大型商业银行信贷制度与关系型信贷形成研究

发布时间：2018-04-27 07:44

本文选题：关系型信贷 + 大型商业银行　；参考：《山东大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：中小企业在我国国民经济中发挥着主力军作用,然而融资约束是中小企业成长和发展过程中面临的首要问题。国内外学者普遍认为,中小企业融资难根源在于银企之间信息不对称。关系型信贷在解决信息不对称、中小企业融资问题上发挥重要作用。理论界认为大银行适合运用交易型信贷技术对大企业发放贷款,中小银行在运用关系型信贷技术对中小企业发放贷款上具有比较优势,即“小银行优势论”。这一观点表明大型商业银行不适合对中小企业实施关系型信贷,从而对中小企业难以发放贷款。然而,目前我国大型商业银行面临金融制度变迁、银行业激烈竞争的局面,亟需发展新客户源如中小企业客户。现在的问题是,中小企业担保抵押不足,传统的交易型信贷技术不适合中小企业贷款,因此在大型商业银行中实施关系型信贷则成为必然趋势。所以,本文突破以往研究分析框架,建立“大银行—关系型信贷—中小企业”的新框架来研究大型商业银行与关系型信贷形成之间的关系。本文从理论和实证两个方面对我国大型商业银行的信贷制度与关系型信贷形成之间关系进行分析。理论分析包括两方面：一是银行的激励约束机制对软信息数量的影响；二是银行的信贷审批权分配制度对软信息被利用程度的影响。理论研究结果表明：(1)在不发生道德风险情况下,基于信贷员利益最大化原则,银行的奖励与惩罚需满足一定条件,在此条件下,银行奖励越多,惩罚越少,信贷员的期望利润越大,则软信息搜集数量越多。(2)中心行通过对比代理成本与信息成本大小来决定信贷审批权分配。信贷审批权分配越倾向于分支行,则软信息被利用程度就越高。在上述理论研究基础上,本文提出三个理论假说,利用调研问卷数据,通过建立实证模型检验了这三个假说。综上,我国大型商业银行现有信贷制度不利于关系型信贷的形成与发展。在激励与约束机制的改革上,应区分资质较好的大企业和资质较差的中小企业。对中小企业贷款过程中,银行应设计合理的激励约束机制,使其满足一定条件,在此条件下,增加银行奖励、减小贷款惩罚,从而促进信贷员搜集软信息的积极性。审批权分配不应一刀切,银行在对代理成本和信息成本进行对比之后,如果代理成本大于信息成本,则审批权分配应更倾向于中心行,如果代理成本小于信息成本,则审批权应更倾向于分支行,提高软信息被利用程度。
[Abstract]:Small and medium-sized enterprises play a major role in our national economy, but financing constraints are the most important problems in the process of their growth and development. Scholars at home and abroad generally believe that SMEs financing difficulties are rooted in information asymmetry between banks and enterprises. Relational credit plays an important role in solving the problem of information asymmetry and SME financing. The theorists think that large banks are suitable to use transactional credit technology to grant loans to large enterprises, and small and medium-sized banks have comparative advantages in using relational credit technology to grant loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, that is, "advantage of small banks". This view shows that large commercial banks are not suitable for implementing relational credit to SMEs, so it is difficult to extend loans to SMEs. However, at present, the large commercial banks in our country are faced with the changes of financial system and the fierce competition of the banking industry, so it is urgent to develop new customer sources such as small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Now the problem is that the guarantee mortgage of small and medium-sized enterprises is insufficient and the traditional transactional credit technology is not suitable for small and medium-sized enterprises, so the implementation of relational credit in large commercial banks has become an inevitable trend. Therefore, this paper breaks through the previous research and analysis framework, and establishes a new framework of "big bank-relational credit-small and medium-sized enterprises" to study the relationship between large commercial banks and relational credit formation. This paper analyzes the relationship between the credit system and the formation of relational credit in China's large commercial banks from both theoretical and empirical aspects. The theoretical analysis includes two aspects: one is the influence of the incentive and constraint mechanism of banks on the amount of soft information; the other is the influence of the distribution system of credit approval power of banks on the degree to which soft information is used. The theoretical results show that: 1) in the absence of moral hazard, based on the principle of maximizing the benefit of the credit officer, the reward and punishment of the bank should meet certain conditions. Under this condition, the more the reward, the less the punishment. The larger the expected profit of the credit officer, the more the amount of soft information is collected.) the center bank determines the distribution of credit approval power by comparing agency cost with information cost. The more the distribution of credit approval power tends to separate branches, the more soft information will be used. On the basis of the above theoretical research, this paper puts forward three theoretical hypotheses and tests the three hypotheses by using the questionnaire data and establishing an empirical model. In summary, the existing credit system of large commercial banks is not conducive to the formation and development of relational credit. In the reform of incentive and restraint mechanism, it is necessary to distinguish better-qualified large enterprises from poorly qualified small and medium-sized enterprises. In the process of SME loan, banks should design reasonable incentive and constraint mechanism to satisfy certain conditions. Under this condition, increase bank incentives and reduce loan punishment, thus promoting the enthusiasm of credit officers to collect soft information. After comparing the agency cost with the information cost, if the agency cost is greater than the information cost, the power distribution should be more inclined to the central bank, if the agency cost is less than the information cost, Then the power of approval should be more inclined to separate branches, improve the use of soft information.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.4;F224

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