债转股治理效应的问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-09 13:24

本文关键词：债转股治理效应的问题研究　出处：《湖南大学》2013年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：国有企业和金融改革长期是我国经济转型过程中的核心问题。20世纪80年代初以来，以“放权让利”为主旋律的国有企业改革已将绝大多数的生产经营决策权从政府转移至企业，并推动我国经济快速发展，，但1998年金融危机中国有企业大面积亏损和银行信贷巨额不良资产推动政府实施了以债转股为代表的国有企业改革和银行不良资产处置政策。1999年国务院公布《关于实施债权转股权的若干意见方案》，并推荐601户债转股企业，建议金额达4596亿元。债转股作为我国国有企业改制的重大配套措施，其对信贷资源配置和国有企业公司治理的效应受到政府各部门和金融机构的极大关注。本文以1999-2008年中国沪深A股上市公司为观察样本，从理论和经验上系统研究债转股对公司治理的效应，全文共分为六章，主要内容如下：本文首先概述了与公司治理相关的代理理论、投资理论、融资理论和激励理论等，为后文分析债转股问题提供理论基础和分析思路；然后基于投资效率、融资结构和高管激励三个方面具体分析和检验了债转股的公司治理效应，既为债转股对公司治理和信贷配置的影响提供了经验证据，也为债转股是如何影响公司治理的路径提供了证据；最后则以公司价值（财务指标和市场指标）这一综合指标来检验了债转股影响公司治理的综合结果，同时也检验债转股影响公司价值的途径。通过研究，本文发现：（1）债转股企业过度投资和投资不足的程度均要低于非债转股企业，即债转股企业的投资效率要高于非债转股企业。结果表明，债转股有利于缓和股东-债权人之间的利益冲突，从而提高投资行为的理性决策；（2）债转股企业更多依赖银行债务融资，且债务融资与投资效率的敏感度高于非债转股企业；同时，债转股企业债务融资对投资效率的约束作用大于非债转股企业。结果表明，虽然债转股企业获得了更多的债务融资，包括在中央银行紧缩型货币政策时，但并不表明银行股东对债转股公司的贷款是预算软约束的表现，相反，债转股公司的债务融资在约束非效率投资行为方面体现了更高的约束作用，即债转股改善了债务融资与投资行为之间的关系；（3）相对于非债转股企业来说，债转股企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性较高，而且，债权转股权后，公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性也得到了提高；（4）债转股企业的盈利能力得到了提高，市场投资者也获得了较高的投资回报。研究结果表明，由于股权结构的改善和代理成本的降低，相比于非债转股企业，债转股企业的投资效率和债务融资与投资效率的敏感度较高，且债务融资对公司投资效率的影响较大；同时债转股提高了公司高管的薪酬业绩敏感度，改善了盈利能力和投资者的市场回报，提高了企业的价值创造能力。综合概而言之，由于股权结构的改善和代理成本的降低，相比于非债转股企业，债转股企业的投资效率和债务融资与投资效率的敏感度较高，且债务融资对投资效率的影响较大；同时债转股提高了公司高管的薪酬业绩敏感度，改善了盈利能力和投资者的市场回报率，提高了企业价值。本文是基于中国国有企业改制背景的一项关于上市公司债转股的经济后果的实证研究，弥补了债转股改革的实证检验文献，深入挖掘了债转股对公司价值变化的具体驱动因素，同时也在一定程度上可为我国商业银行的混业经营之改革提供初步的经验证据。上述研究发现具有如下启示作用：（1）银行直接持有企业股权作为一种与企业形成长期交易稳定型的银企关系的重要方式，可以为银行信贷决策所需信息的生产和利用提供较为持续便捷的渠道，有利于提高信贷配置与公司行为的敏感性；（2）银行直接持有企业股权可以为债权人对公司治理的相机治理作用提供更有效的保障。大股东控制、内部人控制等是我国公司治理的重要问题，若银行持股，则既有助于改变债权人无权的状况，又可以平衡公司治理结构较为单一的问题。
[Abstract]:The state-owned enterprises and long-term financial reform is a key problem in the process of China's economic transformation in the.20 century since the beginning of 80s, the reform of state-owned enterprises in the "decentralization" as the theme of the vast majority of the decision-making power in production and operation transfer from the government to enterprises, and promote China's rapid economic development, but the financial crisis has pushed China 1998 the government has implemented the.1999 reform of state-owned enterprises and the bank non-performing assets disposal policy in debt on behalf of the State Council issued "on the implementation of the opinions of the debt to equity scheme > enterprises large losses and huge non-performing assets of bank credit, and recommend the 601 debt to equity swap enterprises, that amounted to 459 billion 600 million yuan. The major supporting measures as debt China's state-owned enterprise restructuring, the allocation of credit resources and the effect of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises has attracted great attention of various departments and financial institutions of the government. Taking Chinese Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A share as an observation sample, this paper systematically studies the effect of debt to equity swap on corporate governance from 1999-2008 aspects of theory and experience. The full text is divided into six chapters.
