地方政府官员晋升与商业银行中长期贷款集中行为研究

发布时间：2018-05-23 18:14

本文选题：官员晋升 + 中长期贷款集中　；参考：《广东商学院》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文试图通过基于地方政府官员晋升视角来讨论中长期贷款集中现象。从理论方面解释，通过建立“政治锦标赛”博弈模型来分析官员在辖区内有强烈的投资冲动；通过梳理地方政府官员与商业银行关系的变动来分析两者博弈从合作到不合作，再到合作；通过建立两期完美动态博弈模型分析商业银行基于个人利益最大化偏好政府项目贷款，相互竞争导致中长期贷款集中。实证方面解释，首先从人均GDP、人均财政收入、城镇登记失业率三个方面构建了官员晋升压力指数，并用K Mean聚类分析优化了压力指数。回归基本结果得出官员晋升压力使得辖区内中长期贷款占比增速升高约1.2个百分点。利用工具变量等工具对基本结果进行了稳健性检验，回归系数还是正数，两者正相关。进一步我们分地区讨论，东部地区的地方官员晋升压力对中长期贷款集中现象最有显著，西部次之，中部没有这样的影响；分官员年龄讨论，年龄60的省委书记省长推动更多地政府项目中长期贷款，这样的影响因子为0.567；分官员任期讨论，任期4的地方官员压力指数与中长期贷款正相关，影响因子为0.415，但是没有通过显著性检验。因此，为“短期增长而竞争”政治锦标赛的激励机制是中长期贷款集中的一个因素。
[Abstract]:This paper attempts to discuss the phenomenon of medium and long-term loan concentration from the perspective of promotion of local government officials. From the theoretical point of view, through the establishment of the "political Championship" game model to analyze the strong investment impulse of officials in the jurisdiction, by combing the changes of the relationship between local government officials and commercial banks to analyze the game from cooperation to non-cooperation. Then to cooperation; through the establishment of two perfect dynamic game model to analyze commercial banks based on personal interest maximization preference for government project loans, mutual competition leads to the concentration of medium- and long-term loans. The empirical analysis shows that the pressure index of official promotion is constructed from three aspects: per capita GDP, per capita financial income and urban registered unemployment rate, and the pressure index is optimized by K Mean cluster analysis. Returns to the basic results show that the official promotion pressure in the area of medium-and long-term loan growth rate increased by about 1.2 percentage points. The robustness test of the basic results is carried out by means of tools such as tool variables. The regression coefficient or positive number is positively correlated with each other. Further, we discuss by region, the promotion pressure of local officials in the eastern region has the most significant effect on the phenomenon of medium- and long-term loan concentration, followed by the western region, and there is no such effect in the central region. The governor, secretary of the provincial party committee of 60, pushed for more long-term loans for government projects, which has an impact factor of 0.567.The term of office of the official is discussed, and the local official pressure index for the fourth term is positively related to the medium- and long-term loans. The influence factor was 0.415, but the significance test was not passed. Thus, the incentive to compete for short-term growth at the political championships is a factor in the concentration of medium-to-long-term loans.
【学位授予单位】：广东商学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.4;D630.3;F224.32

【参考文献】