考虑名牌产品企业环境管理的供应商减排行为演化及多元引导策略研究

发布时间：2018-05-19 02:31

  本文选题：减排行为 + 环境管理　； 参考：《江苏大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：作为制造业世界工厂,我国环境污染形势严峻。出人意料的是,很多产生严重污染的企业被曝光出是名牌产品企业的供应商。这些污染事故引起了公众的极大关注,并促使人们从名牌产品企业对供应商的环境管理视角思考企业的环境管理问题:一方面,消费者通常会把供应商不良环境行为的责任归属给名牌产品企业,对供应商的环境管理是名牌产品企业不可回避的问题;另一方面,名牌产品企业在供应链运作中处于核心地位,有能力对供应商的环境行为选择产生重要影响。供应商、名牌产品企业、消费者等参与主体的交互性、异质性和自适应性使供应商减排行为的研究面临着复杂性的挑战。社会科学计算实验方法在复杂系统的研究方面具有优势,已被国内外学者成功运用在包括环境管理的多个领域。基于此,本研究运用计算实验方法探究名牌产品企业环境管理下的供应商减排行为的演化规律,目的是探究名牌产品企业对供应商进行环境管理的有效策略和关键影响因素,为推动企业减排的实际问题提供新的思路和解决方案。本研究首先详细分析了名牌产品企业对供应商进行环境管理的动机;其次,探究了国内外名牌产品企业对供应商进行环境管理的实践,总结出采购量分配机制和环境补贴机制两种管理策略;随后,阐述了名牌产品企业的环境管理对供应商减排行为的影响机理;最后,分别构建了采购量分配机制和环境补贴机制下的供应商减排行为研究的计算实验模型,基于Repast Simphony平台采用面向对象编程技术产生参与主体及其交互行为,并赋予实验参数,设定不同的情景,探究供应商减排行为和主体收益的演化规律。本研究得出以下结论:(1)消费者环境意识提高引起的产品需求的增加驱动名牌产品企业对供应商进行环境管理。采购量分配机制和环境补贴机制是两种科学有效的对供应商的环境管理策略。(2)供应商报价情形下,名牌产品企业运用采购量分配机制能简单有效地实现对供应商的环境管理;名牌产品企业定价情形下,仅仅运用采购量分配机制不能使系统达到最优,名牌产品企业还有必要对供应商进行环境补贴。(3)随着采购量分配中对环境因素的重视程度的增加,演化稳定后的供应商减排量增加,但名牌产品企业收益呈现先增加后减少的演化规律。名牌产品企业要把握好激励力度,才能达到既推动供应商减排又提高自身收益的“双赢效果”。相比静态采购量分配机制,名牌产品企业运用动态采购量分配机制能够获得更高的收益。(4)当名牌产品企业掌握供应链定价权时,可以先充分利用采购量分配机制,通过供应商群体之间的采购量竞争迫使供应商进行减排。当供应商减排量趋于稳定时,再实施减排补贴机制,并设定减排目标稍高于供应商当前的平均减排量,充分利用供应商决策的有限理性特征,从而获得较高的收益。(5)消费者购买是推动供应商减排的根本动力。名牌产品企业不能将对上游供应商的环境管理策略视为唯一手段,还应从下游消费者的需求入手,加强环保宣传,努力扩大市场需求规模。
[Abstract]:As a world factory in the manufacturing industry, the situation of environmental pollution in China is severe. Surprisingly, many enterprises which have produced serious pollution have been exposed as suppliers of famous brand products. These pollution accidents have aroused great public concern and prompted people to think about the environmental management from the perspective of the environmental management of the famous brand products enterprises. On the one hand, on the one hand, the consumers usually assign the responsibility of the bad environmental behavior to the famous brand product enterprises, and the environmental management of the suppliers is an unavoidable problem for the famous brand products enterprises. On the other hand, the famous brand products enterprises are at the core position in the supply chain operation, and have the ability to make the choice of the environmental behavior of the suppliers seriously. The interaction, heterogeneity and adaptability of the participants, such as the supplier, the famous brand product enterprise, the consumer and so on, make the research on the emission reduction behavior of the supplier face the challenge of complexity. The social science computing experiment method has the advantage in the research of complex systems, and has been successfully applied by domestic and foreign scholars to the multiple environmental management. Based on this, this study uses the method of calculation to explore the evolution law of the behavior of reducing the emission of suppliers under the environment management of famous brand products. The purpose is to explore the effective strategy and key factors of the environmental management of the famous brand products enterprises, and to provide new ideas and solutions for the practical problems of reducing the enterprises. This study first analyzes the motivation of the brand product enterprises to manage the environment of the suppliers in detail. Secondly, it explores the practice of environmental management for the suppliers at home and abroad, summarizes the two management strategies of the purchase quantity distribution mechanism and the environmental subsidy mechanism, and then expounds the supply of the environmental management of the famous brand products enterprises to the supply. In the end, the experimental model of the supplier reduction behavior research under the purchase quantity distribution mechanism and the environmental subsidy mechanism is constructed. Based on the Repast Simphony platform, the participants and their interactive behavior are produced by the object-oriented programming technology, and the experimental parameters are given, and the different scenarios are set up to explore the supply. The following conclusions are drawn as follows: (1) the increase of the product demand caused by the increase of consumer environmental awareness raises the environmental management of the famous brand products enterprises. The purchase quantity distribution mechanism and the environmental subsidy mechanism are two scientific and effective environmental management strategies for the suppliers. (2) Under the case of quotient quotation, the famous brand product enterprises can use the purchase quantity distribution mechanism to realize the environmental management of the suppliers simply and effectively. Under the pricing situation of the famous brand products enterprises, only using the purchase quantity distribution mechanism can not make the system achieve the best. The famous brand product enterprises are also necessary to carry on the environmental subsidy to the suppliers. (3) with the distribution of the purchase quantity With the increasing attention to environmental factors, the quantity of supplier reduction increases after the evolution of the stable supplier, but the enterprise income of famous brand products presents the evolution law that increases first and then decreases. With the mechanism, the famous brand product enterprises can obtain higher returns by using the dynamic purchase quantity distribution mechanism. (4) when the famous brand products enterprises grasp the supply chain pricing power, they can make full use of the purchase quantity distribution mechanism and force the suppliers to reduce the reduction through the procurement competition among the suppliers. Implementing emission reduction subsidy mechanism, and setting emission reduction targets slightly higher than the current average reduction of suppliers, making full use of the limited rational characteristics of supplier decision making, so as to gain higher income. (5) consumer purchase is the fundamental driving force to promote the reduction of suppliers. One means should start with the needs of downstream consumers, strengthen environmental publicity, and strive to expand the scale of market demand.
【学位授予单位】：江苏大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

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