This paper outlines the agency theory and corporate governance, investment related theory, financing theory and incentive theory, provide theoretical basis and analysis method for the analysis of debt problems; then based on the efficiency of investment, the three aspects of concrete analysis and test the corporate governance effect of debt financing structure and executives incentive, provides experience evidence both for corporate governance and debt to influence credit allocation, but also for the debt is to provide evidence of the influence path of corporate governance; finally, the value of the company (financial index and market index) a comprehensive index to test the comprehensive results of debt the impact of corporate governance and inspection ways of debt effect of the value of the company.
Through the research, this paper found that: (1) swap enterprise excessive investment and insufficient investment levels are lower than that of non debt enterprises, the investment efficiency is higher than that of debt to equity swap enterprises. The results show that the debt to equity swap between shareholders and creditors to ease the conflict of interest, so as to improve the rational investment decision behavior; (2) the debt equity swap enterprises rely more on bank debt financing, and debt financing and investment efficiency of the sensitivity is higher than that of non debt enterprises; at the same time, the constraint effect of debt financing on investment efficiency of corporate debt than non corporate debt to equity swap. The results show that although the debt to equity swap enterprises to obtain more debt financing, including in the central bank tightened monetary policy, but does not mean that the shareholders of the bank loans to debt, is the soft budget constraint, on the contrary, the debt to equity swap company debt financing constraints in non efficiency investment Reflects the restriction effect of higher investment behavior, i.e. debt improves the relationship between debt financing and investment behavior; (3) compared to the non debt enterprise, pay performance sensitivity is higher, debt to equity and debt to equity, the company executive compensation performance sensitivity is improved; (4) swap enterprise profitability improved, market investors get a higher return on investment. The results show that, due to a decrease in the improvement of the ownership structure and agency cost, compared to the non debt to equity, investment and debt financing efficiency and investment efficiency of debt to equity swap enterprises is more sensitive, and the effect of debt financing on the efficiency of investment and debt greatly; to improve the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity, improve profitability and market rate of return of investors, improve the enterprise's value creation Build comprehensive ability. To sum up, due to a decrease in the improvement of the ownership structure and agency cost, compared to the non debt to equity, investment and debt financing efficiency and investment efficiency of debt to equity swap enterprises is more sensitive, and the effect of debt financing on investment efficiency is relatively large; also debt to improve the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity. To improve the profitability and the market return of investors, improve the enterprise value.
This paper is an empirical study on the economic consequences of debt restructuring of listed companies China state-owned enterprises based on the background, make an empirical test of debt to equity reform of literature, in-depth excavation of the specific driving factors of debt changes on the value of the company, but also to a certain extent can provide preliminary empirical evidence for the reform of mixed operation China's commercial banks. These findings have implications as follows: (1) the bank directly held corporate equity as an important way of long-term stable trading relationship with the formation of enterprises, production and use of more convenient channels can provide continuous for bank credit information needed for decision making, is helpful to improve the sensitivity of credit the configuration and the behavior of the company; (2) direct bank corporate equity holders can provide more effective protection for creditors' governance role on corporate governance. Shareholder control and insider control are important issues of corporate governance in China. If banks hold shares, they will help to change the situation of creditors' rights and balance the structure of corporate governance.

【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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