终极控制股东、投资者保护与会计稳健性

发布时间：2018-03-04 13:33

本文选题：会计稳健性　切入点：终极控制股东　出处：《西南交通大学》2015年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：会计信息是公司信息的重要来源。高质量会计信息的重要特征之一是会计稳健性,即会计盈余确认好消息比确认坏消息具有更高的验证要求,从而导致会计盈余反映坏消息比好消息更及时。会计确认好消息和坏消息的这种不对称及时性被称为会计稳健性。会计稳健性具有重要的公司治理作用。因为稳健的会计信息能够及时向股东、债权人等传递信号,缓解信息不对称,有助于降低融资成本,提高融资效率,缓解投资过度与投资不足等问题,从而较好地保护投资者合法利益。21世纪初,安然、世通等重大财务舞弊案的爆发,以及全球股市的衰退引起了理论界和实务界对会计信息质量的高度重视。会计稳健性成为学者、投资人、分析师、监管者和财经媒体等关注的重点问题。当前,中国处于经济转轨时期,存在特殊的制度背景,比如,股权集中、投资者保护水平不高、经理人市场不健全、接管市场机制薄弱等。终极控制股东与外部投资者之间的代理矛盾成为中国上市公司的主要矛盾。在中国特定的制度背景下,终极控制股东如何影响会计稳健性?投资者保护是否提高了公司披露的会计信息的稳健性?终极控制股东与会计稳健性之间的关系是否以及如何受投资者保护的影响?这些问题是当前中国资本市场发展和公司治理亟待解决的理论和实践问题,也是研究会计稳健性更为现实的视角。纵观相关文献,国内学者对中国上市公司会计稳健性的研究存在的问题表现在：缺乏对终极控制股东如何影响会计稳健性的理论与实证的全面分析,如,金字塔股权结构、金字塔层级、终极控制股东派出董事席位及特征对会计稳健性的影响有待进一步考察等；缺乏对投资者保护差异如何影响会计稳健性的研究,如投资者保护水平的时期差异、区域差异等；缺乏投资者保护与终极控制股东的相互作用如何影响会计稳健性的深入探讨；缺乏对中国上市公司会计稳健性制度背景的深入探究。为此,本文研究终极控制股东、投资者保护及二者的相互作用对会计稳健性的影响。在中国特殊的制度背景下,开展终极控制股东、投资者保护与会计稳健性之间关系研究具有重要的研究意义,主要体现在：第一,剖析终极控制股东的掠夺行为和信息操纵行为,揭示终极控制股东在会计稳健性中的作用机理,有助于增强契约的效率性和投资者进行合理的投资决策,减缓信息和代理问题；第二,揭示投资者保护在会计稳健性中的作用机理,寻求有利于提高会计稳健性的制度因素,有助于提高上市公司和证券市场运作的透明度,降低信息披露主体的道德风险和机会主义行为,推动公司治理机制的不断完善,促进证券市场的健康发展；第三,剖析终极控制股东与会计稳健性之间关系是否以及如何随着投资者保护的变化而变化,探讨提高包括会计稳健性在内的会计信息质量的途径或方法,为提高中国上市公司会计信息质量和透明度,降低信息不对称、优化资本市场资源配置提供经验证据和政策建议。文章研究主要内容表现在五个方面：第一,文章对投资者保护、终极控制股东和会计稳健性三个方面的相关文献进行回顾。通过文献回顾发现,在终极控制股东方面,国内外学者主要从终极控制股东分布、盈余管理、公司价值、会计信息等角度进行了深入研究,为终极控制股东对盈余管理、公司价值、会计信息等的影响提供大量的经验证据。在投资者保护方面,国内外学者主要研究了投资者保护对资本结构、公司价值、融资成本,以及会计信息等方面的影响。在会计稳健性方面,国内外学者重点研究了会计稳健性的度量、会计稳健性的存在性,以及会计稳健性的影响因素。研究发现,在终极控制股东、投资者保护与会计稳健性三者之间关系的探讨方面,国外学者对不同法源下不同国家股权结构(包括终极股权结构)与会计稳健性的关系进行了国际比较,但是,未就特定国家投资者保护水平的时期差异和区域差异对会计稳健性的影响进行研究,也未考察投资者保护是否以及如何影响终极控制股东与会计稳健性之间的关系。国内关于终极控制股东、投资者保护与会计稳健性关系的研究存在许多不足,如内容不全面,方法较单一等。第二,文章对中国上市公司会计制度、公司治理特征、资本市场发展状况、投资者法律保护等制度背景进行分析,为解释中国上市公司投资者保护、终极控制股东与会计稳健性的关系提供现实背景和理论依据。研究发现,中国的会计稳健性原则是在中国计划经济向市场经济转化的过程中从国外引入,在中国会计与国际会计接轨和趋同的过程中得到加强。中国独特的制度背景以及由此导致的会计与证券监管是中国会计稳健性得以强化的外在制度原因。虽然中国投资者保护措施不断完善,但是,投资者保护水平总体较低。这些制度背景决定了中国上市公司终极控制股东、投资者保护与会计稳健性之间的关系具有自身特征。第三,理论分析了终极控制股东、投资者保护与会计稳健性的关系,并提出研究假设。金字塔股权结构能够在保证权力不被稀释的情况下通过金字塔层级的杠杆作用放大终极控制股东的控制权,实现以较小的现金流量权控制数倍价值的公司,从而增加了终极控制股东的掠夺动机与能力。为了逃避其掠夺行为的法律制裁和社会监督,控制股东通过操纵财务报告过程和信息披露政策掩盖其机会主义行为。因此,金字塔股权结构及受其影响的终极控制股东股权特征(包括金字塔层级、现金流量权、两权偏离度、派出董事等)影响上市公司会计稳健性水平。投资者保护影响股权集中度,是抑制控制股东掠夺行为的重要机制,也是解决会计信息质量问题的重要措施。第四,应用会计稳健性度量模型检验终极控制股东特征(包括金字塔股权结构、金字塔层级、现金流量权、两权偏离度、派出董事等)、投资者保护(包括投资者保护时期差异和区域差异)及二者的相互作用对中国上市公司会计稳健性水平的影响。研究发现,西方国家会计稳健性的影响因素对会计稳健性的作用机理不能完全解释中国会计稳健性状况,中国制度层面贯彻会计稳健性原则对上市公司会计稳健性影响较大；拥有金字塔股权结构的公司比不具有金字塔股权结构的公司的会计稳健性水平更低。终极控制股东的金字塔股权结构安排加剧了终极控制股东与外部投资者之间的代理矛盾；金字塔层级与会计稳健性负相关,即金字塔层级越多的公司会计稳健性越低。这些公司的终极控制股东可能成为及时披露会计信息的阻滞力量；终极控制股东现金流量权对会计稳健性产生负面影响,这一影响主要通过延迟确认损失产生；终极控制股东两权偏离度越大的公司会计稳健性越低；国有终极控制和非国有终极控制两类公司在会计稳健性方面差异较大,例如,与国有终极控制公司相比,非国有终极控制公司金字塔层级对会计稳健性的负面影响更大；国有终极控制股东两权偏离度越大的公司会计越不稳健；在现金流量权方面,与非国有终极控制公司相比,国有终极控制股东持有现金流量权越大的公司延迟确认了好消息和坏消息；终极控制股东派出董事能够在不增加持股的情况下加大对董事会的控制。终极控制股东派出董事代表控制股东利益,派出董事越多,代表债权人、职工等其他公司主体的利益越少；非国有终极控制股东派出董事的政府背景降低了会计稳健性。政府背景是有价值的资源,带给公司融资便利、税收优惠、降低政府管制等明显的政策好处,从而降低了公司运营管理对稳健会计信息的市场需求；投资者保护在一定程度上提高了会计稳健性；东部地区相对更高的投资者保护水平促进了该地区会计稳健性的提高；但是,中国投资者保护对会计稳健性的促进作用尚未得到充分发挥；随着投资者保护水平的提高,没有充分的证据表明投资者保护降低了金字塔层级、终极控制股东现金流量权、两权偏离度,以及终极控制股东派出董事与会计稳健性之间的负相关关系。研究结论肯定了委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和投资者保护理论等对会计稳健性影响因素及作用方向的解释。第五,根据结论为提高中国上市公司会计信息质量、降低信息不对称、缓解委托代理矛盾、保护投资者利益、优化资本市场资源配置提供政策性建议。
[Abstract]:Accounting information is an important source of information. One of the important characteristics of high quality accounting information is the accounting conservatism, accounting earnings has confirmed the good news shows higher requirements than confirmed the bad news, resulting in accounting earnings reflect bad news than good news. More timely accounting recognition of good and bad news is the asymmetric timeliness known as accounting conservatism. Accounting conservatism plays an important role in corporate governance. Because the conservative accounting information can be timely to the shareholders, creditors and other signals, alleviate the information asymmetry, help to reduce financing costs, improve financing efficiency, alleviate the problem of excessive investment and insufficient