关于非对等股权结构对关联交易的影响及投资者法律保护调节作用的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-13 13:56

本文选题：非对等股权结构 + 关联交易　；参考：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：传统委托代理理论主要是基于Berle和Means(1932)所提出的观点,认为公司的所有权和控制权高度分离,导致了管理者和股东之间的利益冲突。二十世纪九十年代中后期,随着各国公司治理之间比较研究的深入和新兴市场经济国家公司治理理论的兴起,越来越多的学者发现,大部分国家上市公司的股权结构相对比较集中且存在有控制能力的大股东,其中亚洲新兴经济体尤为突出。由于股权集中于较少的控股股东手中,从而就产生了大股东控制问题,即大股东凭借其拥有公司多数的投票权而牺牲中小股东和债权人的利益,为自己谋取比所持股份相应资本收益更大的额外收益。中国的上市公司中普遍存在着“一股独大”的现象,大股东凭借着对上市公司的控制权,频繁的利用关联交易牺牲中小股东的利益以实现其自身利益的最大化,例如：猴王股份、美尔雅、三九药业、幸福实业、济南轻骑等,这使得关联交易已经成为我国上市公司治理结构失衡的一个重要标志。由于我国的经济体制是由计划经济转向市场经济的,上市公司多是由国有企业改制而成,并且与改组以前的母公司及子公司之间有着千丝万缕的联系,这使得其与控股股东发生了许多关联购销、租赁、担保等行为。同时,我国资本市场的建立比西方发达国家要晚,各方面的制度安排还有缺陷、法律法规的建设还有待完善,这都为控股股东谋求私利,侵害中小股东利益创造了条件。可见我国公司治理中存在有严重的大股东控制问题,如何缓解大股东控制所带来的委托代理问题已经成为公司治理理论研究的新方向。大部分学者对公司治理中大股东控制问题的研究是以Berle和Means的研究范式为基础,这种研究范式的前提假设是股权高度分散,已经不适应现在股权相对集中的实际情况。那么在股权集中的条件下,控股股东利用关联交易对中小股东和外部投资者进行利益侵占的内在机理是什么?投资者法律保护能否缓解大股东控制所带来的委托代理问题?解决这些问题是本文的研究焦点。本文通过对经典理论和相关文献进行梳理后借鉴了LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1999)和Johnson (2000)的研究,认为我国的上市公司股权结构相对集中且控股股东拥有的现金流权和投票权存在分离,控股股东正是凭借这种非对等股权结构拥有的超额控制权,利用关联交易等手段对中小股东和外部投资者进行利益侵害。本研究将控股股东追溯到最终控制人并计算出其拥有的现金流权和投票权及两权的分离程度,以此来衡量在股权相对集中条件下的非对等股权结构；根据沈艺峰等(2004)和王鹏(2008)等学者的研究,构造了2003—2009年我国投资者法律保护指数。最终选定了2003—2009年614家上市公司为研究样本,从非对等股权结构与关联交易的关系、投资者法律保护对这种关系的影响两个方面进行了研究。本文关于非对等股权结构与关联交易之间关系的实证研究发现：最终控制人的两权(现金流权和投票权)分离会对关联交易的规模产生正向的影响,即上市公司最终控制人两权分离程度越大,上市公司的关联交易规模就越大；最终控制人拥有的现金流权会对关联交易产生负向的影响,上市公司最终控制人拥有的现金流权越大,他们就越有动机监督并激励高级管理人员,控制公司的经营管理风险从而创造出更高的价值,此时他们用关联交易的方式转移公司的资产和利润或者将风险转嫁给公司的动机将大大的降低,这就导致了上市公司的关联交易规模的减小。由此可知,非对等股权结构是一把双刃剑,既可能会鼓励最终控制人监督经理人和减弱对中小股东和外部投资者掏空动机的作用,又可能会导致其利用关联交易等手段谋取私利。本研究关于投资者法律保护在非对等股权结构和关联交易之间关系影响的实证研究发现：投资者法律保护会对关联交易产生负向的影响,然而在以往的研究中并没有直接的证据证明投资者法律保护会对关联交易产生影响,而本文通过实证数据的分析得出了投资者法律保护会对关联交易产生负向的影响。得出这种的结论的原因可能会是：随着法律保护机制的健全,信息披露制度越来越严格且加大了对控股股东侵害上市公司利益的行为的惩罚力度,提高了其掏空的成本,减弱了最终控制人侵害中小股东的动机,导致了上市公司的关联交易的规模减小；投资者法律保护对两权分离和关联交易的调节关系是负向的,即法律保护水平的提高能减弱最终控制人因为现金流权和投票权的分离而运用关联交易的手段对上市公司进行掏空。投资者法律保护作为一种外部的公司治理机制,较公司内部治理机制是更为基础的层面,随着公司外部治理环境的改善,会促进股权结构等内部公司治理机制发挥其应有的作用；投资者法律保护对现金流权和关联交易的调节关系是正向的,投资者法律保护水平的提高能增强最终控制人因为现金流权的增加而较少的运用关联交易的手段对上市公司进行掏空,从而使关联交易的规模减小。随着投资者法律保护水平的提高,可能会在一定程度上鼓励上市公司的最终控制人监督并激励高级管理人员,控制公司的经营管理风险从而创造出更高的价值,对保护中小股东利益具有积极意义的行为起到了控制关联交易规模的作用。综上所述,本文认为缓解大股东控制问题应从两个方面入手：首先,政府和相关的监管机构应该合理的控制非对等股权结构中两权分离的比例,让现金流权和投票权的分离程度维持在一个恰当的比例,使最终控制人与中小股东的利益趋向一致,从而缓解最终控制人对中小股东利益的侵害；其次,投资者法律保护作为一种公司治理的外部机制,能有效的抑制最终控制人对中小股东和外部投资者利益的侵占,也能有效的鼓励最终控制人加强对管理者的监督从而产生“激励效应”,可以看出这种外部治理机制能在一定程度上弥补内部治理机制的不足。所以说相关的法律制定者应该考虑到法律对上市公司最终控制人的激励和约束的作用,完善相关的投资者法律保护体系,例如：加强上市公司信启、披露的监管、明确大股东的义务与责任、提高中小投资者的参与权等,从而以实现各方面利益的平衡。
