定向增发、大股东控制与盈余管理

发布时间：2018-01-12 14:41

本文关键词：定向增发、大股东控制与盈余管理　出处：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：盈余管理一直是会计学术界常说常新的话题,股权再融资前的盈余管理是盈余管理研究的重要内容,以往的研究表明,上市公司在公开股权再融资前为了达到再融资资格要求或者影响股价会进行盈余管理。2006年以来,定向增发凭借其自身优势超越配股、公开增发等公开股权再融资方式成为上市公司股权再融资时的首选。上市公司是否会在定向增发前进行盈余管理呢?本文对大股东控制下上市公司定向增发前的盈余管理进行研究,揭示大股东控制对盈余管理的影响,并将真实活动盈余管理加入研究范围,研究上市公司定向增发前应计项目盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理的选择偏好。一方面,定向增发与大股东利益息息相关,另一方面,我国“一股独大”的股权结构使大股东在上市公司决策中“一言堂”现象严重,这就使定向增发时大股东有动机通过盈余管理活动侵占中小股东利益。实践中定向增发的发行对象一般包括公司股东(包括大股东)和国内外机构投资者,面对不同的发行对象,上市公司可能在大股东控制下进行不同方向的盈余管理：当上市公司仅向大股东及其关联方进行定向增发收购其资产时,支付方式多为资产认购,此时上市公司有动机进行向下盈余管理,因为更低的盈余带来股价下跌,大股东可以用同样的资产换取更多股份；当上市公司仅向机构投资者进行定向增发募集资金时,支付方式为现金认购,此时上市公司有动机进行向上盈余管理,因为更好看的公司业绩有助于提高公司股价,使公司募集到更多资金,使大股东获得更多财富增加值。同时,大股东持股比例的高低与其从盈余管理活动中获取利益的能力和大小密切相关,因此大股东持股比例很可能对盈余管理程度产生影响。盈余管理有应计项目和真实活动两种方式,国外研究发现由于应计项目盈余管理更容易被监管方和会计师事务所识别,故上市公司会选择真实活动盈余管理作为其替代方式,然而我国审计质量与发达国家相比还有一定距离,加之监管环境较为薄弱,因此应计项目和真实活动盈余管理的成本都不高,且均可获得巨大收益,这就导致上市公司可能同时采用两种方式以达到最佳效果,即两者之间可能存在同高同低互相联动的关系。基于以上分析,本文的研究内容如下：第一章绪论。本章首先介绍本文的研究背景,指出在此背景下的研究目的所在,然后明确研究方法,并建立论文结构和研究框架,最后从理论和实践两方面介绍本文的研究贡献。第二章文献综述。本章分别从股权再融资与应计项目盈余管理、大股东控制与应计项目盈余管理,以及真实活动盈余管理三个方面对相关文献进行梳理和分析,厘清以往学者相关研究的成果与方法,为本文提供一定的文献基础。第三章定向增发、大股东控制与盈余管理的制度背景与理论基础。本章首先回顾了我国定向增发制度的历史沿革,并介绍定向增发的相关规定。然后从委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和会计盈余的决策有用性理论三个方面寻找本研究的理论基础。第四章定向增发、大股东控制与盈余管理的研究设计。本章通过理论分析和合理推导提出三个假设,并选取2006年至2011年进行定向增发的331家A股上市公司作为研究对象,然后分别确定应计项目和真实活动盈余管理程度的衡量方式,并建立研究模型。第五章定向增发、大股东控制与盈余管理的实证结果及分析。本章共分为三个部分：上市公司定向增发前盈余管理的时间序列分布；定向增发、大股东控制与盈余管理的多元回归检验：应计项目和真实活动盈余管理的单变量相关性检验。通过检验,本文所提出的三个假设均得到证实。第六章结论与启示。本章首先根据第五章的实证检验结果总结出研究结论,然后分别从加强外部监管、完善公司治理结构和提高对真实活动盈余管理的重视程度等三个方面提出针对性建议,最后总结本研究的不足之处并对未来研究方向进行展望。本文的主要研究结论有以下四个：第一,上市公司在定向增发前一年及增发当年会进行应计项目和真实活动盈余管理活动,且这种活动在定向增发前一年最明显。第二,上市公司定向增发前盈余管理的方向与发行对象有关。当发行对象为大股东及其关联方(大股东型),上市公司通过定向增发收购大股东及其关联方的资产时,进行向下的应计项目和真实活动盈余管理；当发行对象为机构投资者(机构投资者型),上市公司通过定向增发募集资金时,进行向上的应计项目和真实活动盈余管理。这一结果表明上市公司在定向增发前通过盈余管理方向的选择向大股东进行“利益输送”。第三,在大股东型和机构投资者型定向增发前,上市公司大股东持股比例对盈余管理程度有显著的正向影响,即大股东持股比例越高,通过应计项目(真实活动)进行盈余管理的程度越高。这一结果表明定向增发前存在大股东对中小股东的利益侵占现象。第四,定向增发前上市公司的盈余管理活动既有应计项目方式又有真实活动方式,且两种方式之间是一种同高同低的正向联动关系,即应计项目盈余管理程度越高,真实活动盈余管理程度越高。本研究的贡献主要有以下三个： (1)本文将真实活动盈余管理、如何管理、真实活动盈余管理与应计项目盈余管理的关系加入研究中,丰富了国内关于真实活动盈余管理的研究,也有助于提高对真实活动盈余管理的重视程度。 (2)本文提出定向增发前大股东侵占中小股东利益的证据,从更深层次上揭示了我国上市公司定向增发前盈余管理行为的动机。 (3)本文从大股东控制的角度研究上市公司定向增发前的盈余管理行为,对于强化外部监督管理、完善内部公司治理等具有一定的启示意义。本研究的不足之处主要有以下两个 (1)本文仅研究了销售、费用和生产操控这三种真实活动盈余管理方式,除此之外,上市公司还会通过资产销售、关联交易等方式进行真实活动盈余管理,本文未将这部分方式包括在内。 (2)本文仅针对大股东型(发行对象为大股东及其关联方)和机构投资者型(发行对象为机构投资者)定向增发前的盈余管理进行研究并得出相关结论,而对于混合型(发行对象既包括大股东及其关联方又包括机构投资者)定向增发前的盈余管理并未得出有效结论。
[Abstract]:Earnings management has always been a new topic in accounting academic circles . Earnings management before equity refinancing is an important part of earnings management research . In 2006 , it is the first choice for listed companies to make a surplus management in order to meet the requirement of refinancing or affect stock price . On the one hand , it is closely related to the interests of big shareholders . On the other hand , the equity structure of " one big shareholder " in our country makes the big shareholders " one word hall " in decision - making of listed companies . When the listed company sells its assets to the large shareholder and its affiliated party , the company may pay more shares ; when the listed company only sells the funds to the big shareholder and its affiliated party , the listed company may take the same assets for more shares . At the same time , the company ' s performance will help to raise the stock price of the company , so that the large shareholder can obtain more wealth . At the same time , the proportion of the holding proportion of the big shareholder is closely related to the ability and the size of the benefit from the earnings management activity . There are two ways to manage the surplus management , and the foreign research finds that due to the fact that the surplus management of the accrual project is easier to be recognized by the regulator and the accounting firm , the listed company will choose the real activity earnings management as its alternative , but the audit quality of our country is relatively weak compared with the developed countries . Therefore , the cost of the project and the real activity surplus management is not high , and the listed company can achieve the best effect at the same time , that is , there may be the relationship between the same high and low linkage . Based on the above analysis , the research contents are as follows : The first chapter introduces the background of the research , points out the research aim in this background , then makes clear the research method , establishes the structure of the paper and the research framework , and finally introduces the research contribution from the two aspects of theory and practice . In chapter 2 , this chapter summarizes and analyzes the relevant literatures from three aspects of equity refinancing and accrual project earnings management , big shareholder control and accrual project earnings management , and real activity earnings management . The