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房地产市场各个经济主体的寻租行为分析

发布时间:2018-03-08 16:29

  本文选题:房地产市场 切入点:寻租 出处:《东北财经大学》2013年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:房地产业作为我国国民经济的支柱产业和经济发展的增长点,对我国经济保持快速增长起到重要的支持作用。全国房地产开发投资增速始终保持在20%左右,远远高于经济增长速度,一直拉动国民经济持续、快速发展。不仅如此,房地产业的产业链长、规模大,对其他上、下游产业的关联效用和促进效用巨大,是我国的主导产业,房地产业的波动会直接影响我国的宏观经济状况。同时,我国房地产业由于历史短而且速度快,所以在高速发展的同时,也积聚了大量负面效用,具体表现在:房价“非理性”增长、土地市场秩序混乱、政府职能不明晰、房地产企业行为不规范、市场纠纷多等各个方面。 同时,我国房地产市场存在大量的寻租行为。在我国,土地所有权收归国有,政府垄断土地供应,地方政府依靠出让国有土地资源获得财政收入。考虑到土地资源的稀缺性,房地产商纷纷展开寻租。而且,我国房地产市场机制不完善,仅仅依靠市场不能高效率得配置土地,很多时候需要政府的干预、监督甚至决策,导致权力寻租事件屡禁不止 房地产市场上的寻租活动是一种非生产性的竞争活动,是一种社会福利的净损失。首先,房地产开发商为了获得垄断地位,需要游说相关部门,需要浪费资源去寻求政府的特殊保护。其次,为了应对开发商的寻租,政府需要浪费资源去监督惩罚或者政府浪费时间和精力去设租,积极寻求与开发商“合谋,,最后,当寻租活动完成后,市场上充斥了大量的寻租者,为此,政府的监督部门需要浪费大量的时间和精力进行治理,否则会影响房地产行业的长期可持续发展。而且,寻租活动得以实现,政府与开发商瓜分垄断利润的同时,相关的生产者和购房者将为此付出代价,这种代价比寻租者所得到的利润要高,所以导致了社会福利的净损失。 本文在有限理性的假设下,对房地产市场中不同利益主体之间的关系,从博弈论的角度出发,建立双方博弈模型,分析开发商、地方政府的寻租行为,本文总结出遏制房地产市场寻租行为从以下几个方面入手:第一,改革过去以单一经济指标为核心的政绩考核体系。第二,完善房地产市场机制,减少房地产行业中的政府干预。第三,政府拿出部分上地出让金用来建设保障性住房。第四,加速房地产行业相关法律法规建设、完善房地产行业的监督惩罚机制。
[Abstract]:As the pillar industry of our national economy and the growth point of economic development, the real estate industry plays an important role in supporting the rapid economic growth of our country. Far higher than the speed of economic growth, it has been driving the sustained and rapid development of the national economy. Moreover, the industrial chain of the real estate industry is long and large, and it has a huge related utility and promotion utility to other upstream and downstream industries. It is the leading industry in our country. The fluctuation of the real estate industry will directly affect the macroeconomic situation of our country. At the same time, due to its short history and fast speed, the real estate industry in our country has accumulated a large number of negative effects while developing at a high speed. The concrete manifestation is: the housing price "irrational" growth, the land market order is chaotic, the government function is not clear, the real estate enterprise behavior is not standard, the market dispute and so on each aspect. At the same time, there is a lot of rent-seeking behavior in the real estate market of our country. In our country, land ownership is nationalized, the government monopolizes land supply, and local governments rely on the transfer of state-owned land resources to obtain financial revenue. Real estate developers have launched rent-seeking. Moreover, China's real estate market mechanism is not perfect, relying on the market alone can not be highly efficient allocation of land, many times need government intervention, supervision and even decision-making, leading to repeated power rent-seeking events. Rent-seeking in the real estate market is an unproductive competitive activity and a net loss of social welfare. First, in order to gain a monopoly, real estate developers need to lobby the relevant departments. The government needs to waste resources to seek special protection from the government. Secondly, in order to deal with developers' rent-seeking, the government needs to waste resources to supervise punishment or the government wastes time and energy to set up rent, actively seeking to "collude" with developers. Finally, When the rent-seeking activity is completed, the market is full of rent-seekers. For this reason, the government supervision departments need to waste a lot of time and energy on governance, otherwise, it will affect the long-term sustainable development of the real estate industry. Rent-seeking activities can be realized, the government and developers share the monopoly profits, the relevant producers and buyers will pay the price, which is higher than the rent-seekers' profits, resulting in a net loss of social welfare. Based on the hypothesis of limited rationality, this paper, from the perspective of game theory, establishes a game model to analyze the rent-seeking behavior of developers and local governments in the real estate market. This paper sums up the following aspects to curb the rent-seeking behavior in the real estate market: first, to reform the past performance appraisal system with a single economic index as the core; second, to improve the real estate market mechanism. Reduce the government intervention in the real estate industry. Third, the government put out part of the transfer of land to build affordable housing. 4th, accelerate the construction of laws and regulations related to the real estate industry, improve the supervision and punishment mechanism of the real estate industry.
【学位授予单位】:东北财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F299.23

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