集中采购参与意愿、制药企业议价能力与药品市场绩效

发布时间：2018-06-01 07:11

本文选题：集中采购规制 + 议价能力　；参考：《中国管理科学》2017年07期

【摘要】：以现行的药品集中采购规制为背景,构建双寡头竞争制药企业与政府主导的集中采购平台间的双边纳什议价博弈模型,研究制药企业的定价策略、制药企业和集中采购平台的利润分配机制以及制药企业集中采购参与意愿的关键影响因素,探讨集中采购规制对药品价格、医疗机构采购成本、制药企业利润和药品市场配置效率的影响,得到如下主要研究结论:第一,集中采购规制能够降低药品的采购价格和医疗机构的采购成本,但不一定能够提高药品市场的配置效率;第二,若提高集中采购效率或适当降低议价能力,将有助于提高制药企业的集中采购参与意愿,但若竞争对手主动提高集中采购效率或降低议价能力,将会降低制药企业的集中采购参与意愿。第三,议价能力强的制药企业不一定总是获得高利润,企业最终的利润受到企业自身及竞争对手的议价能力、集中采购效率的共同影响;第四,集中采购规制并非总是损害制药企业的利润,在一定条件下,集中采购规制能实现两家制药企业的"双赢"。本研究对提高制药企业集中采购参与意愿,促进制药企业和集中采购平台间的协作,发挥集中采购优势,提高药品市场的配置效率具有现实意义。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the current centralized drug procurement regulation, this paper constructs a bilateral Nash bargaining game model between the duopoly competitive pharmaceutical enterprises and the government-led centralized procurement platform, and studies the pricing strategy of pharmaceutical enterprises. The profit distribution mechanism of pharmaceutical enterprises and centralized purchasing platform and the key factors of pharmaceutical enterprises' willingness to participate in centralized procurement are discussed, and the effects of centralized procurement regulation on drug prices and procurement costs of medical institutions are discussed. The main conclusions are as follows: first, centralized purchasing regulation can reduce the purchasing price of drugs and the purchasing cost of medical institutions. But it does not necessarily improve the allocation efficiency of the pharmaceutical market; second, if the efficiency of centralized procurement is increased or the bargaining power is reduced appropriately, it will help to increase the willingness of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in centralized procurement. However, if the competitors take the initiative to improve the efficiency of centralized procurement or reduce bargaining power, it will reduce the willingness of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in centralized procurement. Third, pharmaceutical enterprises with strong bargaining power do not always obtain high profits. The final profits of the enterprises are influenced by the bargaining power of the enterprises themselves and their competitors and the centralized purchasing efficiency. Fourth, Centralized procurement regulation is not always harmful to the profit of pharmaceutical enterprises. Under certain conditions, centralized procurement regulation can achieve "win-win" for two pharmaceutical enterprises. This study is of practical significance to improve the willingness of pharmaceutical enterprises to participate in centralized procurement, to promote the collaboration between pharmaceutical enterprises and centralized procurement platforms, to bring into play the advantages of centralized procurement, and to improve the efficiency of drug market allocation.
【作者单位】：天津理工大学管理学院;南开大学商学院;天津工业大学管理学院;天津中医药大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL074) 天津市哲学社科规划项目(TJGL15-035) 天津市教委人文社科重大项目(2011ZD032) 天津市宣传文化"五个一批"人才培养工程(2015CR05)
【分类号】：F274;F426.72

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