财政分权体制下的地方政府干预与区域金融发展

发布时间：2018-01-04 06:20

本文关键词：财政分权体制下的地方政府干预与区域金融发展　出处：《浙江工商大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：中国30多年的改革开放在经济建设上取得了巨大的成就。金融作为经济增长的催化剂,其在改革中的发展进程无疑是我们重点关注的一个方面。始于20世纪80年代的财政分权改革,使得传统的中央与地方的隶属关系不复存在,地方政府开始成为有一定的经济利益的独立的经济体。然而由于这种财政分权改革,特别是1994年的分税制改革切断了财政收入与财政支出的联系,造成了财权与事权上的不对等,这为地方政府金融干预行为以及这种干预行为对区域金融发展的影响埋下了伏笔。本文首先区分了金融约束与金融抑制理论,介绍了金融租金理论对政府行为的解释,在财政分权与政府行为一般理论研究的基础上,建立了财政分权体制下的地方政府行为与金融发展的理论分析框架。通过将地方政府、银行和企业纳入到同一个理论模型框架中,研究在地方政府的干预下,银行的信贷资源如何在权力型关系贷款(PBRL)、市场型关系贷款(MBRL)和交易型贷款(TRAL)三种不同种类的银行业务间进行配置,得出了地方政府的干预行为降低了银行信贷配置的效率,进而导致了银行发展和金融市场发展的低效率的结论。在理论分析的基础上本文选取了1985-2010年华东六省一市的省级面板数据,从实证研究的角度对财政分权体制下,地方政府是否会因为财政压力和国有企业的因素来干预金融市场以造成区域金融发展的低效率做了进一步的考察。证实了财政压力和国有企业引发了地方政府的干预行为和地方政府干预行为造成了金融发展的低效率的分析结论。并在此基础上提出相应的政策建议。全文分为六个部分：第一章为绪论。第二章为对财政分权、政府干预与金融发展的一般理论的研究。第三章为地方政府行为与金融发展的理论模型。第四章为财政分权体制下地方政府对金融资源配置的干预行为分析。先是从历史分析的视角,通过将建国后的财政体制划分为三个时期,从历史发展观的角度对政府行为的演变和发展进行分析。再从地方政府对金融资源配置的干预动机和干预渠道两个方面来考察现阶段地方政府的干预金融行为。第五章为实证研究。基于1985-2010年华东地区六省一市的省级面板数据,构建计量模型组合。对财政压力与国有企业对政府行为的影响以及政府行为对金融发展的影响进行实证分析,为文章的理论分析提供实证上的支持。第六章,结论与政策建议。对本文的研究成果进行总结,并对现阶段的问题提出有针对性的解决方法。
[Abstract]:Over 30 years of reform and opening up, China has made great achievements in economic construction. Finance is the catalyst for economic growth. Its development process in the reform is undoubtedly an aspect of our focus. The fiscal decentralization reform that began in 1980s makes the traditional relationship between central and local subordination no longer exist. Local governments began to become independent economies with certain economic interests. However, due to the fiscal decentralization reform, especially the tax distribution reform in 1994, the relationship between fiscal revenue and fiscal expenditure was cut off. It results in the inequality between financial power and administrative power, which sets the stage for the financial intervention of local government and its influence on the development of regional finance. This paper first distinguishes between financial constraint and financial restraint theory, and introduces the explanation of government behavior by financial rent theory, on the basis of the general theory of fiscal decentralization and government behavior. This paper establishes the theoretical analysis framework of local government behavior and financial development under the fiscal decentralization system. Through the integration of local government, banks and enterprises into the same theoretical model framework, the research is carried out under the intervention of local government. How to allocate the credit resources of banks in three different types of banking business: power relationship loan (PBRL), market-based relationship loan (MBRL) and transactional loan (TRAL). It is concluded that the intervention of local government reduces the efficiency of bank credit allocation. Then it leads to the inefficient conclusion of bank development and financial market development. On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper selects the provincial panel data of six provinces and one city in East China from 1985 to 2010. From the perspective of empirical research on the fiscal decentralization system. Whether the local government will intervene in the financial market because of the financial pressure and the factors of the state-owned enterprises in order to cause the inefficiency of the regional financial development has been further investigated. It has been proved that the financial pressure and the state-owned enterprises have triggered the local government's. The intervention behavior and the local government intervention behavior have resulted in the inefficient conclusion of financial development. On this basis, the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward. The full text is divided into six parts: the first chapter is the introduction, the second chapter is the fiscal decentralization. Research on the general theory of government intervention and financial development. Chapter 3 is the theoretical model of local government behavior and financial development. Chapter 4th is the analysis of intervention behavior of local government on the allocation of financial resources under the system of fiscal decentralization. From the perspective of historical analysis. By dividing the financial system after the founding of the people's Republic of China into three periods. This paper analyzes the evolution and development of government behavior from the angle of historical development view, and examines the intervention behavior of local government at present from two aspects: the intervention motivation and the intervention channel of local government on the allocation of financial resources. Chapter 5th is an empirical study. Based on the provincial panel data of six provinces and one city in East China from 1985 to 2010. To construct the combination of econometric model. To make an empirical analysis of fiscal pressure and the influence of state-owned enterprises on government behavior and the influence of government behavior on financial development, and to provide empirical support for the theoretical analysis of the article. 6th chapter. Conclusion and policy suggestion. Summarize the research results of this paper, and put forward targeted solutions to the problems at this stage.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F127;F832.5;F224

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