贷款公告、联合授信与银行监督

发布时间：2018-05-15 09:23

本文选题：贷款公告 + 联合授信　；参考：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着企业之间横向、纵向的兼并活动越来越频繁,跨行业、跨区域经营逐渐成为企业未来发展的一种趋势。企业的扩大不仅伴随着人力资源的扩充和厂房设备的扩建,更重要的是融资需求的增加。然而现阶段我国资本市场的局限性限制了企业通过债券融资或其他直接融资渠道来获得经营所需的巨额资金,而传统的单个银行一对一的贷款模式越来越无法满足企业庞大的资金需求,在这种情况下,多家银行联合贷款模式以及银团贷款模式应运而生并且得到迅速发展。自2005年-2011年期间,在同一天同时向多家银行贷款的企业数目占到进行银行贷款总企业数目的17.9%,其贷款金额更是占到了市场总银行贷款金额的49.8%。在企业与银行的借贷关系中,银行与企业即相互依赖又相互促进。一方面,银行会通过放宽或紧缩信贷资金影响企业的经营发展：在资金链出现危机时,企业通过银行贷款渡过难关或者利用杠杆效应增加公司收益。另一方面,借款企业经营状况的好坏又会对银行的发展产生较大的影响：信贷资金能否收回以及资金收益的高低都取决于企业的经营绩效以及未来发展状况。所以,银行不仅在授信前会对借款公司进行充分的资信调查,授信中对其信贷条件严格审核,而且在授信后也对企业的经营活动以及资金的使用情况进行持续的监督,从而发挥银行作为“大贷款人”的监督作用。在传统的单一银行贷款模式下,银行与公司之间的信息不对称是制约银行监督效率的关键因素,而在联合贷款模式(多家银行同时向一家公司提供贷款)下,参与贷款的银行数目众多,银行与银行之间的信息不对称问题也严重影响着银行体系的监督效率,并且参与者之间的相互作用及产生后果均具有更大的不确定性,使得银行体系的监督效率更加难以确认与衡量。因此当外部投资者试图通过公司的借款行为获取公司经营、财务、治理等方面的相关信息时,联合贷款行为传递出来的无论是信息含量还是信息质量都会在很大程度上不同于单一银行贷款模式下公司的借贷行为所传递出的信息。公司发布银行贷款公告后会引起公司股价变化,这一现象很早就受到了国外学者们的关注与讨论,通过考察公告后的市场反应来判断银行的监督效率也是学者们在研究银行是否具有“大债权人”监督作用时普遍采用的一种研究方法。就国内的研究而言,胡奕明、谢诗蕾、邓莉和张宗益等人都表示我国银行对上市公司是存在一定的监督作用的。但联合授信模式下银行的监督效率是否不同于传统单一银行贷款模式下银行的监督效率,国内对此问题的研究尚属空白,更别说通过考察贷款模式对市场超额收益率的影响来判断银行的监督效率问题了。由上文的分析可知,不同的贷款模式下参与者之间的作用机制不同因而会向市场传递出不同的公司信息进而引起公司超额收益率的不同变化。究竟联合授信模式下银行之间的作用关系是合作还是竞争?银行之间的这种相互作用是否会影响银行的监督效率,以及影响程度如何?这是本文的研究重点。首先,本文以我国上市公司在2005年至2011年间发布的银行贷款公告为研究对象,遵循一定的原则筛选出313个有效样本,其中包括56个联合贷款样本和257个单一贷款样本。接着本文运用事件研究法对银行贷款公告所引起的市场反应进行实证研究,并利用参数以及非参数的统计方法对总体样本的市场超额收益率进行显著性检验。结果发现,市场对我国上市公司发布银行贷款公告这一事件产生了强烈的反应,具体表现为相应的事件窗内,上市公司的股价出现了显著异于0的平均超额收益率和累积超额收益率,并且市场的整体反应为负,说明我国的投资者在短期内把公司的银行贷款行为视为一个“利空”的事件,这与国外的相关实证研究结果有所出入。另外,在本文的研究中,银行发布贷款公告这一事件所产生的公司股价异常收益率基本上出现在公告日的前第7天左右,且通过了显著性检验,相关证据表明该贷款信息很可能已提前泄露,我国市场中存在“信息泄漏”问题。此外,为考察两种不同模式的贷款公告引起的公司超额收益率是否具有显著差异,本文将总体公司样本按照贷款模式分为了联合贷款子样本和单一贷款子样本,并比较分析了两个子样本在不同事件窗口下的平均超额收益和累计超额收益率,结果发现：首先在整个事件窗内,两个样本的累计超额收益都呈现明显的下降趋势,并且联合贷款子样本的累计超额收益的下降幅度要大于单一贷款累计超额收益的下降幅度,这在一定程度上说明相对于单一银行贷款行为市场投资者似乎更加不认可公司的联合银行贷款行为。此外,本文还对两个子样本的累计超额收益率在不同事件窗口内的差异性进行了显著性T检验和符号秩检验,统计结果显示,在部分事件窗内(尤其是公告前后[-1,2]时间段),两个子样本的累计超额收益率的差异性在5%的置信水平上通过了显著性检验,从而初步验证了不同模式的贷款公告引起的市场反应的确有所不同。其次,在得到上市公司银行贷款公告的超额收益率后,本文在控制了公司特质、贷款特征以及外部环境相关变量的基础上,重点研究了贷款模式对累计超额收益率的影响。通过将超额收益率对贷款模式及其他控制变量进行多元线性回归分析,意在找出不同贷款模式下银行具有不同监督效率的确切证据。此外,为进一步研究联合授信模式下影响银行监督效率的因素,本文在联合贷款公司子样本下,考察了联合贷款特征变量—牵头行的国有性质,牵头行承担的贷款金额占比对超额收益率的影响,从而进一步揭示了联合授信模式下各银行之间的作用关系及其对银行监督效率的影响。具体分析过程为：联合授信模式下的借贷关系本质上是一种共同代理关系,根据共同代理理论,银行之间的合作与共谋能发挥信息的规模优势,获得共同代理关系下的规模经济,使得银行更加有效的发挥其“大贷款人”的监督作用。