extended warranty in computers, cars, household appliances and other durable products industry is very popular. An important feature of such industries in the past was the leading role of manufacturers in the entire supply chain. Facing the increasingly fierce market competition and the rapidly changing economic status, the retailers in the supply chain are increasing their own strength, and sometimes they can even control the operation direction of the whole supply chain. Based on the current retail situation in the market and the lack of previous scholars, this paper makes a comparative analysis of extended guarantee supplier models with retailers as leaders and manufacturers as leaders. This paper mainly studies the influence of the game position of manufacturer and retailer on product policy and extended guarantee policy in the extended guarantee supply chain. We assume that there is only one manufacturer and one retailer in the extended guarantee supply chain. The game between manufacturer and retailer is described by Steinkelberg game theory. This paper studies the situation of manufacturer as leader and retailer as leader, and takes product quality as decision variable, and compares two extended guarantee provider models: retailer or manufacturer provides extended guarantee. The research shows that, whether the manufacturer or the retailer is the leader, the optimal quality of the product is lower in the extended warranty model than in the extended guarantee model provided by the manufacturer, and when the retailer provides the extended guarantee model, Sales of products and extended warranty are the largest. When the manufacturer provides extended warranty, the quality of the retailer as leader is lower than that of the manufacturer as leader. The product quality is the highest when the retailer provides the extension guarantee, and the product quality is the worst when the manufacturer provides the extension guarantee and is in the weak position. When the extension guarantee provider is the same, the manufacturer as the leader, the product and extension guarantee sales are the largest. For the parties, the profit is greater when extending the guarantee than when the guarantee is not provided, and it is the best decision to provide the extended guarantee, and the advantage is greater when it is in the leading position.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

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