investment, so as to better protect the legitimate interests of investors.21 century. Enron, WorldCom and other major outbreak of financial fraud, and the decline in global stock markets caused by the theory and practice of accounting information quality The degree of attention. Accounting conservatism becomes scholars, investors, analysts, regulators and other key issues of financial media attention. At present, Chinese in economic transition period, there are special institutional background, for example, equity concentration, investor protection level is not high, the manager market is not perfect, takeover market mechanism is weak. The contradiction between the ultimate controlling shareholder agency and outside investors become the main contradiction China listed companies. In Chinese specific system background, how the ultimate controlling shareholder influence accounting conservatism? Whether investor protection improves the company's disclosure of accounting information conservatism? Affect the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting conservatism whether and how to protect investors? These problems are the theory and the practice of the China development of capital market and corporate governance to be solved, as well as more research on Accounting Conservatism The point of view of the reality. The related literature, there are domestic scholars to study the China listed companies accounting conservatism problem in: the lack of a comprehensive analysis of the ultimate controlling shareholder theory and empirical how to influence accounting conservatism as Pyramid ownership structure, Pyramid level, the ultimate controlling shareholders sent board seats and the characteristics of influence on Accounting Conservatism further investigation; the lack of research on investor protection difference how to influence the accounting conservatism, such as differences in the level of investor protection period, regional differences; explore how interactions lack of investor protection and the ultimate controlling shareholder influence accounting conservatism; the lack of research on the background of accounting conservatism of listed companies Chinese system deeply. Therefore, the shareholders study on the influence of ultimate control, investor protection and the interaction of the two on Accounting Conservatism Chinese. In the special institutional background, carry out the ultimate controlling shareholder, has important significance to study the relationship between investor protection and accounting conservatism, mainly reflected in: first, the predatory behavior and information manipulation behavior analysis of ultimate controlling shareholder, and reveal mechanism of ultimate controlling shareholder in the accounting conservatism, helps to enhance the efficiency of the contract and investors to make reasonable investment decisions, reduce information and agency problems; second, to reveal the mechanism of investor protection in the accounting conservatism, seek to improve institutional factors of accounting conservatism, help to improve the listed companies and the securities market transparency, reduce the information disclosure of the main moral hazard and the opportunism behavior, promote improvement of corporate governance, promote the healthy development of the securities market; third, the analysis of ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting firm Whether the relationship between health and how to change with the change of investor protection, including to improve the accounting conservatism, the way the quality of accounting information or methods to improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies China and transparency, reduce information asymmetry, to provide empirical evidence and policy suggestions of optimizing the allocation of capital market resources. The main content of the article in five first, the article on the investor protection, literature review three aspects of the ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting conservatism. Through literature review found that the ultimate controlling shareholder, domestic