制度环境、股权激励契约结构及效应研究

发布时间：2018-05-08 10:32

本文选题：制度环境 + 股权激励契约结构　；参考：《中国矿业大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：股权激励一直被视为解决“斯密难题”的较佳方案。然而，中国上市公司的股权激励自从推行伊始就是怪相频出，过低的行权价格、宽松的行权条件、较短的激励期限等，已俨然变形为福利性制度安排。论文突破了以往单从外生视角直接考察高管持股与公司业绩关系的局限，针对我国上市公司普遍存在的政府干预、内部人控制及其导致的管理层权力问题突出的现实背景下，提出从契约结构的内生视角考察制度环境、股权激励契约结构及效应三者之间的关系。论文首先从委托代理理论、契约理论及两权联盟理论系统提炼出股权激励的理论基础，其次对国内外文献进行了系统梳理。在此基础上，论文从规范和实证两个角度，以股权分置改革后我国证券市场2006-2011年公告股权激励计划的上市公司为样本，构建数学模型，利用多元线性回归、因子分析、配对样本T检验、中介变量检验等方法检验了制度环境、股权激励契约结构及效应三者之间的关系。在指标设计中，论文从政府与市场的关系、地区市场化水平、企业最终控制人类别三个变量衡量政府干预程度；从大股东持股和Z指数衡量股权结构；从两职设置情况、董事会规模、管理层持股、董事会持股四个变量衡量管理层权力大小；从激励水平、模式、期限及行权价格四个要素衡量股权激励契约结构；从公司业绩和盈余管理两个层面测度股权激励效应。研究发现：（1）制度环境影响股权激励契约结构。①政府干预降低了股权激励水平；②管理层权力越大，选择的行权价格越低；③大股东持股比例越高，股权激励水平越低，选择的行权价格越高；（2）股权激励契约结构影响激励效应。①管理层股权激励水平越高、货币激励越高、激励期限越短，公司业绩越好，最佳的激励有效期为3-4年，股权激励短期化行为严重；采用股票期权模式的公司业绩更好；②管理层获得的股票数量越多，货币薪酬越高，激励期限越长，盈余管理行为越严重。（3）制度环境、股权激励契约结构及效应三者之间存在相关关系。①股权激励水平在政府干预和公司业绩间起中介传导作用。与非国有控股公司相比，政府干预不仅降低了国有控股上市公司的股权激励水平，还降低了公司业绩；②不同所有制下上市公司管理层进行机会主义行为的时间和方式不同。非国有控股公司管理层在初始设计股权激励契约时权力较大，往往通过自身的权力影响薪酬委员会在合适的时间获得较低的行权价格。而政府干预抑制了国有控股公司管理层在初始制定薪酬契约时的影响力，很难获得较低的行权价格，，为了达到行权条件，管理层往往在股权激励的实施过程中进行盈余管理；③大股东的存在在一定程度上抑制了管理层机会主义行为。论文从制度环境的角度为上市公司有效实施股权激励提供了经验证据，丰富了股权激励契约结构及效应的相关文献。研究表明，股权激励的实施提升了公司业绩，但同时也导致管理层的短期化行为和机会主义行为。总体来说，中国尚不具备大规模推行股权激励的充分条件，只宜适度试点，目前的核心工作仍是继续加大完善公司治理机制和制度法规的建设力度。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive has always been regarded as a better solution to the "Smith Problem". However, the stock incentive of Chinese listed companies has been frequent since the beginning of the implementation, the low price of the right, the loose right conditions, the short incentive period, etc., have been transformed into a welfare system. This paper examines the limitations of the relationship between executive stock ownership and corporate performance. In the light of the prevailing background of government intervention, insider control and the management power caused by the listed companies in China, the institutional environment is investigated from the Endogenous Perspective of the contract structure and the relationship between the three parties.
This paper first abstracts the theoretical basis of equity incentive from the principal-agent theory, contract theory and the two right alliance theory system. Secondly, the paper systematically combs the domestic and foreign documents. On this basis, the paper from the two angles of standard and empirical analysis, the public equity incentive plan of China's stock market after 2006-2011 years' equity division reform is listed public. As a sample, we construct a mathematical model, and use the multiple linear regression, factor analysis, paired sample T test and intermediate variable test to test the relationship between the institutional environment, the structure of the equity incentive contract and the effect of the three. In the index design, the thesis is based on the relationship between the government and the market, the level of Regional Marketization, and the final control of the human three. The degree of government intervention is measured by a variable; the stock ownership structure is measured from the large stockholders and Z index; from the two position setting, the size of the board of directors, the managerial ownership, and the four variables of the board of directors measure the power size of the management level; the structure of equity incentive contract is measured from the four elements of the incentive level, model, term and the price of the power; from the company industry Two levels of performance and earnings management measure equity incentive effect.
(1) the institutional environment affects the structure of equity incentive contract. (1) the government intervention reduces the level of equity incentive; the greater the power of the management, the lower the choice of the right price; the higher the proportion of the large shareholders, the lower the equity incentive level, the higher the choice of the right price.
(2) the equity incentive contract structure affects the incentive effect. (1) the higher the management level, the higher the level of equity incentive, the higher the monetary incentive, the shorter the duration of the incentive, the better the performance of the company, the best incentive validity period of 3-4 years, the serious short-term behavior of the equity incentive, the better performance of the public stock options with the stock option model, and the more stocks obtained by the management level, The higher the monetary pay and the longer the incentive period, the more serious the earnings management behavior.
(3) there is a correlation between the institutional environment, the structure of the equity incentive contract and the effect of the three. (1) the level of equity incentive plays an intermediary role between government intervention and the performance of the company. The time and way of the opportunistic behavior of the management of the listed companies under the system are different. The management of non state holding companies has great power in the initial design of the equity incentive contract, and often affects the salary Committee through its own power to get the lower price of the executive power at the appropriate time. In order to achieve the right conditions, management often conducts earnings management during the implementation of equity incentive, and the existence of large shareholders inhibits the opportunism of management to a certain extent.
From the perspective of institutional environment, this paper provides empirical evidence for the effective implementation of equity incentive for listed companies, enriches the related literature of the structure and effect of equity incentive contract. The research shows that the implementation of equity incentive has promoted the company performance, but also leads to the short-term management and opportunism behavior. With the sufficient conditions for carrying out the equity incentive on a large scale, it is only suitable for a moderate pilot, and the current core work remains to continue to strengthen the construction of the corporate governance mechanism and the system and regulations.

【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

【参考文献】