third chapter introduces the historical evolution of China ' s oriented growth and distribution system , and introduces the relevant regulations of directional augmentation . Then it looks for the theoretical basis of the research from three aspects : the theory of principal agent , the theory of information asymmetry and the decision - making utility theory of accounting earnings . In chapter 4 , the research and design of directional increase , big shareholder control and surplus management are put forward . Three assumptions are put forward through theoretical analysis and reasonable derivation , and 331 A - share listed companies are selected as the research objects from 2006 to 2011 , then the measures to measure the degree of earnings management of accrual projects and real activities are respectively determined , and the research model is established . Chapter V is divided into three parts : the distribution of the time series of surplus management in the direction of the listed company , the multiple regression test of the control of the large shareholder and the surplus management , and the single variable correlation test of the accrual project and the real activity surplus management . The three assumptions proposed in this paper are confirmed . The sixth chapter summarizes the conclusions of the study according to the empirical test results of Chapter V , then puts forward some suggestions on strengthening external supervision , improving corporate governance structure and improving the importance of real - activity earnings management , and finally summarizes the shortcomings of this study and looks forward to the future research direction . The main conclusions of this paper are as follows : First , listed companies will conduct accrual projects and real - activity earnings management activities one year before and during the year , and this activity will be the most obvious one year before the orientation increase . Second , the direction of surplus management of listed company is related to the issue object . When the issue object is big shareholder and its related party ( big shareholder type ) , the listed company carries out downward accrual project and real activity surplus management when the listed company acquires the assets of the big shareholder and its related party through the directional increase . This results show that the listed company carries out " interest delivery " to the big shareholder through the choice of surplus management direction before the targeted increase . Thirdly , the proportion of large shareholders of listed companies has a significant positive influence on earnings management before large shareholder type and institutional investor - oriented increase . The higher the proportion of large shareholders , the higher the surplus management is carried out through the accrual project ( real activity ) . The results show that there is a large shareholder ' s invasion of minority shareholders before the targeted increase . Fourthly , the surplus management activities of the listed companies before and after the orientation increase have both the corresponding project way and the real activity way , and there is a positive linkage relationship with the same height and low , that is , the higher the surplus management degree of the accrual project , the higher the real activity surplus management degree . The contribution of this study is mainly as follows : ( 1 ) In this paper , the relationship between real - activity earnings management , how to manage , real - activity earnings management and surplus management of accrual projects is added into the study , which enriches domestic research on real - activity earnings management , and also helps to improve the attention to real - activity earnings management . ( 2 ) In this paper , we put forward the evidence of the shareholder ' s encroachment on the interests of small and medium - sized shareholders , and reveal the motive of the earnings management behavior of listed companies in our country from a deeper level . ( 3 ) This paper studies the earnings management behavior of listed companies from the perspective of big shareholder control , and has some implications for strengthening external supervision and administration and improving internal corporate governance . The deficiencies of this study are as follows : ( 1 ) In addition , listed companies will carry out real - activity earnings management by means of asset sales and related transactions , and this part is not included in this paper . ( 2 ) In this paper , the earnings management before and after the orientation of the large shareholder type ( big shareholder and related party ) and institutional investor type ( the issuer is institutional investor ) is studied and the relevant conclusion is drawn , and the surplus management before the direct increase of the mixed type ( including both the big shareholder and its affiliated parties and institutional investors ) is not reached .

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

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