新型内部人控制的产生与治理

发布时间：2018-03-29 20:10

本文选题：新型内部人控制　切入点：股权结构　出处：《郑州大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文将股权分散背景下产生的内部人控制称为“传统内部人控制”,而将我国上市公司股权高度集中背景下产生的控股股东侵占公司和小股东利益的现象定义为“新型内部人控制”,控股股东合法掌握上市公司的剩余控制权和剩余索取权,成为“新型内部人”。股权高度集中、国有企业改革的路径依赖、股权属性以及外部治理机制不足是形成新型内部人控制的主要原因。本文将首先对国内外关于上市公司内部人控制和大股东利益侵占的文献进行简要综述,通过评述此前的研究文献,分析二者存在的联系,在此基础上提出“新型内部人控制”的概念。理论研究部分,首先界定“新型内部人”这一概念,然后从股权高度集中、国企改革的路径依赖、股权属性和外部治理四个方面分析新型内部人控制产生的原因,最后对新型内部人控制的运作方式进行理论探析。实证研究部分主要验证股权结构与新型内部人控制的关系、新型内部人控制的运作方式及其对上市公司业绩的影响。最后根据本文理论分析和实证研究的结论,对治理新型内部人控制提出建议。实证结果表明：新型内部人控制权的提高会加剧上市公司的两权分离度,控制权和两权分离度之间存在倒U型的非线性关系,当新型内部人的控制权达到一定程度后,会减少对上市公司的两权分离。控制权比例与利益侵占在总体样本和非国有上市公司都显著正相关,但是非国有上市公司的两权分离度与利益侵占相关性并不显著,说明非国有上市公司的新型内部人更倾向于通过控制权直接侵占上市公司利益。由于国有上市公司的新型内部人受到政府约束较多,两权分离的政治违规成本较高,所以国有上市公司的两权分离程度小于非国有上市公司,且控制国有上市公司的政府层级越高,两权分离程度越小,但是利益侵占程度越高。与通过控制权直接侵占相比,建立金字塔股权结构能够较好地掩饰侵占程度和侵占主体的真实身份,所以国有上市公司的新型内部人更倾向于通过两权分离侵占上市公司利益。非国有上市公司的新型内部人为降低侵占成本,并通过建立公司内部资本市场解决关联企业的融资问题也会构建金字塔股权结构侵占公司和小股东利益。新型内部人直接参与公司治理或与管理层合谋侵占上市公司利益会使内部治理机制失灵,降低公司业绩。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the insider control under the background of decentralized equity is called "traditional insider control", and the phenomenon of controlling shareholders encroaching on the interests of the company and minority shareholders under the background of highly concentrated equity of listed companies in China is defined as " "A new type of insider control", in which the controlling shareholder legally grasps the residual control rights and residual claims of the listed company, Becoming a "new type of insider". The ownership is highly concentrated, and the path to reform of state-owned enterprises is dependent, The main reasons for the formation of the new type of insider control are the ownership attributes and the insufficient external governance mechanism. Firstly, this paper will briefly summarize the literature on insider control and the expropriation of the interests of large shareholders in listed companies at home and abroad. By reviewing the previous research documents, analyzing the relationship between them, the paper puts forward the concept of "new type insider control". In the theoretical research part, it defines the concept of "new insider" first, and then concentrates on it from the perspective of equity ownership. This paper analyzes the causes of the new type of insider control in four aspects: path dependence, ownership attributes and external governance of SOE reform. Finally, the paper makes a theoretical analysis of the operation mode of the new type of insider control. The empirical study mainly verifies the relationship between the ownership structure and the new type of insider control. Finally, according to the theoretical analysis and the conclusion of the empirical research, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the governance of the new type of insider control. The empirical results show that the improvement of the control right of the new insider will aggravate the separation degree of the two rights of the listed company, and there is a negative U type nonlinear relationship between the control right and the separation degree of the two rights, when the control right of the new type of insider reaches a certain degree. The proportion of control right and interest encroachment are positively correlated with the total sample and the non-state-owned listed company, but the degree of separation of the two rights of the non-state-owned listed company is not significantly related to the interest encroachment. It shows that the new type of insiders of non-state-owned listed companies tend to directly encroach on the interests of listed companies through control. Because the new type of insiders of state-owned listed companies are more restrained by the government, the cost of political violation of the separation of the two rights is higher. Therefore, the degree of separation of the two rights of the state-owned listed companies is smaller than that of the non-state-owned listed companies, and the higher the level of government to control the state-owned listed companies, the smaller the degree of separation of the two rights, but the higher the degree of interest encroachment. Compared with direct usurpation of control rights, the establishment of pyramid ownership structure can better cover up the degree of encroachment and the real identity of the subject. Therefore, the new type of insiders of the state-owned listed companies tend to encroach on the interests of the listed companies through the separation of two rights. The new type of insiders of the non-state-owned listed companies artificially reduce the cost of embezzlement. And to solve the financing problem of affiliated enterprises by establishing the internal capital market of the company will also construct a pyramid equity structure to encroach on the interests of the company and minority shareholders. The new type of insiders participate directly in corporate governance or collude with the management to encroach on the listing. The interests of the company will make the internal governance mechanism out of order, Reduce company performance.
【学位授予单位】：郑州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272;F832.51

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