机构投资者持股对上市公司过度投资行为影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-29 17:04

本文关键词： 机构投资者过度投资实证研究　出处：《西南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国的固定资产投资率一直偏高,为了应对全球危机,2007-2011年间我国的固定资产投资率从50%上升到了66%的水平。投资对经济增长具有重要的拉动作用,但过度的投资造成资本价格过于便宜、资产价格上涨、重复建设、资源浪费等。宏观层面的过度投资影响到微观上市公司,尤其是我国大多上市公司国有股缺位的特殊性,公司管理层更容易为了自己的私利,盲目投资以扩大公司规模,损害公司股东的利益。 20世纪70年代以来,发达国家资本市场机构投资者快速发展,持股比例逐渐提高,股东积极主义开始盛行。近年来,我国机构投资者在资本市场逐渐发展和政策的推动下,也呈现了较快的发展趋势。在这种背景下,我国的机构投资者逐渐改变投资理念,转向价值投资,开始利用自己的信息、技术等优势监督上市公司管理层,提高上市公司投资决策的效率。本文首先介绍了我国机构投资者的现状,从理论上分析了机构投资者参与上市公司治理的内外部机制对公司管理层进行监督,从而影响管理层投资决策、提高公司投资效率的机理。以我国A股上市公司2009-2011年的数据为研究样本,从机构投资者总体持股、不同类型机构投资者持股与上市公司过度投资水平的相关角度出发,实证分析我国机构投资者对上市公司过度投资行为的影响效果。根据前人经验和我国的实际情况构建相应模型来研究我国机构投资者与上市公司过度投资行为的关系,实证结果表明：(1)我国上市公司普遍存在非效率投资问题,与投资不足相比,过度投资程度更严重。(2)机构投资者持股比例与上市公司过度投资水平呈显著负相关关系,机构投资者持股比例越高,监督上市公司投资决策的积极性越强,公司的投资效率也就越好。(3)对机构投资者分类分析发现,独立型机构投资者由于与被投资公司不存在其他的业务联系,从而更积极执行股东监督者的角色,而非独立型机构投资者由于与被投资公司存在业务上的关联性,对被投资公司管理层进行监督会对自身的业务产生影响,所以难以对被投资公司管理层进行监督。根据实证结果,本文提出了以下建议：(1)完善资本市场基础制度,为机构投资者创造良好的市场环境；(2)完善上市公司治理结构,鼓励机构投资者参与公司治理；(3)促进机构投资者多元化发展,完善机构投资者结构。
[Abstract]:China's fixed asset investment rate has been high, in order to cope with the global crisis. From 2007 to 2011, the fixed asset investment rate in China rose from 50% to 66%. Investment plays an important role in economic growth, but excessive investment results in too low capital price. The overinvestment at the macro level affects the particularity of the microcosmic listed companies, especially the absence of state-owned shares in most of the listed companies in China. It is easier for managers to invest blindly to expand the size of the company and harm the interests of shareholders. Since 1970s, the capital market institutional investors in developed countries have developed rapidly, the proportion of shares has gradually increased, and shareholder activism has begun to prevail in recent years. With the gradual development of the capital market and the promotion of policies, the institutional investors in our country have also shown a rapid development trend. Under this background, the institutional investors in our country have gradually changed their investment ideas and turned to value investment. Begin to use their own information, technology and other advantages to supervise the management of listed companies, improve the efficiency of investment decisions of listed companies. This paper first introduces the current situation of institutional investors in China, and theoretically analyzes the internal and external mechanism of institutional investors participating in the governance of listed companies to supervise the management of the company, thus affecting the management investment decisions. Based on the data of China A-share listed companies from 2009-2011, the author studies the mechanism of improving the efficiency of corporate investment and holds shares from institutional investors as a whole. Based on the correlation between different types of institutional investors' shareholding and the level of overinvestment of listed companies, this paper empirically analyzes the effect of institutional investors on the overinvestment behavior of listed companies. According to the previous experience and the actual situation of our country to build the corresponding model to study the relationship between institutional investors and overinvestment behavior of listed companies. The empirical results show that China's listed companies generally have the problem of inefficient investment, compared with insufficient investment. The degree of overinvestment is more serious. 2) the proportion of institutional investors holding shares is negatively correlated with the level of overinvestment of listed companies. The higher the proportion of institutional investors is, the higher the proportion of institutional investors is. The stronger the enthusiasm of supervising the investment decision of listed company, the better the investment efficiency of the company is. Independent institutional investors are more active in the role of shareholder supervisors because they have no other business links with the invested company. But the non-independent institutional investor has the business relevance with the invested company, the supervision to the management of the invested company will have the influence on their own business. Therefore, it is difficult to supervise the management of the invested company. According to the empirical results, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: 1) perfecting the basic system of capital market to create a good market environment for institutional investors; (2) perfecting the governance structure of listed companies and encouraging institutional investors to participate in corporate governance; Third, promote the diversification of institutional investors and improve the structure of institutional investors.
【学位授予单位】：西南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.48

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