但基于以下几个方面的原因,参与贷款的银行之间难以达成合作,一方面,银行之间的信息不对称程度不同以及不同的公司业绩评价标准限制了银行之间的合作,另一方面,无论是在授信前还是在授信后银行都会有强烈的“搭便车”动机。在授信前,银行自身实力的限制、地域的限制、公司的业务往来历史、其他银行的声誉等因素都会增加银行收集公司信息的成本,当银行对此成本无法负担或者银行放贷后的收益无法弥补此成本时,银行就会有强烈的动机“搭便车”。在授信后,银行监督活动的外部性也会导致银行的“搭便车”行为。最后,某些银行持有“大树底下好乘凉”的心态加上联合授信中的“羊群效应”会使得银行在对公司的放款上产生激烈竞争,银行之间的竞争性不仅削弱了公司向其提供相关信息的主动性,也会从心理上提升公司的谈判地位,强化公司进行信息操作、数据作假、谎报实情的动机。可见,在联合贷款模式下,银行之间的不合作不仅无助于改善银行与公司之间的信息不对称问题,还可能导致银行贷后监督活动的缺失、对公司的竞相放款以及公司的信息欺诈行为,产生额外的共同代理成本,降低银行的监督效率。因此,发布联合贷款公告后的公司其市场超额收益会更低。此外,在联合贷款模式下,国有银行因其雄厚的资金实力、专业的人才队伍、众多的营业网点以及完善的信息共享系统等原因,在对借款公司的贷前调查、信贷审核以及贷后监督方面比其他非国有银行更具优势,加之部分股份制银行进行贷前调查的能力有限或者成本过高,在决定是否放贷时具有强烈的动机“搭便车”,更有甚者,部分银行会看在国有银行的“面子”上,盲目对公司贷款而忽视了对公司真实风险的防范与控制。此外,牵头行承担较大的贷款份额也会导致其他银行的“搭便车”和竞争行为,并且公司的透明度与牵头行承担的贷款金额占比成反比,占比越高,公司透明度越低。因此,若牵头行是国有银行或承担了较大比例的贷款金额,联合授信模式下银行之间的“搭便车”以及竞争放款问题会更严重,产生的共同代理成本更高,其公告发布后公司的超额收益也相对更低。在上文的假设前提下,本文采用虚拟变量代表银行贷款模式并对事件窗内的累计超额收益进行回归分析,结果显示相比单一贷款,联合贷款公告发布后公司会获得较低的超额收益。为进一步找出联合贷款模式下影响超额收益率的因素,本文又将总样本公司分为了单一贷款子样本和联合贷款子样本,并在联合贷款子样本下,考察了牵头行的国有性质以及牵头行承担的贷款金额占比对公司超额收益的影响。结果显示,当牵头行的是国有银行或者承担了较大比例的贷款金额时,事件窗内的累计超额收益率会相对更低,相关证据均表明市场投资者认为在联合贷款模式下银行之间存在着“搭便车”以及竞争行为从而产生了共同代理成本,削弱了银行的监督效率。最后本文的创新之处在于：国内现有的研究联合贷款模式下银行监督效率问题的文献几乎没有,本文通过考察股票市场对不同贷款模式的不同反应反映联合授信模式的效率问题,并在此基础上进一步研究了联合授信模式下牵头行性质、承担的贷款金额占比对公司超额收益率的影响,试图找出影响银行监督效率的某些因素,据此判断联合授信模式下银行之间的作用关系。
[Abstract]:With the horizontal and vertical merger activities between enterprises more and more frequently, cross industry, cross regional management gradually become a trend of the future development of enterprises. The expansion of enterprises is not only accompanied by the expansion of human resources and the expansion of plant equipment, but also more important is the increase of financing demand. However, the limitation of China's capital market at the present stage is limited. The enterprise through bond financing or other direct financing channels to obtain the huge amount of funds needed to operate, and the traditional single bank one to one loan model is increasingly unable to meet the huge demand for capital. In this case, the multiple bank joint loan model and the syndicated loan model have been developed and developed rapidly. In the period of -2011 in 2005, the number of loans to many banks on the same day accounted for 17.9% of the total number of bank loans, and the amount of loans accounted for 49.8%. of the total bank loan amount.