[Abstract]:The traditional principal-agent theory is based on the viewpoint proposed by Berle and Means (1932), that the company's ownership and control are highly separated, which leads to the conflict of interests between the managers and the shareholders. In the mid and late 1990s, with the further research on the corporate governance and the corporate governance of the emerging market economy countries More and more scholars have found that more and more scholars have found that the stock ownership structure of most listed companies is relatively concentrated and has the ability to control the large shareholders, among which the emerging economies of Asia are particularly prominent. As a result of the concentration of shares in the hands of less controlling shareholders, the problem of controlling large shareholders is produced, that is, the large shareholders have their own ownership. Most of the voting rights of the company sacrifice the interests of the small shareholders and creditors, and seek more extra profits for them than the corresponding capital gains of the shares held.
In China's listed companies, there is a common phenomenon of "one shareholder". With the control of the listed companies, the large shareholders often use related transactions to sacrifice the interests of small and medium shareholders to maximize their own interests, such as the monkey king, the mealya, the 39 medicine industry, the happiness industry, the Ji'nan light ride, etc., which makes the related transactions It has become an important symbol of the unbalance of the governance structure of the listed companies in China. As the economic system of our country turns from the planned economy to the market economy, the listed companies are mostly made up of the state-owned enterprises, and there are thousands of links between the parent companies and the subsidiary companies before the reorganization, which makes them with the controlling shareholders. At the same time, the establishment of China's capital market is more late than the western developed countries, the institutional arrangements of various aspects are still defective, and the construction of laws and regulations remains to be perfected. This has created conditions for the controlling shareholders to seek private profits and invade the interests of small and medium shareholders. It is obvious that there are serious problems in our corporate governance. How to mitigate the principal-agent problem brought by large shareholder control has become a new direction of corporate governance theory.
