机构投资者持股与上市公司违规——兼论不同类型机构投资者的作用差异

发布时间：2018-01-25 14:45

本文关键词： 机构投资者公司违规公司治理　出处：《财会月刊》2014年20期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文采用部分可观测的Bivariate Probit估计方法,以2005~2012年间352家违规上市公司及其配对样本公司为研究对象,考察了机构投资者总体持股以及不同类型的机构投资者持股对上市公司违规行为的影响。结果表明,我国证券市场中的机构投资者总体持股并不能发挥有效的监督作用,其看重短期获利反而在一定程度上会诱发上市公司的违规行为。分类来看,相比于证券投资基金、社保基金、QFII等与被投资公司不具有商业关系的独立机构投资者,券商、企业年金、保险公司以及信托公司等与被投资公司具有商业关系的非独立机构投资者能够发挥有效的监督作用,抑制上市公司的违规行为。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a partial observable Bivariate Probit estimation method is used to study 352 illegal listed companies and their matched sample companies in 2005 / 12. The effects of institutional investors' overall shareholding and different types of institutional investor's shareholding on listed companies' illegal behavior are investigated. Institutional investors in the stock market in our country can not play an effective role in monitoring the overall stock, its emphasis on short-term profits will, to some extent, induce the listed companies to violate the law. Compared with the securities investment fund, social security fund QFII and other independent institutional investors, securities companies, corporate annuity and other companies do not have business relations. Non-independent institutional investors, such as insurance companies and trust companies, who have commercial relations with invested companies, can play an effective supervisory role and restrain the illegal behavior of listed companies.
【作者单位】：湖南大学工商管理学院;
【分类号】：F832.51;F271
【正文快照】： 一、引言近年来,机构投资者的持股比例不断上升,已经成为发达国家资本市场中的主要投资力量。在美国等成熟市场中,机构投资者的持股市值比例大都在90%以上(孙杰,2013)。Pound(1988)针对机构投资者作用的提出了三大假说:有效监督假说(Efficient-monitoring Hypothesis)、利益冲

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