证券分析师与公司盈余管理行为之间影响机制的实证研究

发布时间：2018-02-24 03:07

本文关键词： 分析师盈余管理盈利预测外部监督　出处：《南京大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国的资本市场是一个新兴的市场,而作为资本市场重要组成部分的证券分析师更是一个年轻的行业。分析师通过分析报告和盈利预测的方式向市场投资者传递隐藏于财务报表背后的信息,减轻了投资者与被投资者之间的信息不对称的现象,并在一定程度上促进了整个资本市场的资源配置效率,成为公司治理的一种外部监督机制。由于我国资本市场法律环境尚不健全,我国上市公司管理层普遍存在着盈余管理的行为,这使得盈余管理成为国内学者研究的热点。在理论上代理理论和信息不对称理论均为管理层的盈余管理行为提供了操作的空间。鉴于我国资本市场特殊的历史制度背景,上市公司管理层具有更强烈的盈余管理动机,并且采用的盈余管理手段也与发达国家成熟的资本市场上的上市公司不同。虽然国外的文献对于两者在国外资本市场的关系有充分的研究,但是国内关于二者关系的研究尚未形成体系。为此,本文力图研究分析师作为外部监督机制与公司管理层的盈余管理行为有着怎样的相互关系,以此揭露分析师对于公司治理和资本市场的重要作用。本文选取2008-2012年我国深沪两市A股上市公司为研究样本,通过构建分析师与盈余管理两者的多元回归模型,从选择关注公司的标准、分析报告的预测结果和盈余管理手段的改变等多个方面讨论两者的关系。本文证明了分析师在选择目标公司时,偏好关注盈余管理程度较小的公司,回避盈余管理程度大的公司。针对已经有分析师关注的公司样本发现,随着分析师跟踪人数的增加,对于公司管理层的外部监督压力增大,公司的盈余管理程度在逐渐变小。本文也发现了公司管理层盈余管理行为会对分析师预测结果产生影响,实证结果证明,公司的盈余管理程度越高,分析师预测准确性越差；公司盈余管理程度越高,分析师预测的意见分歧越大。这是由于管理层的盈余管理行为,干涉了财务报告数据的生成过程,降低了财务报告会计信息的可靠性,导致了分析师对于公司未来盈余的误判。最后,本文证明了分析师跟进人数的增多会迫使公司管理层改变盈余管理的手段,管理层会采用更加隐蔽的方法来进行盈余管理方法。在研究过程中,本文还发现机构投资者持股也在一定程度上对公司管理层的盈余管理行为起到了监督作用。虽然机构投资者监督的力度或者效果不及分析师行业,但是随着我国资本市场的不断完善,机构投资者由于其投资数额巨大,拥有专业的管理和分析人才,在资本市场上的角色将会越来越重要。最后,本文结合论文的结论对于分析师行业发展提出了建议,并指出了本文研究中的创新和贡献,也讨论了本次研究的不足和未来研究的方向。
[Abstract]:China's capital market is an emerging market. Securities analysts, an important part of the capital market, are a young industry. Analysts pass information hidden behind financial statements to market investors by analyzing reports and forecasting earnings. It alleviates the information asymmetry between the investor and the investor, promotes the resource allocation efficiency of the whole capital market to a certain extent, and becomes an external supervision mechanism of corporate governance. Because the legal environment of our country's capital market is not perfect, the management of listed companies in our country generally exists the behavior of earnings management. This makes earnings management a hot topic for domestic scholars. In theory, agency theory and information asymmetry theory provide space for management's earnings management behavior. In view of the special historical background of China's capital market, The managers of listed companies have stronger motivation of earnings management, and the methods of earnings management are different from those of listed companies in the mature capital markets of developed countries. Although there has been sufficient research on the relationship between the two in foreign capital markets in foreign literature, the domestic research on the relationship between the two has not yet formed a system. This paper tries to study the relationship between analysts as an external supervision mechanism and earnings management behavior of corporate management in order to reveal the important role of analysts in corporate governance and capital markets. This paper selects the A-share listed companies in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets from 2008 to 2012 as the research samples, and constructs the multiple regression model between the analysts and the earnings management to select the standards to focus on the companies. The relationship between the forecast results and the change of earnings management methods is discussed. This paper proves that when selecting target companies, analysts prefer to focus on companies with less earnings management and avoid companies with higher earnings management. With the increase of the number of analysts tracking, the external supervision pressure on the company management is increasing, and the degree of earnings management is gradually becoming smaller. This paper also found that the behavior of management earnings management will have an impact on the analyst forecast results. The empirical results show that the higher the level of earnings management, the worse the accuracy of analysts' forecasts; the higher the level of earnings management, the more divergent opinions analysts have. It interferes with the process of producing financial report data, reduces the reliability of accounting information of financial report, and leads to the misjudgment of the company's future earnings. This paper proves that the increase in the number of analysts will force the management of the company to change the means of earnings management, and the management will adopt a more covert approach to earnings management. In the course of the research, this paper also found that institutional investor shareholding also has a supervisory effect on the earnings management behavior of the management of the company to a certain extent, although the institutional investor supervision is not as strong or effective as that of the analyst industry. However, with the continuous improvement of the capital market in China, the role of institutional investors in the capital market will become more and more important because of their huge investment amount and professional management and analysis personnel. Finally, based on the conclusion of the paper, the paper puts forward some suggestions for the development of the analyst industry, points out the innovation and contribution of this research, and discusses the shortcomings of this study and the direction of future research.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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