and foreign scholars mainly from the ultimate controlling shareholder distribution, earnings management, corporate value, accounting information of in-depth research, as the ultimate control the shareholder on earnings management, the value of the company, provide accounting information such as a number of empirical evidence. In the protection of investors. Face, domestic and foreign scholars mainly study the protection of investors on the capital structure, corporate value, financing costs, and the influence of accounting information. In the aspect of accounting conservatism, measure of domestic and foreign scholars focus on the accounting conservatism, the existence of accounting conservatism, influencing factors and accounting conservatism. The study found that in the ultimate control the shareholders, to explore the relationship between investor protection and accounting conservatism of the three, foreign scholars of different countries under different legal ownership structure (including the ultimate ownership structure and accounting conservatism) relationship of the international comparison, however, no effect of the differences and regional differences in country specific investor protection level during the period of accounting conservatism. Also did not investigate whether and how investor protection affects the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting conservatism. The ultimate control Study on shareholders, investor protection and accounting conservatism has many deficiencies, such as the content is not comprehensive, the method is simple. Second, the China listed company accounting system, corporate governance, capital market development condition, investor legal protection system background analysis, in order to explain the investor protection China listed, to provide realistic background and according to the relationship between the theory of ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting conservatism. The study found that accounting conservatism principle is introduced into Chinese from abroad in the process of transforming Chinese planned economy to market economy, to be strengthened in the process of China accounting and international accounting standards and convergence. China unique institutional background and the resulting accounting and securities supervision is China accounting conservatism to external institutional reasons. Although China strengthen investor protection measures continue to improve, however, investors The level of protection is low. The system background determines the ultimate controlling shareholder of listed companies Chinese, the relationship between investor protection and accounting conservatism has its own characteristics. Third, the theoretical analysis of the ultimate controlling shareholder, the relationship between investor protection and accounting conservatism, and put forward the research hypothesis. The Pyramid ownership structure can guarantee the control of leverage through Pyramid power level is not diluted under the condition of amplification of the ultimate controlling shareholders, with the minimum cash flow rights control several times the value of the company, thus increasing the ultimate controlling shareholder plunder motivation and ability. In order to escape the legal sanction and social supervision of piracy, controlling shareholders by manipulating the financial reporting process and information disclosure policy conceal their opportunism behavior. Therefore, the ultimate controlling shareholder equity ownership structure and the characteristics of Pyramid affected by the packet ( The Pyramid level, cash flow rights, two right deviation, sent to the directors etc.) affect the accounting conservatism of listed companies. The level of investor protection affects ownership is an important mechanism for controlling shareholders, suppression of piracy, but also an important measure to solve the quality problem of accounting information. Fourth, application of accounting conservatism measurement of ultimate control shareholders inspection model (including Pyramid Pyramid level, ownership