上市公司独立董事制度对重大关联交易的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-16 14:51

本文选题：非公允关联交易　切入点：重大关联交易　出处：《南京理工大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国的上市公司很大一部分是由原先的国有企业通过改制形成的,“国有股一股独大”现象依旧是十分显著的问题,上市公司和母公司以及子公司之间普遍存在着关联关系,关联方利用非公允关联交易来粉饰报表、虚增利润、利益输送、逃避税收等情况已经是不争的事实。尤其是最近几年来,上市公司的关联交易行为越来越受到证券市场广泛的关注。作为一种公司的治理机制,独立董事制度的一项重要职能就是对关联交易的监管。《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》(下文简称《指导意见》)明确提出,上市公司应赋予独立董事对于重大关联交易的知情权、提议权、认可权和发表独立意见权。本文在对目前国内外关于独立董事制度对关联交易监管有效性的研究基础上,结合我国自身情况,从理论和实证两个方面来验证独立董事制度对上市公司非公允关联交易监管有效性。本文实现了如下几个写作目的： (1)实现了独立董事制度对上市公司非公允关联交易监管有效性的理论研究,分别从独立董事制度的理论分析和独立董事对关联交易的经济学分析两方面进行了深入研究。基于委托代理理论和制度变迁视角分析,验证独立董事制度可以有效地监管上市公司的非公允关联交易。 (2)实现了独立董事制度对上市公司非公允关联交易监管有效性的实证分析,利用独立董事制度的特征,用独立董事比例、会计和法律专业独立董事比例、独立董事出席会议比例、独立董事薪酬四项指标,加上公司治理结构和财务指标作为控制变量,利用SPSS17.0对解释变量和被解释变量进行相应的描述性统计,构建了多元线性回归模型,研究了独立董事对不同类型的关联交易的监管效果。 (3)利用主成分分析法,将重大交易的变量集构建为一个综合重大关联交易指标,实现了独立董事制度与上市公司整体的关联交易情况的回归分析。实证结果表明独立董事制度对上市公司非公允关联交易监管效果并不理想,本文为完善独立董事制度提供了很好的建议。
[Abstract]:A large part of the listed companies in our country are formed by the former state-owned enterprises through the reform of the system. The phenomenon of "state-owned shares being dominant in one share" is still a very significant problem, and there is generally a relationship between the listed companies and their parent companies and their subsidiaries. It is an indisputable fact that related parties use unfair related party transactions to whitewash statements, inflate profits, transfer profits, evade taxes, etc., especially in recent years, The related party trading behavior of listed companies has been paid more and more attention to by the stock market. As a kind of corporate governance mechanism, One of the important functions of the independent director system is the supervision of related party transactions. The guidance on the Establishment of Independent Director system in listed companies (hereinafter referred to as "guidance opinion") is clearly put forward. Listed companies should give independent directors the right to know, propose, approve and express their independent opinions on major related party transactions. Combining with the situation of our country, this paper verifies the effectiveness of the independent director system in the supervision of unfair related party transactions of listed companies from both theoretical and empirical aspects. The purpose of this paper is as follows:. 1) realizing the theoretical research on the effectiveness of the independent director system in the supervision of unfair related party transactions of listed companies. Based on the theory of the independent director system and the independent director's economic analysis of the related party transaction, this paper analyzes the relationship between the independent director and the independent director from the perspective of principal-agent theory and institutional change. To verify the independent director system can effectively supervise the unfair related party transactions of listed companies. 2) realizing the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of the independent director system in the supervision of unfair related party transactions of listed companies, using the characteristics of the independent director system, using the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of independent directors in accounting and law, and the proportion of independent directors in accounting and law professions. The proportion of independent directors attending the meeting, the compensation of independent directors, the corporate governance structure and financial indicators are taken as control variables, and the explanatory variables and explained variables are analyzed by SPSS17.0. A multivariate linear regression model is constructed to study the effect of independent directors on the supervision of different types of related party transactions. 3) by using principal component analysis, the variable set of major transaction is constructed into a comprehensive index of significant related party transaction, and the regression analysis of independent director system and related party transaction of listed company as a whole is realized. The empirical results show that the effect of independent director system on the supervision of unfair related party transactions of listed companies is not ideal, and this paper provides a good suggestion for the improvement of independent director system.
【学位授予单位】：南京理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51;F271;F224

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