基于大股东控制下的机构投资者与盈余管理研究

发布时间：2018-04-26 22:41

本文选题：机构投资者 + 应计项目盈余管理　；参考：《东北财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：盈余管理做为上市公司调节利润、粉饰业绩的行为,长久以来成为资本市场中难以消除甚至不可根治的顽疾,虽然有学者认为适度的盈余管理亦有其可取之处,但这种利用信息不对称调节盈余的自利行为始终是对处在信息弱势的投资者的一种“隐瞒”和“欺骗”,并且其行为本身也无异于“临渴掘井”,“寅吃卯粮”,往往是以牺牲企业长期利益为代价的短视行为。因此,抑制上司公司的盈余管理行为是保护投资者的一项重要举措,是良好的公司治理机制应予以保证的一个重要方面。股权结构奠定了公司治理的根基,是衡量公司治理机制不可或缺的维度之一。其中,随着我国资本市场的发展,金融体系的完善,在2001年我国证券监管当局提出“超常发展机构投资者”的号召下,我国机构投资者的构成日益多元化,持股比例日趋扩大,成为我国投资者力量的一个重要代表。机构投资者的投资行为具有专业性和规模性,从而具备改善上市公司股权结构,参与公司治理进而降低盈余管理的可能性。与此同时,控股股东作为上市公司股权结构中另一个重要方面,势必会影响机构投资者参与公司治理的积极性。如果上市公司处于大股东超强控制状态,高持股比例使得控股股东享有绝对控制权,其他股东难以左右控股股东的行为,不利于机构投资者公司治理作用的发挥。尤其是当大股东持股比例超过50%达到绝对控制地位时,包括机构投资者在内的中小投资者难以形成与其抗衡的股权结构。本文在现有国内外研究成果的基础上,从应计项目和真实活动两个方面度量上市公司的盈余管理程度,通过理论梳理和实证检验,分析了机构投资者持股对盈余管理的影响,并结合我国上市公司“一股独大”的实际情况,采用分组检验的方法进一步验证了大股东控制对二者作用机制的影响,从而得出机构投资者对于盈余管理是否具有抑制作用,以及这种抑制作用是否受大股东控制影响的结论,并针对结论提出相应的政策建议及进一步的研究方向。本文分为五大部分：第一部分,绪论。本部分主要阐述研究动机与意义、研究内容与思路以及积极探索之处,为后文的深入研究展开铺垫。第二部分,文献综述。从机构投资者持股对于盈余管理的作用机制、机构投资者持股对于盈余管理的作用效果、大股东控制对于盈余管理的作用机制三个方面对于国内外文献进行综述。第三部分,理论分析。以委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和股权制衡理论为基础,从理论上梳理机构投资者持股、大股东控制对于盈余管理的影响,并进一步分析了大股东控制对于机构投资者抑制盈余管理积极性的影响。第四部分,实证研究。首先,介绍本文的研究设计,包括提出全文的三个关键性假设,变量设计及模型构建。其次,以截面修正琼斯模型衡量上市公司应计项目的盈余管理程度,并从销售操控、生产操控以及费用操控三个方面对真实活动盈余管理程度进行度量,并构建了真实盈余管理活动综合指标。采用回归分析的方法,验证机构投资者持股对盈余管理的影响。并进一步采用分组检验的方法看,对大股东控制影响下,两者的作用机制进行分析。第五部分,结论与建议。这一部分主要包括陈述研究结论,提出政策建议,总结研究不足并指明进一步研究方向。通过理论分析和实证检验,本文得出如下结论：近四年(2009至2012)机构投资者持股比例同盈余管理,不论是应计项目盈余管理还是真实活动盈余管理,均呈现负相关关系,但在大股东绝对控制的样本中机构投资者对应计项目盈余管理以及真实活动盈余管理都不再具有显著影响。本文的积极探索：(1)在验证机构投资者对盈余管理的作用机制时,考虑了大股东控制对二者关系的影响。(2)从应计和真实两个方面衡量盈余管理,较为全面地度量了企业的盈余管理行为。本文的不足之处：(1)限于数据的可获取性,本文仅验证了机构整体持股同盈余管理的关系,而未针对机构的个体特征深入分类研究。(2)针对内生性问题,本文虽然在稳健型检验中采取滞后变量的方法控制,但是并没有进一步采取统计上较为科学的工具变量法等方法控制机构持股同盈余管理间的内生性。
[Abstract]:Earnings management, which regulates profit and whitewash performance for listed companies, has long been a stubborn disease that cannot be eliminated or even radical in the capital market. Although some scholars believe that moderate earnings management also has its advantages, the self-interest of using asymmetric information to regulate earnings is always an investment in disadvantaged information. A kind of "concealment" and "deception" of the person, and its behavior itself is no different from "eager to dig well" and "eat the grain". It is often a short-sighted act at the expense of the long-term interests of the enterprise. Therefore, it is an important measure to prevent the earnings management behavior of the superior company, and a good corporate governance mechanism should be given. Ownership structure is the foundation of corporate governance. It is one of the indispensable dimensions to measure corporate governance.
With the development of China's capital market and the perfection of the financial system, in 2001, under the call of the securities regulatory authorities of our country, the structure of institutional investors in our country is increasingly diversified and the proportion of their shareholding is expanding, which has become an important representative of the investors in our country. The investment behavior of institutional investors In the meantime, as another important aspect of the stock ownership structure of listed companies, the controlling shareholder is bound to affect the enthusiasm of the institutional investors to participate in the governance of the public company. In the state of super strong control, the high shareholding ratio makes the controlling shareholders enjoy absolute control, and the other shareholders are difficult to control the controlling shareholders' behavior, which is not conducive to the corporate governance of institutional investors. Especially, when the proportion of large shareholders exceeds 50%, the small and medium investors, including institutional investors, are difficult to form. The equity structure that is countered with it.