structure, cash flow rights, two right deviation, sent to the directors etc.), investor protection (including the differences and regional differences of investor protection period) influence the level of accounting conservatism and the interaction between the two of China listed companies. The study found that the factors can affect accounting conservatism in western countries to fully explain the accounting conservatism China accounting conservatism, the system level Chinese implementation of accounting conservatism of listed companies Accounting conservatism has a greater impact; Pyramid equity structure of the company to lower the level of accounting conservatism than Pyramid does not have the ownership structure of the company. The Pyramid equity structure the ultimate controlling shareholder arrangement intensifies the agency conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholder and external investors; negative correlation between the Pyramid level and accounting conservatism, namely Pyramid level more companies lower accounting conservatism the ultimate controlling shareholders. These companies may be blocking force of timely disclosure of accounting information; the ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow right have a negative impact on accounting conservatism, this effect mainly through delayed loss; the ultimate controlling shareholder of two right deviation degree is the larger the company Accounting Conservatism is lower; for example, state-owned and non state-owned ultimate control the ultimate control of two larger companies, differences in accounting conservatism, and the ultimate control of state-owned We compared the negative impact of non-state companies in Pyramid the level of accounting conservatism more state-owned shareholders; the ultimate control of two right deviation degree more corporate accounting is not stable; in the cash flow rights, compared with non-state companies, state-owned ultimate controlling shareholder holding cash flow rights greater delay confirm the good news and bad news; the ultimate controlling shareholder can increase the directors appointed control board. Under the condition of not increasing ownership of ultimate controlling shareholder on behalf of directors appointed shareholders, directors appointed more representative of creditors, employees and other corporate interests less; non state-owned ultimate controlling shareholder directors appointed by the the background of the government to reduce the accounting conservatism. The background is a valuable resource, to bring the company financing convenience, preferential tax, reduce government regulation obvious political Good policy, so as to reduce the company's operational management of robust accounting information market; investor protection in a certain extent improve the accounting conservatism; investor protection level of the eastern region is relatively higher promoted accounting conservatism in the region increased; however, China promotes the protection of investors for accounting conservatism has not been brought into full play; along with raising the level of investor protection, there is no evidence to show that investor protection reduces the level of Pyramid, the ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow right, two right deviation degree, the negative relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders and directors appointed and accounting conservatism. The conclusion of the study confirmed the principal-agent theory to explain the influencing factors and the role of accounting conservatism direction the asymmetric information theory and the theory of investor protection. Fifth, according to the conclusion in order to improve the China listed company The policy recommendations are provided for the quality of information, reducing information asymmetry, alleviating principal and agency contradictions, protecting the interests of investors, and optimizing the allocation of resources in the capital market.

【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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