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基于拍卖理论的我国城市土地出让模式研究

发布时间:2018-03-07 04:09

  本文选题:国有土地 切入点:出让模式 出处:《西安建筑科技大学》2013年博士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:当前招标拍卖挂牌出让模式已成为城市国有土地使用权出让的主要方式。土地招拍挂制度遵循市场公平交易的规则,按照“价高者得”的原则对稀缺的土地资源进行有效配置,大幅提高了政府土地出让的收益。不过,伴随土地招拍挂制度的实施,2003年起城市土地市场地价大幅提高,地王频出,城市房价快速增长,地方政府土地收入显著增加,引起社会的普遍关注和土地招拍挂制度的质疑。那么招拍挂模式是否是推高地价房价的主要原因?“价高者得”的规则是否合理?如何治理地王问题?围绕上述问题本文主要进行了如下方面的研究: 1)基于拍卖理论的土地出让模式分析 为体现土地的价值类型特性和估价特点,改变基准模型的假设,建立了一级密封价格拍卖模型和英式拍卖模型,求解均衡报价发现土地公共价值u和投标均衡价bi之间存在正相关的关系,从而说明了招拍挂模式存在影响地价的内在机制,房价地价的增长是外部市场供求因素和内部制度性因素共同作用的结果,“价高者得”原则与政府追求土地价值最大化的要求是一致的。然后探讨了现行土地招拍挂模式的不足,提出地方政府要从公共管理者角度重建土地出让的目标,应追求合理适度的土地收益和提供更多的公共产品。最后从完善现有土地招拍挂模式的角度,结合实践和理论分析,总结出几种新型的土地出让模式。 2)土地出让模式与企业行为分析 本文通过从投标人企业行为研究我国土地出让模式的完善问题,选择“地王”作为研究对象说明土地市场失灵的情况。首先将投标者的风险态度引入基准模型进行分析求解,印证了投标者的风险态度是影响竞标结果(如“地王”)的重要因素。再者在对“地王”后续开发研究中发现存在部分“地王囤地”的情况,通过建立动态博弈模型分析了产生问题的原因:政府监管不力和市场自身缺陷。然后从事前预防、事中督查、事后处罚三个角度提出了遏制“地王”及“地王囤地”的对策和建议。最后通过一个数值模拟解释了“面粉价贵于面包价”现象的合理性及风险。 3)土地出让模式与政府行为分析 本文对地方政府行为对土地出让模式的影响进行了研究。通过对地方政府及官员对城市土地出让的干预行为、手段和寻租动机研究,发现挂牌出让为主是地方政府干预的结果。通过研究地方政府的三种经济行为与供地行为的关系,,揭示了其控制供地行为发展地方经济的逻辑:地方政府通过支撑高房价高地价从土地出让获取巨额收益,并将收益用于基建投资和补贴工业用地,促进地区经济发展和新一轮的土地增值,从而实现土地收益和产出最大化的目标。但这种发展模式存在对土地财政的“路径依赖”。 4)完善我国土地出让模式的原则和建议 在总结前文研究基础上,提出了完善土地招拍挂模式的三个原则,从多个方面给出了完善土地招拍挂模式的具体建议。
[Abstract]:The bidding auction listing mode has become the main way of city use right of state-owned land sold. The land auction system to follow the rules of the market even bargain, the effective allocation of scarce land resources in accordance with the "highest bidder" principle, a substantial increase in the government land transfer income. However, with the implementation of the land auction hung system, 2003 city land price increases, the most expensive land frequent City, the rapid growth of housing prices, the local government land revenue increased significantly, which caused widespread concern and social land auction system questioned. Then the auction model is the main reason for pushing up land prices of the "highest bidder"? The rules are reasonable? How to control the problem of the most expensive land? Around the above problems this paper mainly research on the following aspects:
1) analysis of land leasing model based on auction theory
For value type characteristics and features of land valuation, change the assumption of the benchmark model, established the first price sealed auction model and auction model, solving the equilibrium price found a positive correlation between U value and land public bidding equilibrium price Bi, which shows the existence of bidding mechanism of the influence of land hanging mode the price premium growth is the common factors of supply and demand of external market and internal institutional factors, the "highest bidder" principle and the government to pursue the maximum value of the land requirements are the same. And then discusses the current shortage of land auction hanging mode, the local government from the reconstruction of land target angle of public management that should be the pursuit of reasonable land revenue and provide more public products. Finally, from the improvement of the existing land auction model point of view, combined with the practice and theoretical analysis, Several new models of land transfer are summarized.
2) land leasing model and enterprise behavior analysis
In this paper, through the research on the improvement of China's land transfer mode from the bidder behavior of enterprises, select the most expensive land "as the object of study indicates that the land market failure. The bidder's risk attitude into the benchmark model for analysis, confirms the bidder's risk attitude is bidding results (such as" the most expensive land "). An important factor in" the most expensive land. In the subsequent development of research found in the part of "the most expensive land hoarding", by establishing a dynamic game model to analyze the cause of the problem: government supervision and market defects. And then engaged in the prevention, supervision and punishment afterwards that, three aspects were proposed to prevent the "the most expensive land" and "the most expensive land hoarding countermeasures and suggestions. Finally, through a numerical simulation explains the rationality and the risk price of flour in your bread price" phenomenon.
3) land leasing model and government behavior analysis
This paper studied the effect of local government on land transfer mode. Through the intervention of local government and officials of the city land transfer, research means and rent-seeking motives, found that landauction is mainly local government intervention results. Through the relationship between the three kinds of economic behavior of local government and for the behavior, reveals the the control for the behavior of the local economic development: the logic of local government through the support of high prices to obtain huge profits from the high price of land, and will return for investment in infrastructure and industrial subsidies, promoting the development of regional economy and a new round of land value, land revenue and output in order to achieve the goal of maximizing the development. Model on land finance "path dependence".
4) the principles and suggestions for improving the land leasing model in China
On the basis of summarizing the previous studies, three principles for improving the mode of land acquisition and auction are put forward, and the specific suggestions for improving the land auction mode are given from many aspects.

【学位授予单位】:西安建筑科技大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F299.23;F713.359

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