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过度投资、多元化经营对公司信用风险的影响研究

发布时间:2018-05-23 15:22

  本文选题:供给侧改革 + 过度投资 ; 参考:《电子科技大学》2017年博士论文


【摘要】:2015年11月,中国政府首次提出了供给侧改革,此后,国家领导人在国际、国内重要场合会议上多次提及。至此,以“去产能、去库存、去杠杆、降成本、补短板”为重点的供给侧改革拉开了帷幕。供给侧改革得到了各级政府的推广,成为了企业界和学术界关注的热点问题。供给侧改革的背后,却是我国经济自2011年开始增速回落,长期依赖高投资拉动经济增长的发展模式难以继续保持,宏观经济不景气,且面临持续下行的压力。同时,我国经济长期以来依赖投资维持高速增长所带来的一系列弊端日益突出,比如过度投资现象严重、企业产能过剩、行业过度竞争、政府及企业偏好激进扩张,使得企业财务杠杆普遍畸形高企、企业盈利能力及现金流弱化,导致企业整体信用压力趋增、企业信用风险提升,由此可知,企业过度投资、经营扩张可能是导致企业信用风险扩大的重要原因。事实上,在当前宏观经济整体不景气的大环境下,企业信用风险的增加,降低了企业生产、经营及资金使用效率,增加企业陷入破产境地的可能性。基于此,本文从信用风险视角,研究微观企业过度投资、经营扩张现象导致的经济后果及影响因素。论文的研究内容及结论主要有以下几点:(1)研究过度投资对公司信用风险的影响机理。在对我国过度投资的经济现象进行分析及回顾、总结现有相关研究后,构建了过度投资与公司信用风险关系的研究框架,实证分析了过度投资对公司信用风险的影响机理。研究结果发现:过度投资加大了公司的信用风险;新增有息负债、公司业绩分别在过度投资影响公司信用风险的过程中具有中介作用。(2)分别基于委托代理理论和信息不对称理论,研究了公司信用风险的治理效应。以委托代理理论为基础,分析了内部控制对过度投资导致的信用风险是否能有效管控,以及内部控制对信用风险管控作用是否因企业产权性质而产生差异。通过实证分析产权性质、内部控制、过度投资与公司信用风险之间的关系,研究发现:内部控制能有效降低过度投资导致的公司信用风险;相比非国有企业,国有企业内部控制的信用风险管控作用更为显著。以信息不对称理论为基础,研究了会计信息质量、过度投资及公司信用风险之间的作用机制,以及会计信息质量对信用风险的抑制作用是否因企业所处的融资约束而产生差异。通过实证分析融资约束、会计信息质量、过度投资与公司信用风险之间的关系,研究发现:会计信息质量的改善有利于抑制过度投资,进而降低公司的信用风险;相对于融资约束较严重的公司而言,融资约束宽松公司的会计信息质量对公司信用风险的抑制作用更加显著。(3)研究多元化经营对公司信用风险的影响。多元化经营可能会加大公司信用风险,而多元化经营的实施与管理者的过度自信密切相关。通过实证分析了管理者过度自信、多元化经营及公司信用风险之间的关系,研究发现:管理者的过度自信增加了多元化经营程度,多元化经营程度的提高加大了公司信用风险,且多元化经营在管理者过度自信影响公司信用风险中具有中介作用;上期多元化经营程度会加大管理者的过度自信心理,而上期公司信用风险对管理者的过度自信心理影响较弱。(4)研究公司多元化经营的过度投资效应和融资约束效应。在研究了多元化经营对公司信用风险的影响后,进一步研究了多元化经营的过度投资效应和融资约束效应,以揭示多元化经营失败的内在原因及作用机制。研究发现:在公司多元化经营程度位于较低水平时,随着多元化经营程度的增加,公司的过度投资会减少,但当多元化经营程度增加达到一定的阈值之后,继续增加多元化经营程度会造成过度多元化,从而加大过度投资;公司实施多元化经营战略会加深融资约束。多元化经营失败往往一方面在于没有把握多元化经营的度,过度多元化导致过度投资,公司会逐渐陷入亏损困境,另一方面在于对资金未能有效管控,融资约束的加深可能会导致公司资金链断裂。以上研究对过度投资、多元化经营与公司信用风险之间的关系进行了较为深入的探讨,从信用风险的研究视角,深化了过度投资及多元化经营的经济后果。本文的研究对于提高企业投资效率、调整公司经营战略、管控公司信用风险提供了借鉴,为国家进行供给侧结构性改革提供了经验证据。
[Abstract]:In November 2015, the Chinese government put forward the supply side reform for the first time. After that, the state leaders mentioned many times at the international and domestic conference. At this point, the supply side reform focused on "capacity, inventory, deleveraging, cost reduction and short board". The supply side reform has been popularized by all levels of government and became the enterprise. On the back of the supply side, behind the supply side reform, China's economy has slowed down since 2011. The long-term dependence on high investment in economic growth is difficult to continue, the macroeconomic downturn and the continuing downward pressure. At the same time, China's economy has long relied on investment to maintain high growth. A series of disadvantages are becoming more and more serious, such as excessive investment phenomenon, overcapacity of enterprises, excessive competition in the industry, the radical expansion of government and enterprises, which makes the financial leverage of enterprises generally deformed, the profitability of enterprises and the weakening of cash flow, which leads to the increase of corporate credit pressure and the promotion of enterprise credit risk. Overinvestment and expansion of business may be the important reason for the expansion of enterprise credit risk. In fact, in the current macroeconomic environment, the increase of enterprise credit risk reduces the possibility of enterprise production, operation and capital use efficiency, and increases the possibility of enterprises falling into bankruptcy. Based on this, this article is from credit risk The research contents and conclusions of the paper are as follows: (1) the study of the mechanism of the effect of overinvestment on the company's credit risk. The research framework of the relationship between excessive investment and corporate credit risk has been made. The results show that excessive investment increases the credit risk of the company; the new interest liability is added to the company's performance, and the company performance has a mediating role in the process of overinvestment affecting the credit risk of