大股东控制下的定向增发问题研究

发布时间：2018-03-04 23:31

本文选题：大股东控制　切入点：定向增发　出处：《石河子大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自2006年5月8日中国证监会颁布实施《上市公司证券发行管理办法》（证监会第30号令）后，资本市场的融资功能重新启动。并于股权分置改革之后，对资本市场的融资功能提出了“三步走”战略，其中第一步就是恢复不增加即期扩容压力的定向增发以及以股本权证方式进行的远期再融资，自此，定向增发成为一种制度性的融资举措，并得到快速发展。2007年9月17日中国证监会发布实施了《上市公司非公开发行股票实施细则》，进一步规定了上市公司非公开发行股票行为。虽然定向增发有助于企业以较低的成本实现融资、并有助于企业实现整体上市、不会增加股市的即期扩容、同时还有助于巩固大股东的控制力。但是在定向增发的过程中也存在大股东控制下的财富转移行为。因此，研究大股东控制对定向增发决策、规模、折价的影响以及定向增发行为对中小股东利益的影响具有重要的意义。本文首先回顾了近几年关于定向增发的相关研究，，并基于委托代理理论和信息不对称理论阐述了大股东控制对定向增发行为的影响，在此基础上分析大股东控制定向增发过程对中小股东利益的影响。接着以2006-2011年定向增发成功的上市公司为研究样本，运用回归模型检验了第一大股东持股比例、股权制衡、大股东性质对定向增发决策、定向增发规模、以及定向增发折价的影响，最后进一步研究了定向增发行为对中小股东利益的影响。研究发现：（1）定向增发决策方面，第一大股东持股比例与定向增发决策成显著正相关关系，而且国有上市公司更倾向于进行定向增发。股权制衡对于第一大股东持股比例与定向增发决策的关系没有起到抑制作用，表现出第二到第五大股东持股比例与定向增发决策成显著正相关关系。（2）定向增发规模方面，第一大股东持股比例与定向增发规模成显著正相关关系，可以推测出当定向增发规模较大时，大股东越有机会进行财富的转移。股权制衡对于定向增发规模起到制约作用，即大多数股东支持小规模的增发。（3）定向增发折价方面，第一大股东持股比例、第二到第五大股东持股比例与定向增发折价呈正相关关系，第一大股东的性质与定向增发折价呈负相关关系，但不显著。（4）中小股东侵害方面，定向增发决策、定向增发折价对中小股东的侵害并不显著，符合定向增发对中小股东侵害低于配股和公开增发的论据，折价不能代表对中小股东的侵害。定向增发的规模却与中小股东的侵害呈显著正相关关系，说明当定向增发达到一定规模后，仍会对中小股东造成侵害。本文的研究结论对于投资者正确认识定向增发有一定的指导意义，有助于证监会合理制定定向增发的原则，防范各种危害中小股东利益的行为发生，保证定向增发的客观性和有效性。本文的研究结论，对于不同股权结构的上市公司的股权融资政策的制定、中小股东对企业的投资决策、以及上市公司的股权结构的优化有着重要的理论意义和实践意义。
[Abstract]:Since May 8, 2006 Chinese Commission promulgated "the issuance of securities of listed companies management approach" (the Commission Decree No. thirtieth), capital market financing function. After the restart and the reform on equity, capital market financing function and put forward the "three step" strategy, the first step is to restore the long-term orientation does not increase spot the expansion pressure and the issuance of equity warrants way of refinancing, since then, private placement has become a system of financing initiatives and the rapid development of.2007 in September 17th China Commission promulgated the "rules for the implementation of the non-public offering of shares of listed companies, further provisions of the non-public offering of shares of listed companies. Although the private placement will help enterprises to lower the cost of financing, and help enterprises to achieve the overall market, will not increase the immediate expansion of the stock market, but also help. Solid control of major shareholders. But in the process of private placement are controlled by large shareholder wealth transfer behavior. Therefore, research on the scale of control of the private placement decisions, major shareholders, discount and the influence of the private placement impact is of great significance to the interests of small shareholders.
This paper reviews the related research on the private placement in recent years, and based on the principal-agent theory and asymmetric information theory to explain the impact of large shareholder control of private placement behavior, based on the analysis of large shareholders control the process of the private placement of the shareholders influence. Then in 2006-2011 years of successful private placement of listed companies the research sample, using the regression model to test the proportion of the first largest shareholder, equity balance, nature of major shareholders of private placement decisions, the size of private placement, and the discount of private placement, the last step of the private placement on the interests of small shareholders.
The study found that: (1) the decision of private placement, the proportion of the first shareholder and the decision of private placement has a significant positive correlation, and the state-owned listed companies prefer equity balance for private placement. The relationship between the proportion of the first shareholder and placement decision not to restrain, showed second to fifth major shareholders ownership and private placement decision was observablypositive. (2) the size of private placement, the proportion of the first largest shareholder and the size of private placement have a positive relationship can be inferred when the private placement of large scale, large shareholders have the opportunity to transfer more wealth. Equity balance for private placement to scale restrict action, namely the issuance of the majority shareholder support small scale. (3) the discount of private placement, the proportion of the first largest shareholder, the second to the fifth largest shareholding ratio and The discount was positively correlated with directional properties of the first major shareholder discount was negatively correlated, but not significant. (4) small shareholders, the decision of private placement, private placement discount infringement of minority shareholders is not significant, meet the placement of small shareholders than additional rights and public arguments against discount not representative of small and medium shareholders. The size of the private placement and medium-sized shareholders is positively related, that when the private placement reaches a certain size, will encroach on minority shareholders.
The conclusion of this paper for investors to correct understanding has certain guiding significance of private placement, help the Commission to formulate reasonable principles of private placement, to prevent the occurrence of various acts against the interests of minority shareholders, to ensure the objectivity and validity of private placement. The conclusion of this paper, for the development of different ownership structure of the listed company's equity financing policy the investment decision making of small and medium shareholders of enterprises, has important theoretical and practical significance and the optimization of the ownership structure of listed companies.

【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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