On the basis of the existing research results at home and abroad, this paper measures the earnings management of listed companies from two aspects of accruals and real activities. Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper analyzes the influence of institutional investors' Shareholding on earnings management, and combines the actual situation of "one shareholder" of listed companies in China and adopts group inspection. The method further validates the effect of large shareholder control on the mechanism of the two party, and draws the conclusion that institutional investors have an inhibitory effect on earnings management, and whether this effect is influenced by the control of the major shareholders, and puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions and further research directions.
This article is divided into five parts:
The first part is the introduction. This part mainly expounds the motivation and significance of the study, the contents and ideas, and the positive exploration, so as to pave the way for further study.
The second part, literature review. From the mechanism of institutional investor holding on earnings management, the effect of institutional investor holding on earnings management, and the three aspects of the effect mechanism of large shareholder control on earnings management, the literature is reviewed at home and abroad.
The third part, theoretical analysis. Based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and equity balance theory, this paper theoretically combs the influence of institutional investor ownership and large shareholder control on earnings management, and further analyzes the influence of large shareholder control on institutional investors' incentive to control earnings management.
The fourth part, empirical research. First, it introduces the research design of this paper, including three key hypotheses, variable design and model construction. Secondly, the section revises Jones model to measure the earnings management of the accrued projects of listed companies, and from the three aspects of sales manipulation, production manipulation and cost manipulation. The degree of residual management is measured, and a comprehensive index of real earnings management activities is constructed. The regression analysis method is used to verify the influence of institutional investor ownership on earnings management. Further, the method of grouping test is used to analyze the mechanism of the two.
The fifth part, conclusions and recommendations, this part mainly includes the statement of research conclusions, policy recommendations, summary of research deficiencies and further research directions.
Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper draws the following conclusions: in the last four years (2009 to 2012), institutional investors' shareholding ratio has a negative correlation with earnings management, whether it is accrued earnings management or real activity earnings management, but in the sample of the absolute control of the large shareholders, the earnings management of the institutional investors' corresponding projects And real activity earnings management no longer has a significant impact.
The positive exploration of this paper: (1) in the verification of the mechanism of institutional investors' action on earnings management, the influence of large shareholder control on the relationship between the two parties is considered. (2) the earnings management is measured from the accrual and real two aspects, and the earnings management behavior of the enterprise is measured in a more comprehensive manner.
The shortcomings of this paper are: (1) limited to the availability of data, this paper only validates the relationship between the overall ownership and the earnings management, and does not classify the individual characteristics of the organization in depth. (2) in view of the endogenous problem, this paper takes the method of lagging and variable control in the robust test, but does not take a further statistical analysis. A more scientific tool variable method is used to control the endogeneity between institutional ownership and earnings management.

【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【相似文献】