In the relationship between enterprises and banks, banks and enterprises are mutual dependence and mutual promotion. On the one hand, banks will influence the business development of enterprises by relaxing or tightening credit funds: in the case of crisis in the capital chain, enterprises through bank loans through difficulties or leverage effect to increase the earnings of the company. On the other hand, borrowing Enterprises The good or bad business situation will have a great influence on the development of the bank. Whether the credit funds can be recovered and the income of the funds depends on the business performance and the future development of the enterprise. So, the bank will not only carry out sufficient credit investigation to the borrowing company before the credit, but strictly examine the credit conditions in the credit. Under the traditional single bank loan model, the asymmetric information between banks and companies is the key factor that restricts the efficiency of bank supervision. At the same time, at the same time, the bank has a large number of loans to a company. The problem of asymmetric information between banks and banks has a serious impact on the efficiency of the supervision of the banking system, and the interaction and consequences of the participants are more indeterminate, making the efficiency of the banking system more difficult to supervise. Therefore, when external investors try to obtain relevant information about corporate management, finance, and governance through the company's borrowing behavior, the information content or information quality transmitted by the joint loan behavior is largely different from the company's lending behavior under the single bank loan model. Information.
The company's announcement of bank loan will cause the change of the stock price of the company. This phenomenon has long been paid attention to and discussed by foreign scholars. By investigating the market reaction after the announcement, the supervision efficiency of the bank is also a kind of research method commonly used by scholars to study whether the bank has the supervision of "big creditors". As far as domestic research is concerned, Hu Yiming, Xie Shi Lei, Deng Li and Zhang Zongyi have all indicated that the Bank of our country has a certain supervisory role on the listed company. However, whether the supervision efficiency of the bank is different from the traditional single bank loan mode is different from the supervision efficiency of the bank under the mode of joint credit. By analyzing the effect of the loan model on the excess rate of return on the market, we can see the problem of the efficiency of the supervision of the bank. Is the relationship between banks cooperative or competitive under the mode of credit? Will the interaction between banks affect the efficiency of the bank's supervision and the extent of its impact? This is the focus of this study.
First of all, this paper studies the bank loan announcement issued by Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2011, and follows a certain principle to select 313 effective samples, including 56 joint loan samples and 257 single loan samples. Then this paper uses the event study method to carry out the market reaction caused by the bank loan announcement. The results show that the market has produced a strong response to the issue of issuing bank loan announcements for listed companies in China, and the stock price of listed companies is significantly different from 0 in the corresponding event window. The average excess rate of return and the cumulative excess rate of return and the overall response of the market are negative, which shows that the investors in our country consider the bank loan behavior as a "empty" event in the short term, which is different from the relevant empirical research results from foreign countries. In addition, in this study, the bank issued a loan announcement. The abnormal returns of the company's stock prices are basically around the first seventh days of the announcement day, and through a significant test, the relevant evidence shows that the loan information is likely to have been leaked ahead of time. There is a "information leakage" problem in the Chinese market. In addition, to investigate the excess earnings caused by the two different models of the loan announcement. Whether there is a significant difference in rate, this paper divides the total company sample into the joint loan subsample and the single loan subsample according to the loan model, and compares and analyses the average excess return and the cumulative excess yield of the two sub samples under different event windows. The results are as follows: the cumulative excess of two samples first in the whole event window. There is a significant decline in the amount of income, and the cumulative excess return of the joint loan subsample is greater than the decrease in the cumulative excess income of a single loan. To a certain extent, it seems to show that the market investors with a single bank loan appear to be more reluctant to recognize the company's joint bank lending behavior. The significant T test and symbol rank test are carried out on the difference of the cumulative excess rate of return of two subsamples in different event windows. The statistical results show that the difference of the cumulative excess rate of return of the two subsamples in some event windows (especially in the [-1,2] period before and after the announcement) has passed the significance of the confidence level of 5%. The test shows that the market reaction caused by different loan announcements is different.
