大股东表决权结构、身份类型与公司价值——基于“掏空”行为的视角

发布时间：2018-03-23 20:05

本文选题：表决权结构　切入点：股东身份　出处：《世界经济文汇》2014年05期

【摘要】：本文在一个统一的框架下研究了多个大股东的合谋与制衡关系,构建了合谋利益团体的最优决策模型,得到了符合我国实际情况的结论。以中国A股上市公司2006—2011年间的数据为研究样本,通过实证研究发现:第一大股东不具有绝对表决权优势时,表决权集权程度的增加会加剧"掏空"行为,这种影响在第一大股东为国企时更加明显。"掏空"程度和公司价值随实际控制人所有权的增加分别呈现出倒U型和U型变化。当实际控制人所有权落在30%—40%之间时,"掏空"现象最严重。实际控制人所有权和表决权分离度的增加也会加剧"掏空"。在非国有企业中,当第二、第三大股东为国有企业时,随着其表决权的增加,"掏空"程度不断加深。本研究的发现有助于我们理解大股东表决权结构和身份类型对公司价值的影响机制,对监管部门限制大股东"掏空",提高中小投资者保护水平,进而促进我国资本市场健康持续发展也有重要的政策意义。
[Abstract]:In this paper, we study the collusion and checks and balances of many large shareholders under a unified framework, and construct the optimal decision-making model of collusive interest groups. Taking the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2011 as the research sample, it is found that the first largest shareholder does not have absolute voting advantage. Increased centralization of voting rights exacerbates "tunneling", This effect is more obvious when the largest shareholder is the state-owned enterprise. The degree of "tunneling" and the value of the company show inverted U shape and U type change with the increase of the ownership of the actual controller, respectively. When the ownership of the actual controller falls between 30% and 40%, the degree of "tunneling" and the value of the company show the change of "inverted U" and U-type respectively. "tunneling" is the most serious phenomenon. The increase in the separation of ownership and voting rights of actual controllers will also exacerbate "tunneling." in non-state-owned enterprises, When the third largest shareholder is state-owned enterprise, the degree of "tunneling" deepens with the increase of voting rights. The findings of this study help us to understand the influence mechanism of voting structure and identity type of large shareholder on company value. It is also of great policy significance to limit the "hollowing out" of the major shareholders and to improve the level of protection of small and medium-sized investors, and thus promote the healthy and sustainable development of China's capital market.
【作者单位】：复旦大学经济学院;
【基金】：上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(项目批准号2009BJB026)的资助
【分类号】：F832.51;F271;F272.5

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