最终控制人身份与审计师选择的关系研究

发布时间：2018-01-14 20:14

本文关键词：最终控制人身份与审计师选择的关系研究　出处：《湖南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：资本市场的健康发展是促进证券市场健康发展和实现市场资源有效配置的重要条件。高质量的审计需求和审计供给是发挥审计作用的重要保证。在我国，政府在推动审计需求产生的同时，也通过一系列的制度改革提高会计师事务所的执业质量。从总体上看，目前我国的审计市场已具备了一定的提供高质量审计服务的能力，但是由于我国特殊的经济体制和市场环境等原因，我国的高质量审计需求仍然不足。从最终控制人视角出发研究审计师选择问题，深入分析高质量审计需求缺失的原因，有利于提高上市公司对高质量审计服务的需求，有利于提高资本市场资源配置的效率，同时也为政策制定者制定相关政策提供一定的参考依据。本文首先从理论角度回顾了审计需求的三大假说：代理成本假说、信号传递假说和保险假说；然后，以2008年至2010年三年间沪、深两市A股上市公司为样本，实证检验了代理成本、融资需求、法律风险对审计师选择的影响，以及不同最终控制人身份下这三者对审计师选择影响的差异。研究结果表明：第一，国有及非国有控股企业的代理成本存在显著差异，代理成本影响审计师选择，且代理成本对审计师选择的影响因最终控制人身份的不同而不同；第二，，融资需求与高质量审计需求正相关，且非国有控股身份会加强对高质量审计的需求；第三，法律制度环境越好，对高质量审计师的需求就越高，且非国有控股身份会加强对高质量审计师的需求。针对我国审计师选择中存在的问题，本文提出了推动产权制度改革,增强股票市场流通性,改革IPO机制，加强法制建设等政策建议。
[Abstract]:The healthy development of the capital market is an important condition to promote the healthy development of the securities market and realize the effective allocation of the market resources. High quality audit demand and audit supply is the important guarantee to play the audit role in our country. The government not only promotes the audit demand, but also improves the practice quality of accounting firms through a series of system reforms. At present, the audit market in China has the ability to provide high-quality audit services, but due to the special economic system and market environment in China and other reasons. The demand for high quality audit in our country is still insufficient. From the perspective of ultimate controller, the problem of auditor selection is studied, and the reasons for the lack of demand for high quality audit are analyzed in depth. It is beneficial to improve the demand of high quality audit service of listed companies, to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in capital market, and to provide some reference basis for policy makers to formulate relevant policies. Firstly, this paper reviews three hypotheses of audit demand: agency cost hypothesis, signaling hypothesis and insurance hypothesis. Then, taking the A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2010 as samples, the paper empirically tests the influence of agency cost, financing demand and legal risk on auditor selection. The results show that: first, there are significant differences in agency costs between state-owned and non-state-owned holding enterprises. Agency cost affects auditor selection, and the influence of agency cost on auditor selection varies with the identity of final controller. Second, the demand for financing is positively related to the demand for high-quality audit, and the non-state-owned holding status will strengthen the demand for high-quality audit; Third, the better the legal system environment, the higher the demand for high-quality auditors, and the non-state-owned holding status will strengthen the demand for high-quality auditors. This paper puts forward some policy suggestions, such as promoting the reform of property right system, enhancing the circulation of stock market, reforming IPO mechanism and strengthening the construction of legal system.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F239.2;F832.51

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