Secondly, on the basis of controlling the characteristics of the company, the characteristics of the loan and the external environment related variables, this paper focuses on the effect of the loan model on the cumulative excess rate of return on the basis of obtaining the excess return on the bank loan announcement of the listed company. The purpose of this analysis is to find out the exact evidence that banks have different supervision efficiency under different loan modes. In addition, in order to further study the factors that affect the efficiency of the bank supervision under the joint credit mode, this paper examines the state-owned property of the joint loan characteristic variable, the lead bank, and the amount of the loan to take the lead under the joint loan company sub sample. The impact of the ratio on excess return, further reveals the role of banks in the joint credit mode and its impact on the efficiency of bank supervision.
The specific analysis process is: the loan relationship under the joint credit mode is a kind of common agency relationship in essence. According to the common agency theory, the cooperation and conspiracy among banks can play the advantage of the scale of information and obtain the economies of scale under the common agency relationship, making the banks more effective to play the supervision role of the "big lender". On the basis of the following reasons, there is no cooperation between the banks involved in the loan. On the one hand, the different degree of asymmetric information between banks and the different standards of corporate performance evaluation limit the cooperation between banks. On the other hand, there will be a strong "hitchhiking" motivation either before the credit or in the post credit bank. The bank will have a strong motivation "hitchhiking" when the bank's own strength constraints, regional restrictions, the company's business history, and other banks' reputation will increase the cost of the bank's collection of information. After the credit, the externality of the bank's supervisory activities also leads to the "hitchhiking" behavior of the bank. Finally, some banks hold the "good shade under the tree" plus the "herd effect" in the joint credit. The initiative of related information will also improve the company's negotiating position psychologically, strengthen the company's information manipulation, the false data, and lie the motive of the truth. In the joint loan model, the non cooperation between the banks will not only help to improve the information asymmetry between the banks and the companies, but also may lead to the supervision of the bank after the loan. The lack of movement, the company's competitive lenders and the company's information fraud, produce additional joint agency costs and reduce the efficiency of the bank's supervision. Therefore, the company's market excess returns will be lower after the release of the joint loan announcement.
In addition, under the joint loan model, the state-owned banks have more advantages on the loan companies' pre loan investigation, credit audit and post loan supervision than other non-state banks because of their strong capital strength, professional talent team, numerous business outlets and perfect information sharing system. The ability of the pre loan investigation is limited or the cost is too high. In deciding whether to lend or not, it has a strong motivation "hitchhiking". Even more, some banks will look at the "face" of the state-owned banks and blindly ignore and control the real risk of the company. Other banks' "hitchhiking" and competition behavior, and the company's transparency is inversely proportional to the amount of money taken by the lead bank, the higher the proportion, the lower the transparency of the company. Therefore, if the leading bank is a state-owned bank or a large proportion of the loan amount, the "hitchhiking" between the banks and the competition under the joint credit mode The issue will be more serious and the common agency cost will be higher. The excess return of the company will be relatively lower after the announcement.
On the premise of the above hypothesis, this paper uses the virtual variable to represent the bank loan model and regression analysis on the cumulative excess income in the event window. The results show that the company will get a lower excess return after the release of the joint loan announcement than the single loan. In this paper, the general Sample Firms is divided into single loan subsample and joint loan subsample, and under the joint loan sub sample, the influence of the state-owned property of the lead bank and the amount of the loan amount taken by the lead bank account for the excess earnings of the company. The result shows that the lead is the state-owned bank or the large proportion of the loan. In the amount of money, the cumulative excess rate of return in the event window is relatively lower. The evidence shows that the market investors believe that there is a "hitchhiker" and competitive behavior between banks under the joint loan model and thus produces a joint agency cost, which weakens the efficiency of the bank's supervision.
Finally, the innovation of this paper is that there is little literature in the current domestic research on the efficiency of bank supervision under the model of joint loan. This paper studies the efficiency of the joint credit mode by investigating the different response of the stock market to different loan modes, and on this basis, it studies the lead behavior of the joint credit model. Quality, the amount of loans undertaken accounted for the impact of the company's excess return, trying to identify the impact.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.4

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