金融业高管薪酬与内部控制信息披露质量的相关性研究——来自2009-2014年沪深两市金融业上市公司的经验数据

发布时间：2018-05-25 10:21

  本文选题：金融企业 + 高管薪酬　； 参考：《东岳论丛》2017年06期

【摘要】：既有文献表明,高管薪酬与内部控制之间存在明显的敏感性。但由于金融企业自身经营的独特性,在既有研究中经常被剔除或忽略,金融业高管薪酬与内部控制信息披露质量之间是否也存在这种显著的敏感性,需深入研究。通过以2009-2014年沪深两市A股上市金融公司为研究样本,研究表明:我国金融业上市公司内部控制信息披露整体质量呈显著提高的趋势;高管短期薪酬激励与金融企业内部控制信息披露质量存在显著正向关系;高管长期薪酬激励则与金融企业内部控制信息披露质量之间的关系不显著;相对于非国有控股金融企业,国有控股金融企业高管薪酬对内部控制信息披露质量的影响要弱很多。
[Abstract]:The existing literature shows that there is an obvious sensitivity between executive compensation and internal control. However, due to the uniqueness of financial enterprises' own management, they are often excluded or ignored in the existing research. Whether there is such a significant sensitivity between financial executives' compensation and the quality of internal control information disclosure also needs further study. By taking the A-share listed financial companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2009-2014 as the research sample, the study shows that the overall quality of internal control information disclosure of listed companies in China's financial industry shows a trend of significant improvement; There is a significant positive relationship between short-term executive compensation incentive and internal control information disclosure quality of financial enterprises, while there is no significant relationship between long-term executive compensation incentive and financial enterprise internal control information disclosure quality. Compared with non-state-owned holding financial enterprises, the effect of executive compensation on the quality of internal control information disclosure is much weaker.
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本文编号：1933078