经理管理防御与企业风险承担水平——股权激励的调节作用

发布时间：2018-06-01 22:16

本文选题：经理管理防御 + 风险承担　；参考：《经济经纬》2017年05期

【摘要】：基于委托代理理论中代理人风险规避与风险追逐假说,探讨经理管理防御与企业风险承担水平之间的影响机理和关系,考察股权激励对两者关系的调节作用。研究结果表明:经理管理防御程度越强,企业风险承担水平越低,说明经理人为了保持自身职位和个人利益最大化,表现出更多的风险规避行为;管理层股权激励程度与公司风险承担水平正相关;管理层股权激励对经理管理防御与企业风险承担水平的关系存在正向调节作用。股权激励能激励经理人选择更多风险承担行为。
[Abstract]:Based on the hypothesis of agent risk aversion and risk chase in principal-agent theory, this paper probes into the influence mechanism and relationship between manager's management defense and enterprise's risk-bearing level, and investigates the regulating effect of equity incentive on the relationship between them. The results show that the stronger the managerial defense level, the lower the risk-bearing level of the enterprise, which indicates that the manager shows more risk-averse behavior in order to keep his position and personal interests maximized. The degree of managerial equity incentive is positively related to the level of corporate risk-taking, and the managerial equity incentive has a positive regulating effect on the relationship between managerial defense and enterprise risk-taking level. Equity incentive can encourage managers to choose more risk-taking behavior.
【作者单位】：西安理工大学经济与管理学院;西安财经学院统计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71272118) 中国(西安)丝绸之路研究院科学研究项目(2016SY19) 陕西省教育厅专项科学研究项目(17JK1297)
【分类号】：F272.3;F272.91;F272.92

【相似文献】