高管激励、产品市场竞争与企业会计信息质量

发布时间：2018-05-30 04:22

本文选题：高管激励 + 治理效应　；参考：《杭州电子科技大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：大数据信息经济时代,信息成为最有价值的资源之一,同时随着资本市场的发展,会计信息成为投资者评价公司的重要依据,会计信息的重要性日益提升。较高的会计信息质量能够优化企业资源配置、降低各利益相关方信息不对称、保障证券市场平稳健康发展。但是我国上市公司财务违规案件频现,涉及金额巨大,严重影响证券市场有序、持续发展。高管作为会计信息的决策主体,可以通过公司绩效、投资效率、财务状况、内部控制效果等各个方面影响企业财务信息。因此如何进行有效激励以防范企业管理者出现“逆向选择”和“道德风险”,提升企业会计信息质量具有重要意义。本文根据委托代理理论、激励理论、竞争理论、信号传递理论,以2012-2015年深圳A股上市公司1612个样本为研究对象,采用规范分析与实证分析相结合的研究方法,深入研究了高管激励、市场竞争和会计信息质量的关系,揭示内部治理要素(高管激励)和外部治理要素(产品市场竞争)对会计信息质量的治理效应。基于马斯洛需求层次理论,将高管激励方式划分为显性激励与隐性激励,利用Ordered Logistic模型进行回归分析,实证结果显示,高管薪酬激励、股权激励以及晋升激励对会计信息质量具有正向作用,而控制权激励对会计信息质量产生了负面效应;产品市场竞争会促进高管薪酬、股权以及晋升激励效应的有效发挥,能与这三者激励形成有效的协同治理效应,但是并没有改善控制权激励对会计信息质量的负面效应,反而加剧了该负面影响。研究表明高管显性激励能对会计信息质量产生正面效应,而隐性激励对会计信息质量的影响不同。高管控制权激励虽然可以简化领导权结构提升公司运营效率,但并没有因此提高企业会计信息质量,高管过大的控制权为其谋取私利、掩盖财务信息提供了更大的空间,晋升制度使得管理层结构得到改善,对会计信息质量产生了显著的正面效应。市场竞争作为重要的外部治理对企业经营具有不可替代的作用,它能与内部治理发生协同效应,对企业会计信息质量的提升产生促进作用。这为企业如何采取有效的激励措施以及根据企业自身所处的行业选择有效的高管激励方式提供了理论依据,适当的激励机制和良性的市场竞争有助于提升会计信息质量,从而促进我国资本市场的健康高速发展。
[Abstract]:In the era of big data information economy, information has become one of the most valuable resources. With the development of capital market, accounting information has become an important basis for investors to evaluate companies, and the importance of accounting information is increasing day by day. The higher quality of accounting information can optimize the allocation of enterprise resources, reduce the information asymmetry of all stakeholders, and ensure the stable and healthy development of the securities market. However, the financial violation cases of listed companies in China occur frequently, involving huge amounts, which seriously affect the orderly and sustainable development of the securities market. As the decision-making body of accounting information, executives can influence the financial information of enterprises through various aspects, such as corporate performance, investment efficiency, financial situation, internal control effect, etc. Therefore, it is of great significance to promote the quality of enterprise accounting information through effective incentives to prevent the occurrence of "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" by enterprise managers. Based on the principal-agent theory, incentive theory, competition theory and signal transmission theory, this paper takes 1612 samples of Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012-2015 as the research object, and adopts the research method of combining normative analysis with empirical analysis. The relationship between executive incentive, market competition and accounting information quality is deeply studied, and the governance effects of internal governance elements (executive incentive) and external governance elements (product market competition) on accounting information quality are revealed. Based on Maslow's hierarchy of demand theory, the executive incentive is divided into explicit incentive and implicit incentive. The empirical results show that the executive compensation incentive is based on the Ordered Logistic model. Equity incentive and promotion incentive have positive effect on accounting information quality, while control right incentive has negative effect on accounting information quality. It can form an effective synergistic governance effect with these three incentives, but it does not improve the negative effect of the control incentive on the quality of accounting information, on the contrary, it intensifies the negative effect. The research shows that executive explicit incentive can produce positive effect on accounting information quality, while implicit incentive has different influence on accounting information quality. Although the incentive of executive control can simplify the leadership structure and improve the efficiency of the company, it does not improve the quality of accounting information. The promotion system improves the management structure and has a significant positive effect on the quality of accounting information. As an important external governance, market competition plays an irreplaceable role in enterprise management. It can produce synergistic effect with internal governance and promote the improvement of accounting information quality. This provides a theoretical basis for enterprises to take effective incentive measures and to choose effective incentives according to their own industry. Appropriate incentive mechanism and benign market competition are helpful to improve the quality of accounting information. In order to promote the healthy and high-speed development of China's capital market.
【学位授予单位】：杭州电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F272.91;F273

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