异质机构投资者持股对公司绩效的影响研究

发布时间：2018-02-20 15:22

本文关键词： 机构持股比例变动独立机构投资者非独立机构投资者公司绩效　出处：《湖南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来，在“超常规”发展机构投资者的政策下，，我国机构投资者发展迅速，在资本市场中日渐占据主导地位。由于不同类型的机构投资者在资金来源、业务关系、行政干预、所受法律法规的限制等方面都存在差异，这些差异将直接影响其监督公司治理的积极性及目标函数，从而导致不同类型的机构投资者对公司绩效产生不同的影响。所以从异质性的角度去研究机构投资者对公司绩效的影响，就显得尤为必要。这有助于加深我们对异质机构投资者的认识，对监管部门制定相关的政策和措施具有很好的参考价值。一般来说，机构投资者持股后会通过参与公司治理提高公司治理水平，而公司治理水平的提升则表现为公司绩效的改善。而不同机构投资者之间存在异质性，导致不同机构投资者对公司绩效的影响也存在差异。因此本文就根据机构投资者的资金性质、行政干预和业务联系三个方面的差异将我国的机构投资者分为独立机构投资者和非独立机构投资者。独立机构投资者的资金主要来源于散户投资者，偏向于私有性，较少受政府的干预，同时与被投资公司一般都只存在股票投资的关系，仅仅作为上市公司的股东获取投资收益，因此为了保障投资收益的最大化，其会积极参与公司的治理，提高公司的绩效。而在非独立机构投资者中，一部分非独立机构由于资金的公有性质或者与地方政府的密切关系使其较容易受政府的行政干预；另一部分非独立机构则由于与被投资公司存在业务联系，不能对公司内部人实施有效的监督，这些就会削弱其参与公司治理的动力，不利于公司绩效的提高。基于此，本文就提出研究假设，收集整理数据，以公司绩效为被解释变量，机构投资者持股比例变动为解释变量，实证检验异质机构投资者持股对上市公司绩效的不同影响。通过回归分析发现：整体机构投资者持股比例变动与公司绩效显著正相关；独立机构投资者持股比例变动与公司绩效在1%水平上显著正相关；而非独立机构投资者持股比例变动与公司绩效不存在显著相关性。这就说明了整体机构投资者积极作用的发挥主要得益于独立机构投资者的存在，独立机构投资者在持有公司股票后，会积极参与公司的治理，改善公司的治理结构，提高公司绩效；而非独立机构投资者由于持股规模和利益冲突的影响，难以发挥股东的积极主义，因此改善公司绩效的作用不突出。
[Abstract]:In recent years, under the policy of "supernormal" development of institutional investors, institutional investors in China have developed rapidly and occupied a dominant position in the capital market day by day. Due to different types of institutional investors in the source of funds, business relations, administrative intervention, There are differences in the restrictions of laws and regulations, which will directly affect their enthusiasm and objective function in supervising corporate governance. As a result, different types of institutional investors have different effects on corporate performance. Therefore, from the perspective of heterogeneity to study the impact of institutional investors on corporate performance, This will help us to deepen our understanding of heterogeneous institutional investors and have a good reference value for regulators to formulate relevant policies and measures. Generally speaking, institutional investors can improve the level of corporate governance by participating in corporate governance, and the improvement of corporate governance is the improvement of corporate performance, and there is heterogeneity among different institutional investors. Therefore, according to the nature of the funds of the institutional investors, there are differences in the impact of different institutional investors on corporate performance. The differences of administrative intervention and business connection divide the institutional investors into independent institutional investors and non-independent institutional investors. The funds of independent institutional investors mainly come from retail investors and tend to be private. Less intervention by the government, at the same time with the invested companies generally only have stock investment relationship, only as shareholders of listed companies to obtain investment income, so in order to ensure the maximization of investment returns, they will actively participate in the governance of the company. Improving the performance of the company. Among the non-independent institutional investors, some of the non-independent institutions are more vulnerable to the administrative intervention of the government because of the public nature of the funds or their close relationship with the local government; The other part of the non-independent organizations, because of their business relationship with the invested company, can not carry out effective supervision over the company's insiders, which will weaken their motivation to participate in corporate governance and will not be conducive to the improvement of the company's performance. This paper puts forward research hypotheses, collects and collates the data, takes corporate performance as explained variable and institutional investor's shareholding ratio as explanatory variable, and empirically tests the different effects of heterogeneous institutional investor's shareholding on listed company's performance. Through regression analysis, it is found that the change of overall institutional investor's shareholding ratio is significantly positively correlated with corporate performance, while the change of independent institutional investor's shareholding ratio is significantly positively correlated with corporate performance at the level of 1%. However, there is no significant correlation between the change of non-independent institutional investors' shareholding ratio and corporate performance, which indicates that the positive role of the overall institutional investors is mainly due to the existence of independent institutional investors. Independent institutional investors will actively participate in the corporate governance, improve the corporate governance structure and improve corporate performance after holding company shares, while non-independent institutional investors will participate in corporate governance because of the impact of ownership size and conflicts of interest. It is difficult to give full play to shareholder activism, so the role of improving company performance is not prominent.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.48

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