“小产权房”利益相关者博弈关系分析

发布时间：2018-05-06 08:39

本文选题：小产权房 + 利益相关者　；参考：《江西财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：自1998年住房体制改革以后，“小产权房”市场就随着住房商品化的发展而发展起来。近些年来，村委会、乡镇政府借着新农村建设、旧城改造、土地整理等名目促进了“小产权房”市场规模化发展。这个灰色市场的日益壮大，其涉众之广，违法之深，都是不容忽视的社会问题。为何“小产权房”的参与者甘愿铤而走险？这其中有着怎样的利益链条？要深入解决“小产权房”问题，我们就必须确定“小产权房”市场参与人即利益相关者。本研究首先成立了课题小组，小组成员运用头脑风暴法初步拟定了利益相关者名单，接着邀请相关领域专家运用德尔菲法对利益相关者作出进一步的筛选。专家们分别从“小产权房”市场主体的参与程度、占有支配程度、管理决策权利、纠纷可能性四个方面对各个参与对象进行评分，得分越高者在市场中的参与度也就越高，反之亦然。经过反复的评分与讨论，最终确定出8类利益相关者，分别是：中央政府、地方政府、提供土地的农民、购房的城镇居民、购房的外村村民、村委会及乡镇政府、“小产权房”开发商、中介组织。接着利用Grant分类理论将此8类利益相关者划分为三大类，“小产权房”市场的反对者——中央政府和地方政府；“小产权房”市场的支持者——提供土地的农民、购房的城镇居民、外村村民、村委会及乡镇政府、“小产权房”开发商；边缘者——中介组织。在确定了市场的利益相关者后，本研究借助非合作博弈理论中的完全信息静态博弈理论对“小产权房”利益相关者可能面临的对策选择进行深入分析。总体的分析思路是将利益相关者按照“支持者”-“反对者”、“支持者”-“支持者”、“中间人”的关系进行博弈分析，在每一大分类下又分别对8类利益相关者的博弈策略进行细分讨论。从而得知中央政府及地方政府是市场的外部牵引力，“小产权房”市场的“支持者”是市场的内部驱动力。治理“小产权房”市场，必定是用牵引力克制驱动力。最后提出了治理“小产权房”市场的政策建议。本研究的创新之处是在利益相关者理论的基础上运用德尔菲法准确界定了“小产权房”市场的利益相关者，并对利益相关者之间博弈的可选策略进行了深入的分析与解读。最后得出了“小产权房”市场反对者为市场外部“牵制力”，支持者为市场内部“驱动力”的结论。并根据利益相关者的相互博弈关系提出了根治“小产权房”问题的政策建议，从“小产权房”市场参与者的利益角度出发以杜绝类似问题的再度发生。本研究创新性的将完全信息静态博弈模型引入了“小产权房”的分析领域，细化了“小产权房”市场利益相关者的判定标准，，系统的运用完全信息静态博弈理论来分析“小产权房”市场的利益相关者。
[Abstract]:Since the reform of housing system in 1998, the market of "small property right" has developed with the development of housing commercialization. In recent years, village committees and township governments have promoted the development of "small property houses" market by means of new rural construction, old city transformation, land consolidation and so on. The growing grey market, its wide range of stakeholders and the depth of the law are social problems that cannot be ignored. Why are the participants willing to take risks? What kind of profit chain is there? In order to solve the problem of "small property right house", we must determine the market participant of "small property right house" that is the stakeholder. In this study, a task group was set up, and the members of the group made a preliminary list of stakeholders by using brainstorming method, and then invited experts in relevant fields to use Delphi method to further screen stakeholders. Experts scored each participant from four aspects: the participation of the main body of the market of "small property rights", the degree of dominance, the right of management decision-making, and the possibility of disputes. The higher the score, the higher the participation of the participants in the market. Vice versa. After repeated grading and discussion, eight types of stakeholders were finally identified, namely: central government, local government, farmers providing land, urban residents who bought houses, villagers from outside villages, village committees and township governments. "small property rights" developers, intermediary organizations. Then, using the Grant classification theory, the eight types of stakeholders are divided into three categories: the opponents of the "small property housing" market-central and local governments; the supporters of the "small property house" market; the farmers who provide land. Purchase of houses of urban residents, villagers outside villages, village committees and township governments, "small property" developers; marginal-intermediary organizations. After identifying the stakeholders of the market, this study makes a thorough analysis of the possible countermeasures that the stakeholders of "small property rights" may face with the help of the complete information static game theory in the non-cooperative game theory. The overall thinking of analysis is to analyze the relationship between the stakeholders according to the relationship between "supporters" and "opponents", "supporters"-"supporters" and "middlemen". Under each classification, the game strategy of 8 kinds of stakeholders is discussed separately. Therefore, the central government and local government are the external traction of the market, and the "supporters" of the "small property right" market are the internal driving force of the market. Governance of the "small property rights" market, must be the use of traction to control the driving force. Finally, it puts forward the policy suggestion of managing the market of small property right house. The innovation of this study is that based on stakeholder theory, Delphi method is used to accurately define the stakeholders in the market of "small property right house", and the selection strategy of the game between stakeholders is deeply analyzed and interpreted. Finally, the paper draws the conclusion that the market opponents are the outside of the market, and the supporters are the driving force inside the market. According to the game relation of stakeholders, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to cure the problem of "small property house", and from the angle of the interests of market participants of "small property right house", to prevent the recurrence of similar problems. This research innovatively introduces the static game model of complete information into the analysis field of "small property house", and refines the judgment standard of market stakeholders of "small property house". The systematic use of complete information static game theory to analyze the "small property rights" market stakeholders.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F299.23;F224.32

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