Most scholars study the control problem of large shareholders in corporate governance, based on the research paradigm of Berle and Means. The premise of this research paradigm is that the share of equity is highly dispersed and has not adapted to the actual situation of the relative concentration of stock right now. What is the internal mechanism of external investors' interest embezzlement? Can investor legal protection alleviate the principal-agent problem brought by the control of large shareholders? Solving these problems is the focus of this paper. After combing the classical theory and related literature, this paper draws on LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1999) and The study of Johnson (2000) holds that the ownership structure of the listed companies in China is relatively concentrated and the cash flow rights and voting rights of the controlling shareholders are separated. The controlling shareholders are right by virtue of the excess control owned by this non equivalent equity structure, and the interests of the middle and small shareholders and the external investors are infringed by the means of related transactions. After tracing the controlling shareholders to the final controller and calculating the right of cash flow and the right to vote and the separation of the two rights, the non equivalent ownership structure under the relative concentration of equity is measured. According to the research of Shen Yifeng and other scholars such as (2004) and Wang Peng (2008), the legal protection of the investors in China from 2003 to 2009 is constructed. Finally, we selected 614 listed companies from 2003 to 2009 as research samples, from the relationship between non equivalent equity structure and related transactions, and the influence of investor legal protection on this relationship in two aspects.
The empirical study on the relationship between non equivalent equity structure and related transaction shows that the separation of the two rights of the final controller (cash flow rights and voting rights) will have a positive impact on the scale of related transactions. That is, the greater the degree of separation of the two rights of the final controllers of the listed companies, the larger the scale of the related transactions of the companies in the market. The cash flow rights owned by people have a negative impact on related transactions. The greater the cash flow rights of the final controllers of the listed companies, the more motivated they are to supervise and motivate senior managers to control the risk of the management of the company and create higher value. At this time they transfer the company's assets in the way of related transactions. The motive of the transfer of profit or risk to the company will be greatly reduced, which leads to a reduction in the scale of the related transactions of the listed companies. Therefore, the non equivalent ownership structure is a double-edged sword, which may encourage the final controller to supervise the managers and weaken the effect on the tunneling of the East and the external investors. It will lead to the use of related transactions and other means to seek personal gain.
The empirical study on the influence of investor legal protection on the relationship between non equivalent equity structure and related transaction finds that investor legal protection has a negative impact on related transactions. However, in previous studies, there is no direct evidence to prove that the investor legal protection association has an impact on the related transactions. Through the analysis of the empirical data, it is concluded that the investor legal protection will have a negative impact on the related transactions. The reason for this conclusion may be: with the improvement of the legal protection mechanism, the information disclosure system is more and more strict and increases the punishment of the controlling shareholders to infringe on the interests of the listed companies. The cost of air reduces the motivation of the final controller to infringe on the small and medium shareholders, which leads to the reduction in the scale of the related transactions of the listed companies, and the regulatory relationship between the two rights separation and the related transaction is negative, that is, the improvement of the level of legal protection can weaken the final controller's separation of the cash flow rights and the voting rights. As an external corporate governance mechanism, the legal protection of investors is more basic than the internal governance mechanism of the company. With the improvement of the external governance environment of the company, the internal corporate governance mechanism, such as the ownership structure, will play its due role, and the investor's legal protection is guaranteed. The regulatory relationship between the right to cash flow and the related transaction is positive. The improvement of the legal protection level of the investor can enhance the final controller, because of the increase in the cash flow, and reduce the use of related transactions to the listed companies, thus reducing the scale of the related transaction. With the improvement of the legal protection level of the investor, To a certain extent, it will encourage the supervision of the final controllers of the listed companies and encourage the senior managers, control the risk of the management of the company and create higher value, and play a role in controlling the scale of the related transactions for the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders.
To sum up, this paper holds that the problem of controlling the control of large shareholders should be started from two aspects: first, the government and relevant regulators should reasonably control the proportion of the separation of the two rights in the non equivalent ownership structure, and keep the separation of the right of cash flow and the right to vote in a proper proportion, and make the interests of the final controller and the small and medium shareholders. It tends to be consistent, thus alleviating the infringement of the interests of the small and medium shareholders by the final controller. Secondly, as an external mechanism of corporate governance, the legal protection of investors can effectively restrain the invasion of the interests of the small and medium shareholders and the external investors by the ultimate controller, and can effectively encourage the ultimate controller to strengthen the supervision of the managers. "Incentive effect" can be seen that the external governance mechanism can make up for the lack of internal governance mechanism to a certain extent. Therefore, the relevant legal makers should consider the role of the law on the incentive and constraint of the final controller of the listed company, and improve the relevant legal protection system of the investors, for example, to strengthen the public company's letter and start, Disclosure regulation, clear the obligations and responsibilities of large shareholders, and improving the participation rights of small and medium investors, so as to achieve balance of interests in all aspects.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;D922.287

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