the company. (2) Not based on the principal-agent theory and the information asymmetry theory, the governance effect of the company's credit risk is studied. Based on the principal-agent theory, it is analyzed whether the internal control can effectively control the credit risk caused by excessive investment and the difference between the internal control and the property property of the enterprise. The empirical analysis of the relationship between property property, internal control, excessive investment and corporate credit risk shows that internal control can effectively reduce the risk of corporate credit caused by excessive investment; compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the internal control of state-owned enterprises has more significant role in controlling credit risk. The mechanism of the effect of information quality, over investment and the risk of the company's credit, and whether the accounting information quality restrains the credit risk is different from the financing constraints of the enterprise. Through the empirical analysis of the relationship between financing constraints, the quality of accounting information, the excessive investment and the credit risk of the company, the research finds that the accounting letter is the one. The improvement of interest quality is beneficial to restraining over investment and reducing the credit risk of the company. Relative to the companies with more serious financing constraints, the quality of accounting information is more significant to the company's credit risk. (3) to study the effect of diversification on the company's credit risk. To increase the company's credit risk, the implementation of diversification is closely related to the overconfidence of the managers. Through the empirical analysis of the relationship between the overconfidence of the managers and the relationship between the diversification and the credit risk of the company, the study finds that the overconfidence of the managers has increased the degree of diversification and the increase in the diversification of the management. The credit risk of the company has an intermediary role in the credit risk of the managers, and the degree of diversification in the last period will increase the overconfidence mentality of the managers, while the credit risk of the previous company has a weak influence on the overconfidence of the managers. (4) to study the overinvestment effect of the diversification of the company and the overinvestment effect of the company. After studying the effect of diversification on corporate credit risk, this paper further studies the overinvestment effect and financing constraint effect of diversification in order to reveal the internal causes and mechanism of diversification failure. As the degree of operation increases, the overinvestment will be reduced, but when the diversification is increased to a certain threshold, the continued increase in diversification will result in excessive diversification, thus increasing excessive investment; the implementation of diversification strategy will deepen the financing constraints. In order to grasp the degree of diversification, excessive diversification leads to excessive investment, the company will gradually fall into the loss predicament, the other is that the fund is not effectively controlled, the deepening of the financing constraints may lead to the break of the company's capital chain. From the perspective of credit risk, it deepens the economic consequences of overinvestment and diversification. This study provides a reference for improving the efficiency of enterprise investment, adjusting the management strategy of the company, controlling the credit risk of the company, and providing empirical evidence for the state to carry out the structural reform of the supply side.
【学位授予单位】:电子科技大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F275

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