机构投资者持股差异性对公司治理水平影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-01 06:31

本文选题：机构投资者 + 持股差异性　；参考：《东北大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着我国经济的飞速发展和资本市场体制的不断完善,在监管层的政策引导下,机构投资者在投资主体、持股比例、管理规模及运行模式方面都取得了长足发展,逐渐成为我国资本市场重要的投资力量。随着持股比例的攀升和市场参与程度的深化,机构投资者在公司治理机制中的作用也受到了市场各方及理论界的广泛关注。一部分学者认为,机构投资者具有雄厚的资金、专业的投资决策体系及成熟的投资理念,是破解公司治理困境、优化公司治理结构不可忽视的外部力量。而部分学者的研究结论却表明,机构投资者持股刺激了管理层的短视行为,增加了公司的管理风险,阻碍了公司治理的持续发展。面对机构投资者持股与公司治理两种相反的研究结论,本文结合我国上市公司治理背景及机构投资者发展现状,在机构投资者分类的基础上,以持股比例为依据计量上市公司中机构持股差异性,实证研究机构投资者持股及其差异性对上市公司治理水平的影响有重要意义。本文首先分析了我国上市公司治理存在的问题及我国机构投资者的发展现状,然后从宏观及微观两个方面解析影响机构投资者行为决策的因素,并以机构投资者持股比例、集中度、稳定性为依据,采用因子分析对机构持股进行合理划分,最后以CCGI为公司治理水平的代理变量,选择我国A股上市公司2009-2011年的数据为研究样本,实证探究机构投资者持股差异对公司治理的影响,以及我国机构投资者的角色定位问题。研究结果表明,有机构持股的上市公司治理水平显著高于没有机构持股的上市公司；我国资本市场上的机构投资者有积极和消极之分,机构投资者积极持股显著提升了公司治理水平,而消极持股却阻碍了公司治理的完善；此外,本文的研究还表明,机构投资者的行为效果不仅受外部环境的制约,也会受其持股特征的影响,且机构投资者更倾向于选择投资于治理水平高的公司。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of China's economy and the continuous improvement of the capital market system, institutional investors have made great progress in investment subject, shareholding ratio, management scale and operation mode under the guidance of regulatory policy. Gradually become our country's capital market important investment strength. With the increase of shareholding ratio and the deepening of market participation, the role of institutional investors in the corporate governance mechanism has been widely concerned by market parties and theorists. Some scholars believe that institutional investors with strong funds, professional investment decision-making system and mature investment concept are the external forces that can not be ignored to solve the corporate governance dilemma and optimize the corporate governance structure. However, some scholars' conclusions show that institutional investors' shareholding stimulates the short-sighted behavior of management, increases the risk of management, and hinders the sustainable development of corporate governance. In the face of the two opposite conclusions of institutional investor ownership and corporate governance, this paper combines the background of corporate governance and the development of institutional investors in China, based on the classification of institutional investors. Based on the measurement of institutional shareholding differences in listed companies, it is of great significance to empirically study the influence of institutional investors' shareholdings and their differences on the governance level of listed companies. This paper first analyzes the problems existing in the governance of listed companies in China and the development status of institutional investors in China, and then analyzes the factors that affect the behavior decisions of institutional investors from the macro and micro aspects, and takes the shareholding ratio of institutional investors. On the basis of concentration and stability, we use factor analysis to divide institutional shareholding reasonably. Finally, taking CCGI as the agent variable of corporate governance level, we select the data of China A-share listed companies from 2009-2011 as the research sample. This paper explores the impact of institutional investors' shareholding differences on corporate governance and the role of institutional investors in China. The results show that the governance level of listed companies with institutional shareholding is significantly higher than that of listed companies without institutional shareholding, and there are positive and negative categories of institutional investors in China's capital market. Institutional investors actively hold shares significantly improve the level of corporate governance, while negative holdings hinder the improvement of corporate governance. In addition, the study of this paper also shows that the behavior of institutional investors is not only restricted by the external environment. They are also influenced by their shareholding characteristics, and institutional investors are more likely to invest in companies with high governance levels.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51;F271

【共引文献】