私人股权投资退出契约安排的激励效用研究

发布时间：2018-05-10 14:43

本文选题：私人股权投资 + 道德风险　；参考：《上海交通大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文在契约理论与基于道德风险的委托代理理论的基础上，从私人股权投资的各行为主体的利益分配与博弈的角度分析引入约定退出方式的契约安排对于削减投资过程中道德风险问题的有效性、风险企业家经营行为的激励效用，以及企业后续经营绩效的影响。研究首先构建了不完全信息下的双边合约理论模型，研究普通股投资方式与退出契约安排下企业家努力经营的条件，并发现私人股权投资中所广泛使用的退出契约安排条款对中等道德风险的企业家具有显著的激励作用。其次，，本文从实证分析角度对理论模型成果进行了验证，发现私人股权的参与能够提升企业的经营绩效表现，且不会对企业IPO后长期的经营业绩产生负面影响。中等道德风险企业在IPO前具有显著更好的盈利表现。最后，本文说明退出契约安排条款与企业家向投资者出售的看跌期权之间的等价性。并利用B-S期权定价公式计算该条款价值，分析影响私人股权投资对该条款偏好的因素。本研究有助于加深对于私人股权投资防范投资过程中信息不对称问题的方式方法与制度设计的了解，并探究私人股权投资的契约设计与投资行为与被投资企业管理层的经营决策与后续经营绩效间的相互关系。补充了目前针对私人股权投资工具以及委托代理理论的实务应用的研究，对我国私人股权投资业的发展将起到借鉴作用。
[Abstract]:Based on the contract theory and the principal-agent theory based on moral hazard, From the point of view of benefit distribution and game of the actors of private equity investment, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the contractual arrangement of the contractual arrangement in the process of reducing the moral hazard in the process of investment, and the incentive effect of the venture entrepreneur's management behavior. And the influence of the enterprise's subsequent operation performance. First of all, the paper constructs the bilateral contract theory model under incomplete information, studies the common stock investment mode and the conditions of entrepreneur's hard operation under the withdrawal contract arrangement. It is also found that the withdrawal contract arrangement clause widely used in private equity investment plays a significant role in motivating middle moral hazard entrepreneurs. Secondly, this paper verifies the theoretical model from the perspective of empirical analysis, and finds that the participation of private equity can improve the performance of business performance, and will not have a negative impact on long-term business performance after IPO. Medium moral hazard companies have significantly better earnings performance before IPO. Finally, this paper explains the equivalence between the exit contract arrangement clause and the put option that the entrepreneur sells to the investor. The B-S option pricing formula is used to calculate the value of the clause and the factors affecting the preference of private equity investment to the clause are analyzed. This study is helpful to deepen the understanding of the ways, methods and system design of preventing information asymmetry in the process of private equity investment. It also explores the relationship between the contract design and investment behavior of private equity investment and the management decision of the invested enterprise and the subsequent business performance. It complements the current research on the application of private equity investment tools and principal-agent theory, which will serve as a reference for the development of China's private equity investment industry.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F830.91;F224

【参考文献】